Commentary on 1 Corinthians (Super I Epistolam ad Corinthios Lectura)

Aquinas assigned the distinction of graces freely given, and of the ministries in which the members of the Church are distinguished; here he treats of charity, which inseparably accompanies the grace that makes one pleasing. And because he had promised them that he would show a more excellent way, he shows the preeminence of charity over the other gratuitous gifts. First as to necessity, namely that without charity the other gratuitous gifts do not suffice; second as to usefulness, namely that through charity all evils are avoided and all goods are done, at the place "charity is patient," etc.; third as to permanence, at the place "charity never fails," etc. Now the Apostle seems to reduce all the gratuitous gifts to three. For first he shows that the gift of tongues, which pertains to speech, avails nothing without charity; second, that those things which pertain to knowledge also do not avail, at the place "and if I have prophecy," etc.; third he shows the same about those things which pertain to action, at the place "and if I distribute to the food of the poor," etc.

Now the gift of tongues was much desired among the Corinthians, as will be clear below in chapter XIV; and therefore, beginning from it, he says: I promised that I would show a more excellent way, and this is first evident in the gift of tongues, because "if I speak with the tongues of men," namely of all men, that is, if I have the gift of grace by which I could speak in the tongues of all men; and for greater abundance he adds "and of angels: but if I have not charity, I have become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." He uses a fitting comparison. For the soul lives through charity, which lives to God, who is the life of the soul, according to that saying of Deut. XXX, 20: "he is your life." Hence also in I John III, 14 it is said: "we have been translated from death to life, because we love the brothers; he who does not love abides in death." Rightly, therefore, he compares speech lacking charity to the sound of a dead thing, namely of brass or a cymbal, which, although it renders a clear sound, is nevertheless not living but dead. So too the speech of a man lacking charity, however eloquent it may be, is nevertheless held as dead, because it does not profit toward the merit of eternal life. Now there is a difference between sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal, because brass, since it is flat, emits a simple sound from being struck; but a cymbal, since it is concave, multiplies the sound from a single strike, which pertains to tinkling. To brass, then, are compared those who pronounce the truth simply, but to a cymbal those who multiply and pronounce the truth, adding many arguments and similitudes, and drawing out very many conclusions, all of which, however, without charity are held as dead.

Now it must be considered what are called the tongues of angels. For since the tongue is a bodily member, and the gift of tongues, which is sometimes called "tongue," pertains to its use, as will be clear below at XVI, neither seems to belong to angels, who do not have members. It can therefore be said that by "angels" are understood men having the office of angels, namely those who announce divine things to other men, according to that saying of Mal. II, 7: "the lips of the priest keep knowledge, and they seek the law from his mouth, because he is the angel of the Lord of hosts." In this sense, then, it is said "if I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," that is, not only of lesser men but also of greater ones who teach others. It can also be understood of the incorporeal angels themselves, as it is said in Ps. CIII, 4: "who makes his angels spirits." And although they do not have a bodily tongue, nevertheless by likeness there can be called "tongue" in them the power by which they manifest to others what they have in mind.

Now it must be known that in the cognition of the angelic mind there is something concerning which the higher angels do not speak to the lower, nor conversely, namely the divine essence itself, which all see immediately, God showing himself to all, according to that saying of Jer. XXXI, 34: "a man shall no longer teach his neighbor, and a man his brother, saying: know the Lord. For all shall know me, from the least even to the greatest of them." But there is something in the cognition of the angelic mind concerning which the higher speak to the lower, but not conversely. And of this sort are the mysteries of divine providence, of which the higher know more in God himself, since they see him more clearly than the lower. Hence the higher instruct or illumine the lower concerning such things, which can be called speech. But there is something in the cognition of the angelic mind concerning which the higher speak to the lower and conversely; and of this sort are the hidden things of hearts, which depend on free will, which are open to God alone, and to those whose they are, according to that saying above at II, 11: "the things that are of a man, no one knows except the spirit of the man that is in him." These come into the knowledge of another when the one whose they are makes them manifest, whether he be inferior or superior. Now such a manifestation occurs when a lower angel speaks to a higher, not through illumination, but through a certain mode of signification. For there is in each angel something that is naturally known by another angel. When, therefore, that which is naturally known is set forth as a sign of that which is unknown, the hidden thing is manifested. And such a manifestation is called speech, by likeness to men, who manifest the hidden things of their hearts to others through sensible voices, or through whatever other corporeal thing appearing outwardly. Hence also those things which are naturally known in angels, insofar as they are taken up for the manifestation of hidden things, are called signs or nods. And the power of manifesting one's own concept in this way is metaphorically named "tongue."

