Thomas Aquinas

The Evangelist John, as has been said, principally intends to show the divinity of the incarnate Word; and therefore this Gospel is divided into two parts. For first he intimates Christ's divinity; second he makes it manifest through the things which Christ did in the flesh, and this at the second chapter: "and on the third day." Concerning the first he does two things. First he sets forth Christ's divinity; second he sets down the manner in which Christ's divinity became known to us, there: "and we saw his glory," etc. Concerning the first he does two things. First he treats of the divinity of Christ; second of the incarnation of the Word of God, there: "there was a man sent from God." But because in each thing two things are to be considered, namely being and operation, or its power, therefore first he treats of the being of the Word as to the divine nature; second of its power, or operation, there: "all things were made through him." Concerning the first he does four things. First he shows when the Word was, because "in the beginning was the Word"; second where it was, because "with God"; whence he says, "and the Word was with God"; third what it was, because God; whence he adds, "and the Word was God"; fourth how it was, because "this was in the beginning with God." The first two pertain to the question "whether it is"; but the second two pertain to the question "what it is."

Now concerning the first, we must see what this is which is said, "in the beginning was the Word." Here three things concur that must be diligently inquired into, according to the three terms of this sentence. And first, what this is which is said, "Word"; second, what this is which is said, "in the beginning"; third, what this is which is said, "the Word was in the beginning."

Now for the understanding of this name "Word," it must be known that, according to the Philosopher, the things which are in the voice are signs of the affections which are in the soul. But it is customary in Scripture that the things signified are named by the names of the signs, as that in 1 Corinthians 10:4: "and the rock was Christ." Now of necessity it is required that that intrinsic thing of our soul, which is signified by our exterior word, be called a word. But whether the name "word" belongs first to the thing uttered by the exterior voice, or to the conception of the mind itself, is of no importance for the present. Yet it is plain that that which is signified by the voice, existing interiorly in the soul, is prior to the word itself uttered by the exterior voice, inasmuch as it exists as its cause. If therefore we wish to know what the interior word of the mind is, let us see what that signifies which is uttered by the exterior voice.

Now in our intellect there are three things: namely the very power of the intellect; the species of the thing understood, which is its form, standing to the intellect itself as the species of color stands to the pupil; and, third, the very operation of the intellect, which is to understand. But none of these is signified by the word uttered by the exterior voice. For this name "stone" does not signify the substance of the intellect, because this is not what the one naming intends to say; nor does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this too is not the intention of the one naming; nor does it signify the very act of understanding, since to understand is not an action proceeding outward from the one understanding, but remaining in him. That therefore is properly called the interior word, which the one understanding forms in understanding. Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. For according to its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; but according to its operation by which it composes and divides, it forms an enunciation, or something of this kind. And therefore, that which is thus formed and expressed through the operation of the intellect, whether defining or enunciating, is signified by the exterior voice. Whence the Philosopher says that the notion which a name signifies is the definition. This therefore thus expressed, namely formed in the soul, is called the interior word; and therefore it is compared to the intellect not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands; because in this thing expressed and formed it sees the nature of the thing understood. Thus therefore we have the signification of this name "Word."

Second, from the things which have been said, we can conceive that a word is always something proceeding from an intellect existing in act. Again, that a word is always the notion and likeness of the thing understood. And if indeed the one understanding and the thing understood are the same, then the word is the notion and likeness of the intellect from which it proceeds; but if the one understanding and the thing understood are different, then the word is not the likeness and notion of the one understanding, but of the thing understood: as the conception which someone has of a stone is the likeness of the stone only, but when the intellect understands itself, then such a word is the likeness and notion of the intellect. And therefore Augustine places the likeness of the Trinity in the soul according as the mind understands itself, but not according as it understands other things. It is clear therefore that in every intellectual nature it is necessary to posit a word: because it belongs to the very notion of understanding that the intellect, in understanding, forms something; and the formation of this is called a word; and therefore in every being that understands one must posit a word.

