Thomas Aquinas

Above, the Apostle showed in many ways the excellence of Christ, preferring him to the Angels, to Moses, and to Aaron, and admonished the faithful that they ought to be joined to Christ himself. And because this joining comes about chiefly and initially through faith — Eph. 3:17: that Christ may dwell through faith in your hearts — the Apostle therefore proceeds to the commendation of faith.

And concerning this he does three things: first, he describes faith; second, he sets down various examples of it, at the words "for in this"; third, he exhorts them to the things that belong to faith, in chapter 12, at the words "therefore you... so great." Chapter, at the words "therefore you... so great." He sets down the definition of faith completely, indeed, but obscurely.

Hence it must be known that one wishing to define perfectly any virtue must touch upon its proper matter, that with which it is concerned, and its end, because a habit is known through its act, and an act through its object. And therefore it is necessary to touch upon the act, and its order to the object and the end. Thus one wishing to define fortitude must touch upon its proper matter, that with which it is concerned, namely fears and acts of daring, and its end, namely the good of the commonwealth, so that it may be said that fortitude is the virtue that moderates these, for the sake of the good of the commonwealth. But since faith, a theological virtue, has the same thing for its object and its end, namely God: first, therefore, he sets down the order and the end; second, the proper matter, at the words "the evidence of things not appearing."

But it must be known that the act of faith is to believe, which is an act of the intellect determined to one thing, at the command of the will. Hence to believe is to think something with assent, as Augustine says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints. And therefore the object of faith and the end of the will must correspond to each other. Now the First Truth is the object of faith, in which indeed the end of the will consists, namely beatitude, which exists differently in the wayfaring state and in the fatherland; because in the wayfaring state the First Truth is not possessed, and consequently not seen either — since, in those things that are above the soul, to see and to have are the same, as Augustine says in the 73 Questions — but it is only hoped for. Rom. 8, Questions, but it is only hoped for. Rom. 8, v. 25, 24: for what we do not see, we hope for. For what a man sees, why does he hope for it? Therefore the First Truth, not seen but hoped for, is the end of the will in the wayfaring state, and consequently the object of faith, since the same thing serves it as end and as object.

But the last end simply of faith itself in the fatherland, which we intend from faith, is beatitude, which consists in the open vision of God. John 17:3: this is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, etc. And 20:29: blessed are they who have not seen and have believed. And such is the hope of the faithful. 1 Peter 1:3: he has regenerated us unto a living hope. The end of faith in the wayfaring state, therefore, is the attainment of the thing hoped for, namely eternal beatitude. And therefore he says "of things to be hoped for."

But here it is asked why, since faith is prior to hope, it is defined through hope; for the posterior ought to be defined through the prior, and not the reverse. I respond. It must be said that the solution is clear from what has already been said, because it has been said that the object and the end of faith are the same. Since, therefore, the attainment of the thing hoped for is its end, it must also be its object. Now it was said above that every habit ought to be defined through the order of its act to its object. But the true and the good, although considered in themselves they are convertible as to their supposits, nevertheless, insofar as they differ in notion, stand toward one another in a different order; for the true is a certain good, and the good is a certain true. And likewise the intellect and the will, which are distinguished according to the distinction of the true and the good, have between themselves a different order. For insofar as the intellect apprehends truth and whatever is contained in it, thus the true is a certain good, and thus the good is under the true. But insofar as the will moves, thus the true is under the good. In the order of knowing, therefore, the intellect is prior, but in the order of moving the will is prior. Since, then, the intellect is moved to the act of faith at the command of the will, as has been said, in the order of moving the will is prior. Therefore the prior is not defined through the posterior; because, as has been said, in the definition of faith it is necessary to set down the order of the act to the object, which is the same as the end. But the end and the good are the same, as is held in Physics 2. But in order to the good the will — of which hope is as of its subject — is prior. But why does he not say "of things to be loved," but "of things to be hoped for"? The reason is that charity is of things present and things absent. Since, then, the end not yet possessed is the object of faith, therefore he says "of things to be hoped for." Nor does it stand in the way that the thing to be hoped for is the object of hope. Because it is necessary that faith, as to an end, be ordered to the object of those virtues by which the will is perfected, since faith belongs to the intellect insofar as it is commanded by the will. But since faith is one — because a habit is called one from the unity of its object — why is it not said "of the thing to be hoped for," but "of the things to be hoped for"?

I respond. It must be said that beatitude, which in itself is essentially one — because it consists in the vision of God, which in itself is one — is the principle and root from which many goods are derived, which are contained under it: such as the endowments of the body, the fellowship of the saints, and many other things. In order to show, then, that all these things pertain to faith, he speaks in the plural.

Now that word which is said, "substance," can be expounded in many ways. In one way, causally, and then it has a twofold sense. One, that it is substance — that is, making the things hoped for stand under in us — which it does in two ways. In one way, as it were by meriting. For from the fact that a man takes his intellect captive and submits it to the things of faith, he merits that he may at some time arrive at seeing that which he hopes for. For vision is the wage of faith. In another way, as it were, by its own property it makes present, so that what is believed to be future in reality is in some way already possessed, provided that one believes in God. In another way substance can be expounded essentially, as though faith were the substance — that is, the essence — of the things to be hoped for. Hence in the Greek it reads hypostasis of the things to be hoped for.