Then, when he says "and if I have," etc., he shows the same concerning those things which pertain to knowledge. Now it must be noted that above he set forth four gratuitous gifts pertaining to knowledge, namely wisdom, knowledge, faith, and prophecy. He begins here, therefore, from prophecy, saying "and if I have prophecy," by which hidden things are divinely revealed, according to that saying of II Pet. I, 21: "for prophecy was not at any time brought by the will of man, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit." Second, as to wisdom, he adds "and know all mysteries," that is, the hidden things of the divinity, which pertains to wisdom, according to that saying above at II, 7: "we speak the wisdom of God, hidden in mystery." Third, as to knowledge, he says "and all knowledge," whether humanly acquired, as the philosophers had it, or divinely infused, as the apostles had it. Wis. VII, 17: "he gave me the true knowledge of the things that are." Fourth, as to faith, he adds "and if I have all faith, so that I could move mountains." Now what he says, "all faith," can be explained as, that is, of all the articles; but it is fitting that "all" be explained as, that is, perfect faith, because of what is added: "so that I could move mountains." For it is said in Matt. XVII, 19: "if you have faith as a grain of mustard seed, you shall say to this mountain: move from here, and it shall move." And although the mustard seed is smallest in quantity, nevertheless it is not a small but a perfect faith that is understood to be compared to the mustard seed. For it is said in Matt. XXI, v. 21: "if you have faith, and do not hesitate, not only will you do what was done to the fig tree, but even if you say to this mountain: take yourself up and cast yourself into the sea, it shall be done." Faith, therefore, that does not hesitate, is compared to a mustard seed, which the more it is crushed, the more its strength is felt.

But some object that although many saints had perfect faith, no one is read to have moved mountains; which indeed is resolved by what was said above at XII, 7: "to each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for usefulness." For miracles are wrought through the grace of the Holy Spirit in that manner, place, and time in which the usefulness of the Church is required. But the saints did much greater things than the moving of mountains, insofar as it was useful for the faithful, for instance by raising the dead, dividing the sea, and doing other such works. And this too they would have done, if necessity had been present. This can also be transferred to the expulsion of demons from human bodies, who are called mountains on account of pride. Jer. XIII, 16: "before your feet stumble upon the darkening mountains"; "behold, I am against you, O pestilent mountain, who corrupts the whole earth." Now the working of miracles is attributed to faith that does not hesitate, because faith rests upon omnipotence, through which miracles are wrought.

If, I say, I shall have had all the aforesaid things pertaining to the perfection of the intellect, but shall not have had charity, by which the will is perfected, "I am nothing," namely according to the being of grace, concerning which it is said in Eph. II, 10: "we are his handiwork, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." Hence also against a certain one it is said in Ez. XXVII, 19: "you have been made nothing, and you shall not be forever." And this indeed happens on account of a lack of charity, through which a man makes good use of a perfect intellect. But without charity its use is not good. Hence also above at chapter VIII, 1 it is said, "knowledge puffs up, but charity builds up."

Now it must be noted that the Apostle here speaks of wisdom and knowledge according as they pertain to the gifts of grace freely given, which can exist without charity. For according as they are counted among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, they are never had without charity. Hence also in Wis. I, 4 it is said: "wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul." And in Wis. X, 10 it is said: "he gave him the knowledge of the saints." But concerning prophecy and faith it is manifest that they can be had without charity. But it must be noted here that firm faith, even without charity, works miracles. Hence, in Matt. VII, 22, to those saying: "have we not prophesied in your name, and done many mighty works?" it is said: "I never knew you." For the Holy Spirit works mighty works even through the wicked, just as he also speaks the truth through them.