But intellectual nature is threefold, namely human, angelic, and divine: and therefore the word is threefold. Namely the human, of which in Psalm 13:1: "The fool said in his heart: There is no God." There is also the angelic, of which in Zechariah 1:9 and in many places of sacred Scripture it is said: "the Angel said," etc. The third is the divine Word, of which in Genesis 1:5: "God said: Let there be light," etc. When therefore the Evangelist says "in the beginning was the Word," it cannot be understood of the human or angelic word: because each of these words is made, since man and Angel have a beginning and cause of their being and operation; but the word of a man or of an Angel cannot pre-exist them. But of which word the Evangelist understood, he declares by this, that he says this Word was not made, since all things were made through it; and this is the Word of God, of which John here speaks.

But it must be known that this Word differs from our word in three respects. The first difference is, according to Augustine, that our word is first formable before it is formed: for when I wish to conceive the notion of a stone, I must arrive at it by reasoning; and so it is in all other things which are understood by us, except perhaps in first principles, which, since they are simply known, are known at once without the discourse of reason. As long therefore as the intellect is thus tossed about hither and thither by reasoning, the formation is not yet perfect, except when it has perfectly conceived the very notion of the thing: and then first it has the notion of the thing perfectly, and then first it has the character of a word. And hence it is that in our soul there is thought, by which is signified the very discourse of inquiry, and the word, which is already formed according to the perfect contemplation of truth. Thus therefore our word is first in potency before it is in act; but the Word of God is always in act: and therefore the name "thought" does not properly belong to the Word of God. For Augustine says, in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity, that the Word of God is so called that it is not called thought, lest something as it were changeable be believed in God. But that which Anselm says, namely that for the supreme Spirit to speak is nothing other than to behold by thinking, is said improperly.

But the second difference of our word to the divine Word is that our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect. For because we cannot express all our conceptions by one word, therefore we must form many imperfect words, through which we separately express all the things which are in our knowledge. But in God it is not so: for since he understands both himself and whatever he understands through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of the whole that is in God, not only of the persons, but also of creatures: otherwise it would be imperfect. Whence Augustine says: if anything less were in the word than is contained in the knowledge of the one speaking, the word would be imperfect. But it is established that it is most perfect; therefore it is only one. Job 33:14: "God speaks once."

The third difference is that our word is not of the same nature with us, but the divine Word is of the same nature with God: and therefore it is something subsisting in the divine nature. For the understood notion, which the intellect is seen to form of some thing, has intelligible being only in our soul; but to understand in our soul is not the same as what the nature of the soul is, because the soul is not its own operation. And therefore the word which our intellect forms is not of the essence of the soul, but is an accident to it. But in God to understand and to be are the same; and therefore the Word of the divine intellect is not something accidental, but something pertaining to his nature: because whatever is in the nature of God is God. Whence Damascene says that the Word of God is substantial, and existing in a hypostasis, but the rest, namely our words, are powers of the soul.

From the premises it is also clear that the Word, properly speaking, is always taken personally in divine matters, since it implies nothing but something expressed by one understanding. Likewise, that the Word in divine matters is the likeness of that from which it proceeds; and that it is coeternal with that from which it proceeds, since it was not formable before formed, but always in act; and that it is equal to the Father, since it is perfect, and expressive of the whole being of the Father; and that it is coessential and consubstantial with the Father, since it is his substance. It is also clear that, since in every nature that which proceeds, having a likeness of the nature of that from which it proceeds, is called a son, and this Word proceeds in the likeness and identity of the nature of that from which it proceeds, it is fittingly and properly called Son, and its production is called generation. Thus therefore the first is clear, namely what this is which is said, "Word."

Now concerning this, four questions arise. Two are of Chrysostom. The first is why John the Evangelist, leaving aside the Father, began immediately from the Son, saying "in the beginning was the Word." Now to this there is a twofold response. One is that the Father had become known to all in the Old Testament, though not under the aspect of Father, but as God; but the Son was unknown: and therefore in the New Testament, in which the knowledge of the Word is treated, he begins from the Word, or Son. The other is that through the Son we are led to the knowledge of the Father; below, 17:6: "Father, I have manifested your name to the men whom you gave me." Wishing therefore to lead the faithful to the knowledge of the Father, the Evangelist fittingly began from the Son, immediately adding about the Father when he says "and the Word was with God."

