Thomas Aquinas

Above he set down three things pertaining to a high priest, and showed that two of them belong to Christ, namely the office, and the manner of arriving at it; here he pursues the third, namely the devotion and mercy which a high priest ought to have. And concerning this he does two things. First he shows that which he suffered; second, what benefit followed even for others, at the words "and being made perfect."

He says then: I have said that a high priest must be such that he can suffer with others. And Christ is such. For since he is the Son of God from eternity, and according to this he could neither suffer nor suffer with others, he assumed a nature in which he could suffer, and thus could also suffer with others. And this is what he says: that though he was the Son of God, namely from eternity, he learned obedience in time.

On the contrary. To learn belongs to one who is ignorant; but Christ, from eternity as God, and from the instant of his conception as man, had the fullness of knowledge; therefore he was ignorant of nothing, and consequently did not learn.

I answer. It must be said that knowledge is twofold: namely, of simple awareness, and it is with respect to this that the argument proceeds, namely, that he was ignorant of nothing. There is also knowledge of experience, and it is according to this that he learned obedience. Hence he says he learned from the things he suffered, that is, he experienced them. And the Apostle speaks in this way: because one who has learned something has come to know it voluntarily. But Christ voluntarily took on our weakness. And therefore he says that he learned obedience, that is, how heavy a thing it is to obey: because he himself obeyed in the heaviest and most difficult things, since even unto the death of the cross, Phil. II, 8. And here he shows how difficult the good of obedience is. For those who have not experienced obedience, and have not learned it in difficult matters, believe that to obey is very easy. But in order that you may know what obedience is, it is necessary that you learn to obey in difficult matters, and one who has not learned, by obeying, to be subject, never knows how, by commanding, to be well set over others. Christ, therefore, although from eternity he knew by simple awareness what obedience is, nevertheless learned obedience by experience from the things he suffered, that is, difficult things, namely through his passion and death. Rom. V, 19: through the obedience of one, many were made just.

Then, when he says "and being made perfect," etc., he shows the fruit of the passion, which was twofold. One in Christ, the other in his members. In Christ the fruit was glorification, and therefore he says "and being made perfect." For from the instant of his conception he was made perfectly complete as to the beatitude of his soul, insofar as it was borne toward God; yet nevertheless he had the passibility of nature. But after the passion he had impassibility. And therefore, because according to this he is wholly perfect, it belongs to him to perfect others. For this is the nature of what is perfect, that it can generate something like itself. And therefore he says that he is made perfect. For it was through the merit of obedience that he arrived at this consummation. Prov. XXI, 28: "the obedient man speaks of victories" — he was made, for all who obey him, the cause of salvation, not temporal, but eternal. Is. XLV, 17: "Israel is saved in the Lord with an eternal salvation." And therefore he says, "called by God high priest according to the order of Melchisedech," and this has been explained above.

Then when he says "concerning whom we have great things to say," etc., he prepares the minds of his hearers for what follows, which is to be said about the priesthood of Christ. And concerning this he does two things. First he shows their slowness; second, his own intention, when he says, in chapter VI, "Wherefore leaving." Again the first part is divided into two, because first he shows their slowness; second he shows that it is culpable, at the place, "for whereas you ought." Likewise concerning the first part he does two things: first he shows the greatness of what is to be said; second, their slowness in grasping it, at the place, "since you have become weak."

He says then: I have said that he was called high priest, concerning whom, namely concerning his priesthood, we have a great discourse, because it concerns great things. Prov. VIII, 6: "I shall speak of great things." Again, it is great because it concerns something useful, namely the salvation of souls. I Tim. I, 15: "A faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners." This discourse is "interpretable" for teaching, which can be expounded in two ways. Either the force there is negative: "interpretable," that is, not expoundable, because it cannot be expounded perfectly. For no discourse can express the things that pertain to Christ. Eccli. XLIII, 32ff: "Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, his magnificence will still surpass and be wonderful: blessing the Lord, exalt him as much as you can, for he is greater than all praise." In another way, affirmatively: "interpretable," that is, needing interpretation on account of its height and greatness and depth. Prov. I, 6: "he will attend to the parable and the interpretation," et cetera. For the interpretation of Scripture is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, I Cor. XII, 10. It also needs to have its interpretation given on account of our slowness. And therefore he adds their very slowness, when he says, "since you have become weak in hearing." Those who are of weak understanding cannot grasp lofty things unless they are explained to them point by point. Jn. XVI, 12: "I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now." I Cor. III, 1: "I could not speak to you as unto spiritual men," et cetera.