Then, when he says "and if I distribute," etc., he shows the same in those things which pertain to works, which consist in this, that a man do good things, according to that saying of Gal. VI, v. 9: "let us not fail in doing good"; and in this, that he patiently endure evils, according to that saying of Ps. XCI, 15 f.: "they shall be well patient, that they may announce." Now among the other good works, works of piety are commended more, according to that saying of I Tim. IV, 8: "piety is useful for all things." Concerning this work he designates four conditions. Of which the first is, that the work of piety not be gathered wholly into one, but be divided among many, according to that saying of Ps. CXI, 9: "he has dispersed, he has given to the poor." And this is designated when it is said "if I distribute." Second, that the work of piety be done to relieve necessity, not to serve superfluity, according to that saying of Is. LVIII, 7: "break your bread for the hungry," and this is designated when it is said "to the food of the poor." Third, that the work of piety be shown to those in need, according to that saying of Lk. XIV, 13: "when you make a feast, call the poor"; and this is designated when it is said "of the poor." Fourth, it pertains to perfection, that a man expend all his goods in works of piety, according to that saying of Matt. XIX, 21: "if you wish to be perfect, go, sell all that you have, and give to the poor"; and this is designated when it is said "all my goods."

Now among the evils which one endures patiently, martyrdom is the most excellent. Hence it is said in Matt. V, 10: "blessed are they who suffer persecution for justice's sake." This too he commends in four ways. First indeed, because it is more praiseworthy that, when necessity is imminent, for instance for the defense of the faith, one offer oneself to suffering, than if one should suffer having been caught. And therefore he says "if I deliver up." Just as also of Christ it is said in Eph. V, 2: "he delivered himself up for us." Second, because the loss of the human body is more grievous than that of possessions, concerning which nevertheless certain ones are commended in Heb. X, 34: "you sustained the plundering of your goods with joy." And therefore he says "body." Is. L, 6: "I have given my body to those who struck me." Third, it is more praiseworthy that someone expose his own body to punishment, than the body of a son, or of any relative whatsoever, concerning which nevertheless a certain woman is commended in II Mac. VII, 20: "she seems worthy of remembrance beyond measure, and worthy of good memory, who, seeing her seven sons perishing within the space of one day, bore it with a good spirit." And therefore he says "my." Judges V, v. 9: "you who of your own will offered yourselves to danger for the Lord." Fourth, martyrdom is rendered more praiseworthy from the bitterness of the punishment, concerning which is added "so that I burn," as Lawrence did. Ecclus. L, 9: "like a fire shining forth, and like incense burning in the fire."

If, I say, I shall have done the aforesaid works, so excellent as they are, but shall not have had charity, either because together with the aforesaid works there is present the will to sin mortally, or because they are done for the sake of empty glory, "it profits me nothing," namely as to the merit of eternal life, which is promised only to those who love God, according to that saying of Job XXXVI, 33: "he declares concerning it to his friend that it is his possession." And it must be noted that speech, which is the voice of an animate being, if it be without charity, he compares to something that does not exist; but works which are done on account of faith, if they be without charity, he says are fruitless. Wis. III, 11: "their hope is vain, and their labors without fruit."