The second question is also of Chrysostom. For since, as has been said, the Word proceeds as a Son, why did he say "Word," and not "Son"? To this also a twofold answer is given. First, because "son" says something begotten, and when we hear of the generation of a son, one might think that that generation is such as he can comprehend, namely material and passible; therefore he did not say "Son" but "Word," which implies an intelligible procession, so that it not be understood that that generation was material and passible. Showing therefore that the Son is born from God impassibly, he destroys the vicious suspicion through the appellation "Word." Otherwise it can be said thus: the Evangelist was about to treat of the Word inasmuch as it had come to manifest the Father. Whence, since the notion of manifestation is more implied in the name "Word" than in the name "Son," therefore he rather used the name "Word."

The third question is of Augustine in the Book of 83 Questions, which is this: in the Greek, where we have "word," there is "logos." Since therefore "logos" signifies in Latin both "reason" and "word," why did the translators translate it "word," and not "reason," since reason is something intrinsic, just as the word also is? I answer. It must be said that "reason" properly names the concept of the mind according as it is in the mind, even if nothing be done exteriorly through it; but by "word" is signified a relation to exterior things: and therefore, because the Evangelist by this, that he said "logos," intended to signify not only the relation to the existence of the Son in the Father, but also the operative power of the Son, by which all things were made through him, the ancients rather translated it "word," which implies a relation to exterior things, than "reason," which only suggests the concept of the mind.

The fourth question is of Origen, which is this. Scripture in several places, speaking of the Word of God, names it not absolutely "Word," but with an addition, namely "of God," when it says "the Word of God," or "of the Lord": Ecclesiasticus 1:5: "the fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high," and Revelation 19:13: "and his name, the Word of God." Why therefore did the Evangelist, when he was speaking here of the Word of God, not say: "in the beginning was the Word of God," but said only "Word"? I answer. It must be said that although there are many participated truths, yet there is one absolute truth, which by its essence is truth, namely the divine being itself, by which truth all words are words. In the same way there is one absolute wisdom elevated above all things, namely the divine wisdom, by the participation of which all the wise are wise. And also one absolute Word, by whose participation all those having a word are called speakers. But this is the divine Word, which through itself is a word elevated above all words. In order therefore that the Evangelist might signify this supereminence of the divine Word, he set it before us absolutely as "Word," without any addition; and because the Greeks, when they wish to signify something set apart and elevated from all others, are accustomed to add an article to the name by which that thing is signified — just as the Platonists, wishing to signify separate substances, for instance the separate good, or the separate man, called it "the per se good," or "the per se man" — therefore the Evangelist, wishing to signify the separateness and elevation of this Word above all things, added an article to this name "logos," so that, if it were said in Latin, it would be "the Word."

Second, it must be considered what this signifies which is said, "in the beginning." But it must be known that "beginning," according to Origen, is said in many ways. For since a beginning implies a certain order to other things, it is necessary to find a beginning in all things in which there is order. Now order is found in quantities; and according to this a beginning is spoken of in numbers and in length, for instance of a line. Order is also found in time; and according to this a beginning of time, or of duration, is spoken of. Order is found in the disciplines, and here it is twofold: according to nature, and in relation to us; and in both ways a beginning is spoken of. Hebrews 5:12: "you ought to be masters by reason of the time." And in this way, according to nature indeed, in the Christian discipline the beginning and principle of our wisdom is Christ, inasmuch as he is the wisdom and Word of God, that is, according to his divinity. But in relation to us the beginning is Christ himself, inasmuch as "the Word was made flesh," that is, according to his incarnation. Order is also found in the production of a thing; and according to this a beginning is spoken of on the part of the thing generated, namely the very first part of the thing generated or made: as the foundation is called the beginning of a house. Or on the part of the maker: and thus there is a threefold beginning, namely of intention, which is the end, which moves the agent; of reason, which is the very form in the mind of the artificer; and of execution, which is the operating power.

In these ways, therefore, it must be inquired concerning "beginning," how "beginning" is here taken, when he says "in the beginning was the Word." It must be said therefore that it can be taken in three ways. In one way, according as "beginning" stands for the person of the Son, who is the beginning of creatures according to the notion of active power, and by way of wisdom, which is the notion of the things that are made; whence it is said in 1 Corinthians 1:24: "Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Whence also the Lord says of himself below, 8:25: "I am the beginning, who also speak to you." Thus therefore, taking "beginning" in this way, that which is said, "in the beginning was the Word," is to be understood as if he said "in the Son was the Word," so that the sense is: the Word itself is the beginning, according to the manner of speaking by which life is said to be in God, which nevertheless is nothing other than God himself. And this is Origen's exposition. The Evangelist therefore here says "in the beginning," so that at once, in the beginning, he might show the divinity of the Word, as Chrysostom says, while he asserts that it is the beginning; because according to the determination of all, the beginning is the most honored.

