Thomas Aquinas

After he has mentioned above the special and universal benefits of grace, here he commends the author of this grace, namely Christ. And first by comparison to God; second, generally by comparison to the whole of creation, at the firstborn ; third, specifically by comparison to the Church, at and he himself is the head . Concerning the first, it must be noted that God is called invisible because he exceeds the capacity of the vision of any created intellect, so that no created intellect by natural knowledge can attain to his essence. Job XXXVI, 26: behold, God is great, surpassing our knowledge . I Tim., last chapter: he dwells in inaccessible light . He is therefore seen by the blessed from grace, not from nature. The reason for this is assigned by Dionysius, because every cognition terminates at something existing, that is, at some nature participating in being. But God is being itself, not participated; therefore he is unknown. Of this invisible God, therefore, the Son is the image. But it must be seen how he is called the image of God, and why he is called invisible. And indeed of the nature of an image there are three things, namely that there be likeness there, that it be drawn out or expressed from that with which it has the likeness, and that it be drawn out in something pertaining to the species or a sign of the species. For if there are two similar things, of which one is not derived from the other, we call neither the image of the other, just as an egg is not called the image of an egg. And therefore it is called an image from imitating. Likewise if it is similar, but not as to species, or a sign of the species, then it is not called an image either: just as in man there are many accidents, such as color, quantity, and things of this kind, and according to none of these is he called an image. But if one takes his figure, thus it can be an image, because figure is a sign of the species; but the son is like the father, and the father like the son, but the son has this from the father, while the father does not have it from the son. And therefore, properly speaking, we say that the son is the image of the father, and not the reverse, because this likeness is drawn out and derived from the father. Likewise this likeness is according to species, because the son is in some way represented among us, though deficiently, through the word of our mind. Now the word of our mind occurs when we actually form the form of the thing of which we have knowledge, and this we signify by an exterior word. And this word thus conceived is a certain likeness of the thing which we hold in the mind, and like it according to species. And therefore the Word of God is called the image of God. As to the second point, it must be known that the Arians understood this word badly, judging concerning the image of God according to the images which were made by the ancients, so that they might see in them their dear ones taken away from them, just as we also make images of the saints, so that those whom we do not see in substance, we may see in image. And therefore they say that being invisible is proper to the Father, but the Son is the first visible thing, in which the goodness of the Father is manifested, as though the Father were truly invisible, and the Son visible, and thus they would be of a different nature. But the Apostle excludes this at Hebr. I, 3, saying: who, since he is the splendor of glory, and the figure of his substance , etc. And thus he is the image not only of the invisible God, but he himself is also invisible like the Father. Who is the image of the invisible God .

Then, when he says firstborn , etc., he commends Christ by comparison to creation. And first he does this, second he explains it, at because in him . Concerning the first it must be known that the Arians understand it thus, as though it were said "firstborn" because he is the first creature: but this is not the sense, as will be shown. And therefore two things must be seen, namely how this image is begotten, and how it is firstborn of creation. As to the first, then, it must be known that in each thing generation is according to the mode of its being and its nature. For the mode of generation is one thing in men, and another in plants, and so of other things. Now the nature of God is being itself understanding, and thus it is necessary that his generation, or intellectual conception, be the generation or conception of his nature. But in us, intelligible conception is not the conception of our nature, because in us understanding and our nature are different things. And therefore, since this image is the word and conception of the intellect, one must say that it is the offspring of nature, and thus of necessity begotten, because it receives nature from another. Second, it must be seen how he is called firstborn. For God does not know himself and creation by another thing, but knows all things in his essence, as in the first effective cause. Now the Son is the intellectual conception of God according as he knows himself, and consequently every creature. Insofar as he is begotten, therefore, he appears as a certain word representing the whole of creation, and he himself is the principle of all creation. For if he were not thus begotten, the word would be only the firstborn of the Father, but not of creation. Eccli. XXIV, 5: I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the firstborn before all creation , etc. Then, when he says because in him , etc., he explains what he had said, namely that he is firstborn, because he is begotten as the principle of creation. And this as to three things: first as to the creation of things; second as to their distinction, at in the heavens ; third as to their conservation in being, at and all things in him , etc. He says therefore: he is the firstborn of creation, because he is begotten as the principle of all creation. And therefore he says because in him , etc. Concerning this it must be known that the Platonists posited ideas, saying that any thing came to be from the fact that it participated in an idea, for instance of man or of some other species. In place of these ideas, we have one, namely the Son, the Word of God. For the craftsman makes the artifact from this, that he makes it participate in the form conceived within himself, as it were enfolding it into exterior matter: as if it were said that the craftsman makes a house through the form of the thing which he has conceived within himself. And thus God is said to make all things in his wisdom, because the wisdom of God is related to created things as the art of the builder to the house made. Now this form and wisdom is the Word, and therefore all things are founded in him, as in a certain exemplar, Gen. I: he said, and they were