Since the Apostle showed that charity is so necessary that without it no spiritual gift suffices for salvation, here he shows that it is so useful and of such efficacious power that through it all the works of virtue are accomplished. And first he sets forth two, as it were, general points; second he subjoins in particular the works of the virtues which are fulfilled through charity, at the place charity does not seek its own, etc. Concerning the first he does two things. For every virtue consists in this, that someone conducts himself well in acting, either in enduring evils or in doing good things. As to the endurance of evils, therefore, he says charity is patient, that is, it makes evils be endured patiently. For when a man loves someone on account of love for him, he easily bears whatever is difficult; and likewise he who loves God, on account of love for him, patiently bears whatever adversities. Hence also in Cant. 8:7 it is said: many waters cannot quench charity, neither shall the rivers overwhelm it. James 1:4: patience has a perfect work. But as to the working of good things, he adds it is kind; now kindness is called, as it were, a good fieriness, so that just as fire, in melting, causes things to flow out, so charity brings this about, that the goods which a man has, he does not keep to himself alone, but derives them to others, according to that word of Prov. 5:16: let your fountains be conveyed abroad, and divide your waters in the streets. This indeed charity does. Hence in 1 John 3:17 it is said: whoever has the substance of this world, and sees his brother in need, and shuts up his heart from him, how does the charity of God abide in him? Hence also in Eph. 4:32 it is said: be kind and merciful to one another. And in Wisdom 1:6 it is said: the spirit of wisdom is kind. Then when he says charity does not seek its own, etc., he sets forth in particular the works of the virtues which charity brings about; and because two things pertain to virtue, namely to abstain from evil and to do good, according to that word of Ps. 33:15: turn away from evil, and do good, and Is. 1:16f.: cease to act perversely, learn to do good. First he shows how charity causes all evils to be avoided; second how it causes all good things to be accomplished, at the place but rejoices in the truth, etc. Now a man cannot effectively do evil to God, but only to himself and to his neighbor, according to that word of Job 35:6: if you have sinned, what harm will you do him? And afterward it is added: your impiety will harm a man who is like yourself. First, therefore, he shows how through charity are avoided the evils which are against one's neighbor; second how are avoided the evils by which someone is thrown into disorder in himself, at the place is not puffed up, etc. Now the evil which is against one's neighbor can be in affection and in effect. In affection especially it occurs when, through envy, someone grieves over the goods of his neighbor, which is directly contrary to charity, to which it pertains that a man should love his neighbor as himself, as is had in Lev. 19:18. And therefore it pertains to charity that, just as a man rejoices over his own goods, so he should rejoice over the goods of his neighbor. From which it follows that charity excludes envy. And this is what he says: charity is not envious, that is, it does not envy, because indeed it causes one to be wary of envy. Hence also in Ps. 36:1 it is said: do not be envious of evildoers. And Prov. 23:17: let not your heart envy sinners. As to effect, he adds it does not act perversely, that is, wickedly against someone. For no one acts unjustly against him whom he loves as himself. Is. 1:16: cease to act perversely. Then when he says is not puffed up, etc., he shows how charity causes the evils to be avoided by which someone is thrown into disorder in himself. And first as to the passions, second as to choice, at the place thinks no evil. He shows, therefore, first that charity repels disordered passion, as to three things. First indeed as to pride, which is a disordered appetite for one's own excellence. Now a man seeks his own excellence in a disordered way when he is not content to remain within that degree which has been granted to him by God. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiasticus 10:14: the beginning of man's pride is to apostatize from God. This indeed happens when a man is unwilling to be contained under the rule of divine ordination. And this is repugnant to charity, by which one loves God above all things. Col. 2:18f.: puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the head, etc. Rightly, moreover, is pride compared to inflation. For that which is puffed up does not have solid magnitude, but apparent magnitude; thus the proud indeed seem to themselves to be great, though they lack true greatness, which cannot exist apart from divine order. Wisdom 4:19: he will dash them, puffed up, without a voice. Now the principal daughter of pride is ambition, through which someone seeks to be preeminent; this too charity excludes, which rather chooses to minister to its neighbors, according to that word of Gal. 5:13: by charity serve one another in the