Then when he says "for whereas you ought," he shows that this slowness is culpable. And concerning this he does three things: first he shows the fault of their slowness; second he applies a comparison, at the place, "and you have become"; third he explains it, at the place, "for everyone who is a partaker of milk."

For it is someone's fault when, having heard for a long time, he is still slow; but it is otherwise if he is a new hearer. For negligence is not without fault. Therefore he says, "whereas you ought to be teachers," namely of others, on account of the time during which they had heard the law and the prophets. Jn. V, 39: "Search the Scriptures," et cetera. Likewise, Christ himself. Likewise, the apostles, and many converted by them. Jn. XIV, 9: "So long a time am I with you, and you have not known me." "Again you need" — as if he were to say: you ought rather to teach than to be taught, yet you need to be taught what the elements of the beginning of the words of God are. For "elements" are called those things which are first handed on in grammar, when they are set down as to letters; for these are the letters themselves. The beginnings, therefore, of the words of God, and the first principles and elements, are the articles of faith and the precepts of the Decalogue. Whoever, then, had studied theology for a long time and did not know these things, time would run against him. Therefore he says, "you need to be taught what the elements of the beginning of the words of God are," that is, the first principles. II Tim. III, 7: "always learning, and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth." Is. LXV, 20: "the child of a hundred years shall die, the sinner of a hundred years shall be accursed."

Then when he says "and you have become," he sets down a comparison for this. It must be known, then, that sacred doctrine is like food for the soul. Eccli. XV, 3: "he fed him with the bread of life and understanding." And XXIV, 29: "they that eat me shall yet hunger: and they that drink me shall yet thirst." Sacred doctrine, then, is food and drink, because it gives the soul drink and satisfies it. For other sciences only illumine the intellect, but this illumines the soul. Ps. XVIII, 8: "the commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." And it also nourishes and strengthens the soul. But in bodily food there is a difference. For children use one food, and the mature another. For children use milk, as being more delicate and connatural, and easily converted, but adults use more solid food. So in sacred Scripture, those who are newly beginning ought to hear light things, which are as it were milk; but the learned ought to hear stronger things. And therefore he says, "you have become such as have need of milk," namely like children. I Pet. II, 2: "as newborn babes, desire the rational milk without guile," et cetera. I Cor. III, 1f: "as unto little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, not meat," and this is what follows, "not with solid food," that is, lofty doctrine, which is about the hidden and secret things of God, which confirm and strengthen.

Then when he says "for everyone who is a partaker of milk," he explains the comparison, and first he explains what he said about milk; second, what he said about solid food, at the place, "but solid food is for the perfect." Concerning the first he does two things; first he sets down the explanation; second, the reason for the explanation, at the place, "for he is a little one."

He says then: I say this, that you need milk like children, for everyone who is a partaker of milk is unskillful in the word of justice, that is, everyone who needs to be nourished with milk is unskillful, that is, cannot have a part in perfectly understanding the words of justice. Matt. V, 20: "unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes." Prov. XV, 5: "in abundant justice there is the greatest strength." But children are not partakers of things of this kind. Is. XXVIII, 9: "whom shall he teach knowledge, or whom shall he make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts."

But on the contrary: because the Apostle above handed on to them many very difficult things, namely concerning the mystery of the Trinity and the sacrament of the Incarnation, and many other arduous things; therefore either they were not little ones, or such things are to be handed on to little ones.

I answer. It must be said, according to Augustine, that it is not to be understood that in the doctrine of faith some things are to be handed on to the greater and perfect, and other things to the imperfect. For this difference does not exist between them. For the same things are to be handed on to both, but to little ones they are to be proposed, but not expounded nor treated at length, because their understanding would rather fail than be raised up. Milk, according to the Gloss, is like: "the Word was made flesh."