In the second way "beginning" can be taken as it stands for the person of the Father, who is the beginning not only of creatures, but of every divine procession; and thus it is taken in Psalm 109:3: "with you is the beginning in the day of your power." According to this, therefore, it is said "in the beginning was the Word," as if it were said: "in the Father was the Son." And this is the exposition of Augustine, and also of Origen. But the Son is said to be in the Father because he is of the same essence with the Father. For since the Son is his own essence, in whatever the essence of the Son is, there is the Son. Because therefore in the Father is the essence of the Son through consubstantiality, it is fitting that the Son be in the Father. Whence below, 14:10, it is said: "I am in the Father, and the Father is in me."

In the third way "beginning" can be taken for the beginning of duration, so that the sense is "in the beginning was the Word," that is, the Word was before all things, as Augustine expounds, and by this is designated the eternity of the Word, according to Basil and Hilary. For by this, that it is said "in the beginning was the Word," it is shown that whatever beginning of duration be taken — whether of temporal things, which is time, or of aeviternal things, which is aeviternity, or of the whole world, or any imagined extension through many ages — in that beginning the Word already was. Whence Hilary says in the seventh book of On the Trinity: "Times are passed through, ages are transcended, epochs are taken away. Put whatever beginning you will of your opinion; the Word already was, of which the discourse treats." And this is what is said in Proverbs 8:22: "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning." But that which is before the beginning of duration is eternal. Thus therefore according to the first exposition, the causality of the Word is asserted; but according to the second, the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, who speaks the Word; but according to the third, the coeternity of the Word.

It must also be considered here that it is said "the Word was," which is of the past imperfect tense, and this seems most to be suited for designating eternal things, if we attend to the nature of time and of the things that are in time. That which is future is not yet in act; but the present is in act, and by the fact that it is actually present, it is not designated to have been: but the perfect past designates that something has existed, and is now determined, and has now ceased to be; but the imperfect past signifies that something was, and is not yet determined, nor has ceased to be, but still remains. Therefore pointedly John, wherever he sets down something eternal, says "was" (erat); but where he says something temporal, he says "was" (fuit), as will be clear below. But as to the notion of the present, the present tense is most suited for designating eternity, which marks something to be in act, which always belongs to eternal things: and therefore it is said in Exodus 3:14: "I am who am"; and Augustine says that he alone truly is, whose being knows not past and future. It must also be considered that this word "was," according to the Gloss, is not taken here inasmuch as it signifies temporal motions, after the manner of other verbs, but according as it marks the existence of a thing: whence it is also called the substantive verb.

But someone can ask, since the Word is begotten by the Father, how it can be coeternal with the Father: for a man, a son begotten by a father who is a man, is posterior to him. To which it must be said that the beginning of origin is found to be prior in duration to that which is from the beginning, on account of three things. First indeed, because the beginning of the origin of some thing precedes in time the action by which it produces the thing of which it is the beginning; as a man does not begin to write immediately when he exists, and therefore in time precedes the writing. Second, by the fact that the action has succession, and therefore even if it begins together with the agent, yet the term of the action is after the agent: as, at the same moment fire is generated in these lower regions, it begins to tend upward; yet the fire is prior to its being aloft, because the motion by which it tends upward is measured by a certain time. In the third way, because from the will of the beginning is determined the commencement of the duration of that which is from the beginning, as from the will of God is determined the beginning of the duration of the creature: whence God was prior to the creature.