spirit. And therefore he adds it is not ambitious, that is, it makes a man avoid ambition. Ecclesiasticus 7:4: do not seek leadership from a man, nor a seat of honor from a king. Second, he shows how charity excludes the disorder of cupidity, when he says it does not seek what is its own, so that this be understood with precision, that is, with the goods of others neglected. For he who loves others as himself seeks the goods of others just as he does his own. Hence also above, in 10:33, the Apostle said not seeking what is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved. Against which it is said of certain persons in Phil. 2:21: all seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ's. It can also be understood otherwise, it does not seek what is its own, that is, it does not demand back what has been taken from it, namely in judgment with scandal: because it loves the salvation of its neighbor more than money, according to that word of the end of Philippians: I do not seek the gift, but I seek the fruit that abounds in your justice. How this, however, is to be understood has been said above, in chapter 6. Third, he shows how charity excludes the disorder of anger, saying it is not provoked to anger, that is, it is not provoked to wrath. For anger is a disordered appetite for vengeance. Now it pertains to charity rather to forgive offenses than to take vengeance beyond measure or in a disordered way, according to that word of Col. 3:13: forgiving one another, if anyone has a complaint against another; James 1:20: the anger of man does not work the justice of God. Then when he says thinks no evil, etc., he shows how through charity the disorder of choice is excluded. Now choice, as is said in Ethics III, is an appetite following deliberation. Then, therefore, does a man sin from choice and not from passion, when from the counsel of reason his affection is provoked to evil. Charity, therefore, first indeed excludes perversity of counsel. And therefore he says it thinks no evil, that is, it does not permit one to devise how someone might accomplish evil. Micah 2:1: woe to you who think what is useless, who work evil in your beds. Is. 1:16: take away the evil of your thoughts from before my eyes. Or, charity thinks no evil, because it does not permit a man, through various suspicions and rash judgments, to think evil of his neighbor. Matt. 9:4: why do you think evil in your hearts? Second, charity excludes the disordered affection for evils, when he says it does not rejoice over iniquity. For he who sins from passion commits sin with a certain remorse and grief; but he who sins from choice rejoices in this very fact, that he commits sin, according to that word of Prov. 2:14: who rejoice when they have done evil, and exult in the worst things. This, however, charity prevents, inasmuch as it is love of the highest good, to which every sin is repugnant. Or he says that charity does not rejoice over iniquity, namely committed by one's neighbor, but rather grieves over it, inasmuch as it is contrary to the salvation of one's neighbor which it desires. 2 Cor. 12:21: lest, when I come again, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of those who have sinned before. Then when he says but rejoices, etc., he shows how charity causes good to be worked. And first as to one's neighbor; second as to God, at the place believes all things, etc. As to one's neighbor, however, a man works good in two ways. First indeed by rejoicing over his goods. And as to this he says but rejoices in the truth, namely of one's neighbor, or in his life, or his teaching, or his justice, from the fact that he loves his neighbor as himself. In 3 John 3: I rejoiced greatly when the brothers came, and bore testimony to your truth, as you walk in charity. Second, in this, that a man endures the evils of his neighbor as is fitting. And as to this he says bears all things, that is, without disturbance he endures all the defects of his neighbors, or whatever adversities. Rom. 15:1: we who are stronger ought to bear the weaknesses of the weak. Gal. 6:2: bear one another's burdens, and so you will fulfill the law of Christ, namely charity. Then when he says believes all things, he shows how charity causes good to be worked in relation to God. This indeed happens especially through the theological virtues, which have God for their object. Now besides charity there are two theological virtues, as is said below, namely faith and hope. As to faith, therefore, he says believes all things, namely the things that are divinely handed down. Gen. 15:6: Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice. But to believe everything that is said by men is a mark of levity, according to that word of Ecclesiasticus 19:4: he who believes quickly is light of heart. As to hope, however, he says hopes all things, namely the things that are promised by God. Ecclesiasticus 2:9: you who fear God, hope in him. And lest hope be broken by delay, he adds endures all things, that is, patiently awaits the things promised by God, however delayed, according to that word of Hab. 2:3: if it makes delay, wait for it; Ps. 26:14: let your heart be strengthened, and endure the Lord.