On the contrary. To understand this is of no less difficulty than how the Word was with God. Hence Augustine says that this is found in the books of Plato, but not that. But Augustine himself could not even suspect what mystery was contained in: "the Word was made flesh."

I answer. It must be said that to know "the Word was made flesh" by simple faith is easy enough, because it can fall under the imagination and in some way under sense; but "the Word was with God" altogether exceeds every sense, and can be comprehended only by reason, and with much and the greatest difficulty.

Consequently he assigns the reason, when he says, "for he is a little one" — not indeed in age, but in sense. Now someone is called a little one in three ways. For someone is a little one through humility, Matt. XI, 25: "you have revealed these things to little ones"; in age, Gal. IV, 1: "as long as the heir is a little one," et cetera; in sense, I Cor. XIV, 20: "do not become children in sense, but in malice be children, and in sense be perfect." And it is in this way that "little one" is taken here.

Then when he says "but solid food is for the perfect," he explains what he had said about solid food. For this is evident in bodily things, that when a man arrives at a mature age, he uses stronger and nobler and more solid food. So the spiritual man, when he arrives at spiritual perfection, ought to have a more solid doctrine proposed to him. But this perfection is twofold: one is perfection according to the intellect, when someone has judgment of intellect to rightly discern and judge concerning the things proposed to him. The other is perfection according to affection, which charity produces, which is when someone wholly clings to God. Hence Matt. V, 48, after the precepts of charity, it is said, "be you therefore perfect," et cetera. But the perfection of charity, as Augustine says, is where there is no covetousness. For the more someone ascends into God, the more he despises temporal things. Ps. LXXII, 24: "for what have I in heaven," et cetera. For the doctrine of sacred Scripture has this, that in it are handed on not only things to be contemplated, as in geometry, but also things to be approved through affection. Hence Matt. V, 19: "but he that shall do and teach," et cetera. In other sciences, then, it suffices that a man be perfect according to intellect; but in this one it is required that he be perfect according to both intellect and affection.

Lofty mysteries, then, are to be spoken to the perfect. I Cor. II, 6: "we speak wisdom among the perfect." For each one judges according to how he is disposed; just as an angry man judges one way while the passion lasts, and another way once it ceases. And likewise the incontinent man judges something to be good in one way during the time of passion, and in another way afterward. And therefore the Philosopher says that as each one is, such does the end appear to him. And because the things handed on in sacred Scripture pertain to affection, and not only to intellect, therefore it is necessary to be perfect in both. And therefore the Apostle, wishing to show who are the perfect, to whom this solid food is to be handed on, says that they are those who, by their custom, have senses exercised.

Hence in this perfection four things are to be attended to: namely, the perfection itself, in what it consists — and as to this he says, "who have senses exercised." And he speaks fittingly. For in this he expresses both perfections, because (as the Philosopher says) the intellect, insofar as it judges concerning things to be desired and done, is called sense, because it is referred to something particular; hence "sense" is not taken here for exterior sense. He, then, who has a sense for the things that are of God, is perfect. Phil. III, 15: "as many as are perfect, let us be of this sense." I Cor. II, 16: "but we have the sense of Christ." But those who have a sense only for carnal things cannot please God, as is evident from Rom. VIII, 8.

Second, the disposition of the one in whom it is, is to be attended to, because he ought to be exercised. I Tim. IV, 7: "exercise thyself unto godliness." For he who is not exercised cannot have the right judgment which is required for this. Eccli. XXXIV, 9: "a man that has had experience in many things will think of many things." Likewise, he who has not had experience recognizes few things.

Third, the cause of this exercise is custom — not, namely, idleness, but frequency of act. And therefore he says, "by custom," namely of acting rightly. Prov. XXII, 6: "a young man according to his way, even when he is old he will not depart from it." If, then, you wish to be perfect, do not give yourself to idleness, but accustom yourself to good things from your youth.

Fourth, the end of this exercise, namely because it is for the discernment of good and evil. For he is then perfect, when he discerns between good and evil. Is. VII, 15: "that he may know to choose the good, and refuse the evil." But these are three: namely, discernment between good and evil, between good and better, between evil and worse. For there are many things which seem good, and yet are evil. Prov. XIV, 12: "there is a way which seems right to a man, but its ends lead to Hell." In these things, then, rightness of judgment is required.