But none of these three is found in the generation of the divine Word. For God did not exist prior to his having begun to generate the Word: for since the generation of the Word is nothing other than an intelligible conception, it would follow that God were understanding in potency before in act, which is impossible. Likewise it cannot be that the very generation of the Word is successive: for thus the divine Word would be unformed before formed, as happens in us, who by thinking form words; which is false, as has already been said. Likewise it cannot be said that the Father by his will bestowed a beginning of duration on his Son; because God the Father does not generate the Son by will, as the Arians said, but naturally: for God the Father, understanding himself, conceived the Word, and therefore God the Father was not prior to the Son. Some likeness of this appears in fire, and in the brightness proceeding from fire: for the brightness proceeds naturally and without succession. Likewise, if fire were eternal, its brightness would be coeternal: on account of which the Son is called the brightness of the Father; to the Hebrews 1:3: "who, since he is the brightness of glory," etc. But in this likeness connaturality is lacking, and therefore we name him Son, although in human sonship coeternity is lacking: for it is necessary to arrive at divine knowledge from many likenesses of sensible things, because one does not suffice; and this is what is said in the book of the Council of Ephesus, that the Son always coexists with the Father: for the brightness proclaims impassibility, the nativity shows the Word, but the name "Son" suggests consubstantiality. We therefore name the Son by different names, to express his perfection, which cannot be expressed by one name. For in order that he be shown connatural to the Father, he is called Son; in order that he be shown in no way dissimilar, he is called image; in order that he be shown coeternal, he is called brightness; in order that he be shown immaterially begotten, he is called Word.

Then he says "and the Word was with God." Here is set down the second clause, which the Evangelist places in his narration. Here first the signification of two words must be considered which were not placed in the first clause, namely "God" and "with." For what "Word" is, and what "beginning" is, has already been expounded. These things therefore which are newly placed in this second clause, namely "God" and "with," let us investigate and pursue more diligently. And that we may better understand the exposition of this second clause, something must be said about the signification of each, insofar as it pertains to the matter at hand.

It must be known therefore, in the first place, that this name "God" signifies divinity, but in a supposit and concretely; but this name "deity" signifies deity in the abstract, and absolutely: and hence it is that it cannot stand for a person by its natural power and by its manner of signifying, but stands only for the nature. But this name "God" naturally has, from its manner of signifying, that it stand for some one of the persons, as this name "man" stands for the supposit of humanity, and therefore whenever the truth of the statement, or the predicate itself, requires that this name "God" stand for a person, then it stands for a person, as when we say, "God generates God." And so when here it is said "with God," it is necessary that "God" stand for the person of the Father, because this preposition "with" signifies a distinction of the Word, which is said to be "with God"; and although it signifies a distinction in person, yet not in nature, since the nature of the Father and the Son is the same. The Evangelist therefore wished to signify the person of the Father by this, that he said "God."

But it must be known concerning this that this preposition "with" implies a certain conjunction of the thing signified by the nominative to the thing signified by the oblique case, like this preposition "in." But differently, because this preposition "in" signifies a certain intrinsic conjunction; but this preposition "with" in a certain way implies an extrinsic conjunction. And we say both in divine matters: namely that the Son is in the Father, and is with the Father; and the intrinsic indeed pertains to consubstantiality, but the extrinsic (if it be permitted so to speak, since "extrinsic" is said improperly in divine matters) is referred only to the personal distinction, since the Son is distinguished from the Father only by origin. And therefore by both of these, both consubstantiality in nature is designated, and distinction in persons: consubstantiality indeed, inasmuch as it implies a certain conjunction; but distinction, inasmuch as it signifies a certain distinction, as was said above. And because this preposition "in," as was said, principally designates consubstantiality, inasmuch as it implies an intrinsic conjunction, and consequently the distinction of persons, inasmuch as every preposition is transitive; but this preposition "with" signifies principally the personal distinction, but consubstantiality inasmuch as it signifies a certain conjunction as it were extrinsic — therefore the Evangelist in this place specially used this preposition "with," so that he might suggest the distinction of the person of the Son from the Father, when he said "and the Word was with God," that is, the Son with the Father, as one person with another.

But it must be known that by this preposition "with" four things are signified, by which four contrary objections are excluded. For this preposition "with" signifies, first, subsistence in the nominative; because those things which do not have subsistence per se are not properly said to be "with" something: as we do not say whiteness to be "with" a body, and similarly of other things which do not subsist per se. But those things which subsist per se are properly said to be one "with" another; as we say a man to be with a man, and a stone with a stone. Second, it signifies authority in the oblique case, for a king is not properly said to be "with" a soldier, but a soldier is properly said to be "with" a king. Third, it says distinction: for someone is not properly said to be "with" himself, but one man is "with" another. Fourth, it signifies a certain conjunction and society: for when someone is said to be "with" another, a certain social conjunction between them is suggested to us.