After the apostle showed that charity excels the other gifts of the Holy Spirit in necessity and in fruitfulness, here he shows the excellence of charity over the other gifts as regards permanence. And concerning this he does three things. First he sets forth the difference between charity and the other gifts of the Holy Spirit, as regards permanence; second he proves what he had said, at ex parte enim cognoscimus, etc.; third he draws the conclusion he intends, at nunc autem manent, et cetera. Concerning the first he does two things. First he sets forth the permanence of charity; second the cessation of the other gifts, at sive prophetiae, et cetera.

He says therefore first, charitas numquam excidit. Certain people, misunderstanding this, fell into an error, saying that charity once possessed can never be lost, to which it seems to agree with what is said in 1 John 3:9: everyone who is born of God does not commit sin, because His seed remains in him. But of this saying, first indeed the sense is false. For someone having charity can fall away from charity through sin, according to Apocalypse 2:4-5: thou hast left thy first charity. Be mindful therefore whence thou hast fallen, and do penance. And this is so because charity is received in the soul of man according to the mode of the man himself, so that he can, that is, use it or not use it. But while a man is using it, he cannot sin, because the use of charity is the love of God above all things, and therefore nothing remains by which man might offend God. And in this way the word of John cited is understood. Second, the aforesaid sense is not according to the intention of the apostle, because he is not speaking here of the cessation of spiritual gifts through mortal sin, but rather of the cessation of the spiritual gifts which pertain to this life, through the glory that comes upon it. Hence the sense of the apostle is charitas numquam excidit, because namely just as it exists in the state of the way, so it will remain in the state of the homeland, and with increase, according to Isaiah 31:9: the Lord hath said, whose fire is in Sion, namely in the Church militant, and his furnace in Jerusalem, that is, in the peace of the heavenly homeland.

Then when he says sive prophetiae, etc., he sets forth the cessation of the other spiritual gifts, and especially of those which seem foremost. First as regards prophecy, he says sive prophetiae evacuabuntur, that is, they will cease, because namely in the future glory prophecy will have no place, on account of two things. First indeed because prophecy regards the future, but that state will not await anything in the future, but will be the final fulfillment of all the things that had before been prophesied. Hence in Psalm 47:9 it is said: sicut audivimus, namely through the prophets, ita et vidimus, in presence, in civitate domini virtutum. Second, because prophecy is with figural and enigmatic cognition, which will cease in the homeland. Hence it is said in Numbers 12:6: if there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a dream or in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. And Hosea 12:10: in the hands of the prophets I have been likened.

Second as regards the gift of tongues, he says sive linguae cessabunt. This indeed is not to be understood as regards the bodily members themselves, which are called tongues, as it is said below in chapter 15:52: the dead shall rise incorrupt, that is, without diminution of members. Nor again is it to be understood as regards the use of the bodily tongue. For there will be vocal praise in the future in the homeland, according to Psalm 149:6: the exultations of God in their throat, as the Gloss there expounds. It is therefore to be understood as regards the gift of tongues, by which namely some in the primitive Church spoke in various tongues, as is said in Acts 2:4. For in the future glory, each one will understand every tongue. Hence it will not be necessary to speak in various tongues. For even from the beginning of the human race, as is said in Genesis 11:1: there was one speech, and one lip for all, which will be much more so in the final state, in which there will be consummated unity.

Third as regards knowledge, he adds: sive scientia destruetur. From which certain ones wished to take it that acquired knowledge is totally lost along with the body. For the inquiry into this truth it is necessary to consider that there is a twofold cognitive power, namely the sensitive power and the intellective power. Between which there is a difference, because the sensitive power is the act of a bodily organ, and therefore it must cease when the body is corrupted; but the intellective power is not the act of any bodily organ, as is proved in Book III of On the Soul, and therefore it must remain when the body is corrupted. If therefore anything of acquired knowledge is preserved in the intellective part of the soul, it must remain after death.

Some therefore have posited that the intelligible species are not preserved in the possible intellect, except so long as it is understanding. But the species of phantasms are preserved in the powers of the sensitive soul, for instance in the memorative and imaginative powers; in such a way, namely, that the possible intellect, whenever it wills anew to understand, even those things it had previously understood, needs to abstract from phantasms through the light of the agent intellect, and according to this it follows that the knowledge acquired here does not remain after death.