made , because in his eternal Word he created all things that they might come to be. As to the distinction of things, it must be known that some, such as the Manichees, erred, saying that these earthly bodies, because corruptible, were made by an evil god, but the heavenly ones, because incorruptible, by a good god, namely the father of Christ. But they lie, because both are created by the same one. Therefore he says in the heavens , etc. And this is the distinction according to the parts of corporeal nature. Gen. I, 1: in the beginning , that is, in the Son, God created , etc. The Platonists also say that God through himself created the invisible creatures, namely the angels, and through the angels created corporeal natures. But this is excluded here, because it says visible and invisible . Concerning the first, Hebr. XI, 3: by faith we understand that the ages were fitted together, that from invisible things visible things might be made . Concerning the second, Eccli. XLIII, 36 and following: we have seen few of his works, but the Lord made all things , etc. Now this distinction is according to the nature of created things. The third distinction is of order and rank among the invisible things, when he says whether thrones , etc. The Platonists err here too. For they said that there are diverse perfections in things, and they attributed each to one first principle, and according to the orders of those perfections, they posited orders of principles, just as they posited a first being, from which all things participate being, and a principle other than this, namely the first intellect, from which all things participate understanding, and another principle, life, from which all things participate living. But we do not posit it thus, but from one principle things have whatever perfection is in them. And therefore he says whether thrones , etc., as if to say: they do not depend on other, ordered principles, but on that one Word of God alone. But what of what he says Eph. I, 22: he gave him as head , etc., where there seems to be some diversity from these? Solution. Here he enumerates descending, because he shows the progression of creation from God; there, ascending, because he shows that the Son of God, according as he is man, is above all creatures. But nevertheless there principalities are placed under powers, and virtues between dominations and powers, here principalities above powers, and principalities midway between dominations and powers. And according to this the opinions of Gregory and Dionysius differ. For Dionysius orders them according to what is said to the Ephesians, because in the second hierarchy he places dominations, virtues, and powers. Gregory, however, orders them as is held here, because in the second hierarchy he places dominations, principalities, and powers, and in the third, virtues, archangels, and angels. But it must be known that, as Gregory and Dionysius say, these spiritual gifts, from which these orders are named, are common to all, yet some are named from some of them, others from others, the reason for which is taken from the sayings of the Platonists, because everything that belongs to something belongs in three ways, namely either essentially, or by participation, or causally. Essentially, indeed, what belongs to a thing according to the proportion of its nature, as the rational to man. By participation, however, what exceeds its nature, but nevertheless it participates something of that, though imperfectly, as the intellectual to man, which is above the rational and is essential to angels, and man participates something of the same. Causally, however, what belongs to a thing in a supervening way, as artificial things to man, because they are not in him as in matter, but by way of art. Now each thing is named only from that which belongs to it essentially. Hence man is called neither intellectual nor artificial, but rational. Now concerning the said gifts in the angels, those things which belong to the higher ones essentially, belong to the lower ones by participation; and those which belong to the lower ones essentially, belong to the higher ones causally. And therefore the higher are named from the higher gifts. Now the highest thing in a spiritual creature is that it attains to God, and in some way participates him. And therefore the higher ones are named from this, that they attain to God. Seraphim, as it were burning toward God or setting on fire; Cherubim, as it were knowing God; thrones, as it were having God seated in themselves. For in three ways can something participate from another: in one way, by receiving a property of its nature; in another way, that it receive it by way of cognitive intention; in another way, that it in some way serve its power, just as someone participates the medical art from a physician either because he receives in himself the art of medicine, or he receives knowledge of the medical art, or because he serves the art of medicine. The first is greater than the second, and the second than the third. Now in Sacred Scripture something divine is signified through fire. Deut. IV, 24: the Lord your God is a consuming fire , etc. And therefore the supreme order is called Seraphim, as it were burning toward God, and containing some divine property. The second order is Cherubim, following him cognitively. And the third, thrones, serving his power. But the other orders are not named from attaining to God, but through some operation of his. And some as directing, and thus they are dominations. Others executing, and of these indeed as more principal, as principalities, Ps. LXVII, 26: princes went before , etc. Others according to execution, and thus they are executing over spiritual creatures, as are the powers which restrain demons; if over natural things, they are virtues, which work miracles; if over men, they are archangels for great things; if angels, for the least things. And so, concluding, he says all things through him , as through the effective cause, and in him , as through the exemplar cause. Jo. I, 3: all things were made through him , etc. But because someone could say: are not all things eternal? Therefore the Apostle, as it were responding to this, says that they are not, but he himself is before all things , namely times and other things. Prov. VIII, 22: the Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning , etc. Or before in dignity. Ps. LXXXVIII, 7: who is like God , etc. As to conservation he says and all things hold together in him , that is, are conserved. For God is related to things thus, as the sun to the moon, which, when it withdraws, the light of the moon fails. And thus if God were to withdraw his power from us, in a moment all things would fail. Hebr. c. I, 3: bearing all things by the word of his power .