For the essence of beatitude is nothing other than the vision of God. John 17:3: this is eternal life, that they may know thee the only true God, etc. Hence in On the Trinity, chapter 10, Augustine says: this contemplation is promised to us as the end of all actions, etc. The full vision of God itself, therefore, is the essence of beatitude. Now we see this in the liberal sciences, that if anyone wishes to learn one of them, he must first receive its principles, which he must believe when they are handed on to him by a teacher. For it is necessary that one who is learning should believe, as is held in Posterior Analytics 1. And in those principles the whole science is in a certain way contained, just as conclusions are in the premises, and effects in the cause. He, therefore, who has the principles of that science has its substance — for instance, of geometry. And if geometry were the essence of beatitude, he who had the principles of geometry would have, in a certain way, the substance of beatitude. But our faith is that we believe that the blessed will see and enjoy God. And therefore, if we wish to arrive at this, we must believe the principles of this knowledge. And these are the articles of faith, which contain the whole sum of this science, because the vision of God, three and one, makes us blessed. And this is one article. Hence we believe this, and therefore he says "the substance of things to be hoped for." 1 Cor. 13:12: we see now through a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face; as if he were to say: then we shall be blessed when we shall see face to face that which we now see through a glass and in a dark manner. In these words, therefore, the order of the act of faith to the end is shown, because faith is ordered to the things to be hoped for as a kind of beginning, in which the whole is contained as it were essentially, just as conclusions are in principles.

Next, when he says "the evidence of things not appearing," he touches upon the act of faith with respect to its proper matter. But the proper act of faith, although it is ordered to the will, as has been said, nevertheless is in the intellect as in a subject, because its object is the true, which properly belongs to the intellect. But in the acts of the intellect there is a difference. For some are habits of the intellect which carry with them a certitude of every kind, unto the complete vision of that which is understood, as is clear regarding understanding, which is the habit of first principles; for he who understands that every whole is greater than its part sees this, and is certain. This also the habit of science does; and thus such a habit — understanding and science — produce certitude and vision. But there are certain others which produce neither, namely doubt and opinion. Faith, however, holds a middle place between these, because it has been said that faith produces assent in the intellect, which can happen in two ways. In one way, because the intellect is moved to assent by the evidence of the object, which is knowable through itself, as in the habit of principles, or known through something else which is knowable through itself, as is clear in the science of astronomy. In another way, one assents to something not because of the evidence of the object, by which he is not moved sufficiently; hence he is not certain, but either doubts — namely, when he has no more reason for one side than for the other — or holds an opinion, if indeed he has a reason for one side, though it does not entirely set him at rest, but leaves him with a fear of the opposite. But faith is simply neither of these, because it is neither evident to itself as with the first, nor does it doubt as with the last two, but it is determined to one side with a certain certitude and firm adherence, through a kind of voluntary choice. And divine authority produces this choice, through which choice the intellect is determined, so that it firmly adheres to the things of faith, and assents to them most certainly. And therefore to believe is to know with assent.

The proper matter of the habit of faith, therefore, is things not appearing. For things that appear have recognition, but not faith, as Gregory says. But the act of faith is a certain adherence, which the Apostle calls "evidence," taking the cause for the effect, because evidence produces faith concerning a doubtful matter. For evidence is a reason producing faith concerning a doubtful matter, as Boethius says. Or if we follow the etymology of the name by which it is called "argumentum," as it were arguing the mind, then he takes the effect for the cause, because from the certainty of the thing it comes about that the mind is compelled to assent. Hence "evidence" is said "of things not appearing," that is, a certain apprehension of those things which one does not see.

But if anyone wishes to reduce these words to their proper form, he could say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to things not appearing. For where we have "evidence," another text has "conviction," because through divine authority the intellect is convinced to assent to those things which it does not see. It is clear, therefore, that the Apostle defines faith completely, although obscurely. For by this definition faith is distinguished from all things that pertain to the intellect. For by the fact that it is called "evidence," faith is distinguished from opinion, doubt, and suspicion, because through these a firm adherence of the intellect to something is not had. But by the fact that it is called "of things not appearing," it is distinguished from the habit of principles and from science. And by the fact that it is called "of things to be hoped for," it is distinguished from faith taken commonly, which is not ordered to beatitude. For through its proper definition each thing becomes known, and is distinguished from any other, as is the case here. Hence also all the others are reduced to this one.

But it seems that he speaks wrongly in saying "of things not appearing," because, as it is said in John 20:28, Thomas saw and believed. Likewise we believe that God is one, which nevertheless is demonstrated by the philosophers. I respond. It must be said that faith is taken in two ways. In one way, properly, and thus it is of things not seen and not known, as is clear from what has been said. And for this reason, because a greater certitude cannot be had of a conclusion than of the principle from which it is drawn — since principles are always better known than conclusions — therefore, since the principles of faith do not have evidence, neither, consequently, do its conclusions. And therefore the intellect does not assent to the conclusions as to things known, nor as to things seen. In another way, commonly, and thus it excludes every certain knowledge; and thus Augustine speaks in Questions on the Gospel, that faith is concerning certain things which are seen. But the Apostle speaks of the first.

And indeed concerning Thomas it must be said that, as Gregory says, he saw one thing and believed another, because he saw the humanity, and believed the divinity. To that objection about demonstration, it must be said that nothing prevents a thing from being seen by one which is believed by another, as is clear in different states. For what is not seen in the wayfaring state is seen in the fatherland. Hence what I believe, an Angel sees. Likewise, what was seen by the prophets — as that God is one and incorporeal — this is to be believed by the unlearned, just as the unlearned man believes the eclipse which the astronomer sees. And of such things there is faith only in a qualified sense. But there are certain things which simply exceed the state of the present wayfaring life, and of such things there is faith simply.