But this position is, first indeed, contrary to reason. For it is manifest that the intelligible species are received in the possible intellect at least while it is actually understanding. But what is received in something is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Since therefore the substance of the possible intellect is immutable and fixed, it follows that the intelligible species remain in it immovably. Second, it is contrary to the authority of Aristotle in Book III of On the Soul, who says that when the possible intellect is knowing each thing, then it is also understanding in potency. And thus it is clear that it has the intelligible species by which it is called knowing, and yet it is still in potency to understanding in act, and so the intelligible species are in the possible intellect, even when it is not actually understanding. Hence also, in the same place, the Philosopher says that the intellective soul is the place of species, because namely the intelligible species are preserved in it. It needs, however, in this life to turn itself to phantasms, in order that it may actually understand, not only that it may abstract species from phantasms, but also that it may apply the species already possessed to phantasms: a sign of which is that when the organ of the imaginative power, or also of the memorative power, is injured, man is not only impeded from the acquisition of new knowledge, but also from the use of knowledge previously possessed.

Thus therefore knowledge remains in the soul after the death of the body, as regards the intelligible species, but not as regards the inspection of phantasms, which the separated soul will not need, having being and operation without communion with the body. And according to this the apostle here says that knowledge will be destroyed, namely according to the conversion to phantasms. Hence also Isaiah 29:14 says: the wisdom of the wise shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent men shall be hid.

Then when he says ex parte enim cognoscimus, he proves what he had said: and first he brings forth the proof; second he manifests the things which are contained in the proof, at cum essem parvulus, et cetera. He brings forth therefore first, to prove the proposition, an argument such as this: when the perfect comes, the imperfect ceases; but the other gifts besides charity have imperfection; therefore they will cease when the perfection of glory comes upon them.

First therefore he sets forth the minor proposition as regards the imperfection of knowledge, when he says ex parte enim cognoscimus, that is, imperfectly. For a part has the character of the imperfect. And this is verified especially as regards the knowledge of God, according to Job 36:26: behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge; and 26:14: behold, these things are said in part of his ways. He sets forth also the imperfection of prophecy, when he adds et ex parte, that is imperfectly, prophetamus. For prophecy is knowledge with imperfection, as has been said. He is silent, however, about the gift of tongues, which is more imperfect than these two, as will be clear below in chapter 14:2.

Second he sets forth the major, saying cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, that is, the perfection of glory, evacuabitur quod ex parte est, that is, all imperfection will be taken away. Concerning which perfection it is said in 1 Peter, last chapter: having suffered a little, he himself will perfect. But according to this it seems that charity too would be emptied out by the future glory, because it itself is imperfect in the state of the way in comparison to the state of the homeland.

It must be said therefore that imperfection relates in two ways to that of which it is said to be imperfect. For sometimes it belongs to its very notion, but sometimes it does not, but happens to it accidentally; just as imperfection belongs to the notion of a boy, but not to the notion of man, and therefore, when perfect age arrives, boyhood indeed ceases, but humanity becomes perfect. Imperfection therefore belongs to the notion of knowledge, as it is had here concerning God, inasmuch namely as he is known from sensible things; and likewise to the notion of prophecy, inasmuch as it is figural cognition and tending toward the future. But it does not belong to the notion of charity, to which it pertains to love the good known. And therefore, when the perfection of glory comes upon it, prophecy and knowledge cease; but charity does not cease, but rather is perfected, because the more perfectly God will be known, the more perfectly also he will be loved.

Then when he says cum essem parvulus, etc., he manifests the things that were premised. And first he manifests the major, namely that when the perfect comes the imperfect ceases; second he manifests the minor, namely that knowledge and prophecy are imperfect, at videmus nunc, et cetera. He shows the first, however, through a likeness of the perfect and the imperfect, which is found in bodily age. Hence also first he describes the imperfect of bodily age, saying cum essem parvulus, namely in age, loquebar ut parvulus, that is, as befits a little child, namely by stammering. Hence, on account of the natural defect of speech which is in little children, wisdom is commended for making the tongues of infants eloquent, Wisdom 10:21; and one speaks as a little child who speaks vain things. Psalm 11:3: they have spoken vain things each one to his neighbor.