But according to these conditions implied in the signification of this preposition "with," the Evangelist fittingly subjoins this clause, namely "the Word was with God," to the first clause, namely "in the beginning was the Word." For, setting aside one of those three expositions of this, "in the beginning was the Word" — namely that according to which "beginning" is put for the Son — to each of the other expositions — namely to that which says "beginning" is the same as "before all things," and to that according to which "beginning" is taken for the Father — a twofold objection is made by the heretics; and thus there are four objections, which we can exclude by the four conditions of this preposition "with" set down above.

Of these the first is this: you say that the Word was in the beginning, that is, before all things; but before all things there was nothing; where therefore was the Word, if before all things there was nothing? But this objection proceeds according to the imagination of those who hold that everything which is, is somewhere and in a place. Which indeed is excluded by John, when he says "with God." And he designates conjunction according to the last of the said conditions, so that the sense is, according to Basil: where therefore was the Word? He answers "with God," not in some place, since it is incircumscribable, but with the Father, who is comprehended by no place.

The second question to the same point is this: you say that the Word was in the beginning, that is, before all things. But those things which are before all things seem to proceed from no source; since that from which something proceeds seems to be prior to that which proceeds from it; therefore the Word does not proceed from another. But this objection is excluded when he says "the Word was with God," so that the "with" is taken according to the second condition, according to which it implies authority in the causal sense, and the sense is, according to Hilary: from whom is the Word, if it is before all things? The Evangelist answers "the Word was with God"; as if to say: although the Word lacks a beginning of duration, yet it does not lack a beginning or an author: for it was with God, as with an author.

The third question is to the other exposition according to which "beginning" stands for the Father; which is this: you say "in the beginning was the Word," that is, the Son was in the Father; but that which is in something does not seem to be subsisting, as a hypostasis: as the whiteness which is in a body does not subsist. But this objection is resolved by this, that he says "the Word was with God"; so that the "with" is taken according to the first condition, by which it implies subsistence in the nominative; and thus, according to Chrysostom, the sense is: the Word was in the beginning, not as an accident, but was with God, as subsisting, and a divine hypostasis.

The fourth question to the same point is this: you say that the Word was in the beginning, that is, in the Father; but that which is in something is not distinct from the Father. But this objection is excluded by this, that he says "and the Word was with God"; so that the "with" is taken according to the third condition, according to which it signifies distinction: so that the sense is, according to Alcuin and Bede, the Word was with God, and thus it was in the Father through the consubstantiality of nature, which nevertheless is with him through the distinction of person.

Thus therefore by this clause "and the Word was with God," is shown the conjunction of the Word to the Father in nature, according to Basil; but the distinction in person, according to Alcuin and Bede; the substance of the Word in the divine nature, according to Chrysostom; the authority of the Father over the Word, according to Hilary.

But it must be noted, according to Origen, that by this, that he says "the Word was with God," he shows that the Son always was with the Father. For in the Old Testament the word of the Lord is said to have come to Jeremiah, or to any other, as is clear in many places of Scripture, but it is not said: "the word of the Lord was with Jeremiah" or "with another"; because the word comes to those who begin to have the word, after they did not have it. Whence the Evangelist did not say "the Word came to be with the Father," but "was with the Father": because from the time the Father was, the Word was with him.

Then he says "and the Word was God." This is the third clause of John's narration, which indeed follows most fittingly according to the order of teaching. For because John had said of the Word when it was and where it was, it remained to ask what the Word was; that is, the Word was God, so that the "Word" is put on the part of the subject, and the "God" on the part of the predicate. But since one must first ask concerning a thing what it is, before where and when it is, it seems that John perverts this order, suggesting first concerning the Word where and when it is. But to this question Origen responds that the Word of God is said to be "with" man in one way, and "with" God in another way. For with man it is as perfecting him, because through it man is made wise and good, Wisdom 7:27: "she makes friends of God and prophets." But with God the Word is not said to be so, as though the Father were perfected through the Word and illuminated by it; but it is with God in such a way that it receives natural divinity from him who speaks the Word, from whom it has that it is the same God with him. From this, therefore, that it is by origin with God, it was necessary to show first that the Word was in the Father and with the Father, before showing that the Word was God.

