The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws; and they agree … the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe. … Souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or motions. And the two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with one another.
The Argument from Psychophysical Harmony
From the striking "fit" between our conscious experiences and our physical states — pain feeling bad and driving us to avoid harm — to God. A very recent argument (Cutter & Crummett), with a forerunner in Leibniz's pre-established harmony. The modern material is under copyright: summarized here and linked.
The Argument
The numbered form is ours, after Brian Cutter & Dustin Crummett, "Psychophysical Harmony: A New Argument for Theism" (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 11, 2025) — the words themselves are the philosophers', below.
- P1 Our conscious experiences are harmonious with our physical states — what we feel fits what our bodies do, what we perceive, and what we truthfully report.
- P2 On a mindless view of reality the laws pairing experience with brain-state could have been almost anything, and the overwhelming majority of them would be discordant — so this harmony is enormously improbable if no mind stands behind it. the hinge
- P3 This harmony is just what a good God would set up, so it is far more probable on theism.
- Therefore psychophysical harmony is strong evidence that God exists — evidence, again, not proof.
The sources
Argument hinges on:
That the harmony is improbable without a mind On a mindless view of reality the laws pairing experience with brain-state could have been almost anything, and the overwhelming majority of them would be discordant — so this harmony is enormously improbable if no mind stands behind it. What does that mean?
The puzzle is old. Leibniz was struck that mind and body run in perfect step — the soul "acting according to the laws of final causes," the body "according to the laws of efficient causes," yet the two "in harmony with one another" — and he could explain it only by a harmony God had established between them in advance. The modern argument strips away Leibniz's particular metaphysics and turns the harmony itself into evidence.
Consider pain. It feels a certain awful way, and it also makes you withdraw, guard the injury, and remember the danger. Notice these are two different facts: the felt quality, and the behaviour. There seems no necessity that the state driving avoidance should feel bad rather than good — a creature might have been built so that pleasure made it flee and agony drew it in, or so that its inner life had no bearing on its actions at all. Across the space of possible mind-body laws, harmony like ours is a vanishingly rare exception. Yet we have it, top to bottom: our experiences match our behaviour, our senses match the world, our reports match our experiences.
On theism this is expected: a good God, making conscious creatures, would pair their inner lives with their bodies well — pain with harm, pleasure with flourishing, perception with truth. On a mindless naturalism there is no such steering; the psychophysical laws are simply brute, and brute laws had every chance of being discordant. Something enormously improbable on one view and expected on the other has, its defenders argue, turned out exactly as the God-view predicts.
Two objections carry the weight. The first is functionalism: if a mental state simply IS its functional role — if to be pain just is to be the state that does what pain does — then harmony is automatic, not a lucky match, and there is no gap to explain. The second, pressed by Graham Oppy and others, is that even if harmony needs explaining, a good God is only one of several "value-oriented" explanations, so the argument may reach a benevolent ground of things without reaching the full God of theism. How much survives these is exactly what the current debate — all of it recent, and under copyright — is about.
Written for this library — not a quoted source. It reports how the premise is argued and answered; the philosophers' own words are above.
Accept that the harmony needs explaining, and — Oppy's reply runs — a personal God is only one of several value-oriented explanations; an impersonal principle by which reality tends toward the good would do as well, so the argument may reach less than the full God of theism.
Graham Oppy; the axiarchist alternatives ↗
Deny that the harmony is contingent — hold with the functionalist that a mental state just is its causal role, so pain could not have felt otherwise while doing pain's job — and the argument dissolves; but many hold that consciousness is more than its function, and that how things feel is a further fact the role does not fix.
functionalism; critics of the harmony framing ↗
Where it leads
Accept that the harmony is improbable without a mind behind reality, and this argument raises the probability of a mind behind reality — offered as evidence, not as proof.
Beyond the public domain
The modern revivals and their critics are under copyright, so we don't host them — the reading doesn't stop at the public-domain record. Follow it at the sources:
You have read the premise and the cost of each move. The library draws no conclusion. No objection to it is hosted here yet.