But it must be known that by this clause "the Word was God," a reply can be made to two objections which arise from the preceding. Of these one arises from the name "word," and is this: you say that the Word was in the beginning, and with God; but it is established that "word," according to the common usage of speaking, signifies some voice and the enunciation of necessary things, the manifestation of thoughts; but these pass away and do not subsist; it could therefore be believed that the Evangelist was speaking of such a word. But this question is sufficiently excluded by what has been said, according to Hilary and Augustine, in the first Homily on John, who says that it is manifest that "word" in this place cannot be taken for speech, because since speech is in motion and passes away, it could not be said that "in the beginning was the Word," if the Word were something transient and in motion. Likewise, when he says "and the Word was with God," the same is given to be understood; for it is sufficiently clear that to be in (inesse) is one thing, and to be present with (adesse) is another. For our word, since it does not subsist, is not present with, but is in; but the Word of God is subsisting, and therefore is present with. And therefore the Evangelist pointedly said "the Word was with God." But nevertheless, that the cause of the objection may be totally removed, he adds the nature and being of the Word, saying "and the Word was God."

The other question arises from this, that he had said "with God." For since the "with" says distinction, it could be believed that the Word was with God, namely the Father, distinct from him in nature. And therefore, to exclude this, he immediately adds the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, saying "and the Word was God"; as if to say: not separated from the Father by a diversity of nature, because the Word itself is God. Note also the special manner of signifying, because he says "the Word was God," putting "God" absolutely; in order that he might show that it is not God in that manner in which the name of deity is said to be attributed to a creature in sacred Scripture; because sometimes a creature participates in this name with some addition. As that in Exodus 7:1: "I have appointed you the god of Pharaoh," to designate that he was not God simply, nor by nature, because he was appointed god of someone determinately; and that in Psalm 81:6: "I have said, you are gods," as if to say: by my reputing, not according to the truth of the thing, you are gods: for it is one thing to be reputed God, and another to be God. Whence the Word is called God absolutely, because it is God according to its essence, and not by participation, like men and Angels.

It must also be known that concerning this clause Origen erred shamefully, taking the occasion of his error from the manner of speaking which is had in the Greek. For it is the custom among the Greeks that they add an article to any name, to designate a certain distinction. Because therefore in the Gospel of John, in the Greek, to this name which is "Word," when it is said "in the beginning was the Word," and likewise to this name which is "God," when it is said "and the Word was with God," an article is added, so that it is said "the Word," and "the God," to designate the eminence and distinction of the Word from other words, and the primacy of the Father in the divinity; therefore, since in this which is said "the Word was God" an article is not added to this name "God," which stands for the person of the Son, Origen blasphemed that the Word was not God by essence, although it is essentially Word, but is called God by participation: but the Father alone is God by his essence. And thus he held the Son to be less than the Father.

But that this is not true, Chrysostom proves by this, that if the article placed to this name "God" implied a greater status in the Father in respect of the Son, it would never be added to this name "God" when it is predicated of another, but only when it is predicated of the Father, and always when it is said of the Father the article would be added. But we find the contrary through two authorities of the Apostle, who marks Christ as God with the addition of the article, saying in the Epistle to Titus 2:13: "awaiting the blessed hope, and the coming of the glory of the great God." For there "God" stands for the Son, and the article is added to it in the Greek; therefore Christ is the great God. Likewise the same Apostle, Romans 9:5, says: "from whom is Christ, who is over all things, God blessed forever." There likewise the article is placed to the "God" in the Greek. Moreover, 1 John, final chapter, verse 20: "that we may be in his true Son Jesus Christ; this is the true God, and eternal life." Christ therefore is not God by participation, but true God. It is clear therefore that what Origen invented is false.

But the reason why the Evangelist did not add the article to this name "God" is assigned by Chrysostom; namely because he had already named "God" twice with the addition of the article, and therefore it was not necessary to repeat it a third time, but it is understood. Or it must be said, and better, that "God" is here placed in the predicate, and is taken formally; but it is customary that to names placed in the predicate an article is not placed, since it would imply a distinction. But if "God" were here placed on the part of the subject, it would stand for whatever person, whether for the Son or for the Holy Spirit; and then there is no doubt that in the Greek the article would there be added.