As regards judgment, however, he adds sapiebam ut parvulus, that is, I approved or disapproved certain things foolishly, as little children do, who sometimes despise precious things, and desire cheap things, as is said in Proverbs 1:22: how long, little ones, will you love childishness, and fools covet those things which are hurtful to themselves? They savor therefore as little children, who, having despised spiritual things, cling to earthly things; concerning whom it is said in Philippians 3:19: glory in the confusion of them, who mind earthly things.

As regards, however, the discourse of reason, he says cogitabam ut parvulus, that is, certain vain things. Hence also in Psalm 93:11 it is said: the Lord knoweth the thoughts of men, that they are vain. And the apostle seems to place these three in reversed order. For speech presupposes the judgment of wisdom; but judgment presupposes the thoughts of reason. And this fits well enough with childish imperfection, in which there is speech without judgment, and judgment without deliberation. It can, however, be referred, that he says loquebar ut parvulus, to the gift of tongues; when he says sapiebam ut parvulus, to the gift of prophecy; and what he adds cogitabam ut parvulus, to the gift of knowledge.

Second he sets forth that which pertains to the perfection of age, saying quando autem factus sum vir, that is, when I arrived at perfect and virile age, evacuavi, that is, I cast away, quae erant parvuli; because, as is said in Isaiah 65:20, a child of a hundred years shall die, and the sinner being a hundred years old shall be accursed. And it is to be noted that the apostle here compares the present state to childhood on account of imperfection; but the state of future glory, on account of perfection, to virile age.

Here he speaks of vision, which is the knowledge of God. Hence all the preceding gifts that are to be done away with are to be understood insofar as they are ordered to the knowledge of God. Concerning this he does two things. First he proves what he intends in general; second, in particular concerning himself, where he says now I know, et cetera.

He says therefore: I said that we know in part, because now we see through a mirror in an enigma, but then, namely in our homeland, we shall see face to face. Here first it must be considered what it is to see through a mirror in an enigma; second, what it is to see face to face.

It must be known, therefore, that something sensible can be seen in three ways: either through its own presence in the thing seeing, as light itself, which is present to the eye; or through the presence of its likeness derived immediately from the thing itself into the sense, as whiteness which is in a wall is seen, the whiteness itself not being present in the eye, but its likeness, although that likeness itself is not seen by it; or through the presence of a likeness not derived immediately from the thing itself, but derived from the likeness of the thing into something else, as when some man is seen through a mirror. For the likeness of the man is not immediately in the eye, but the likeness of the man resulting in the mirror.

Speaking, then, of the vision of God according to this manner, I say that by natural knowledge only God sees himself: because in God his essence and his intellect are the same. And therefore his essence is present to his intellect. But in the second way perhaps the Angels see God by natural knowledge, insofar as the likeness of the divine essence shines forth immediately in them. But in the third way we know God in this life, insofar as we know the invisible things of God through creatures, as is said Rom. I, 20. And thus every creature is to us as a kind of mirror: because from the order, and goodness, and magnitude which are caused in things by God, we come into the knowledge of the divine wisdom, goodness and eminence. And this knowledge is called vision in a mirror.

Further it must be known that a likeness of this kind, which is the likeness of a thing shining forth in another, is twofold: for sometimes it is clear and open, as that which is in a mirror; sometimes obscure and hidden, and then that vision is called enigmatic, as when I say: my mother bore me, and the same is born from me. This is by a hidden likeness. And it is said of ice, which is born from water congealed, and water is born from ice melted. So then it is clear that vision through a likeness of a likeness — which is in a mirror — is through a hidden likeness in an enigma, but through a clear and open likeness it makes another species of allegorical vision.

Insofar, then, as we know the invisible things of God through creatures, we are said to see through a mirror. But insofar as those invisible things are hidden from us, we see in an enigma. Or otherwise, we now see through a mirror, that is, through our reason, and then the term "through" designates only power. As if he should say: we see through a mirror, that is, by the power of our soul.

Concerning the second, it must be known that God, insofar as he is God, does not have a face, and therefore this, that he says, face to face, is said metaphorically. For when we see something in a mirror, we do not see the thing itself, but its likeness; but when we see something according to its face, then we see the thing itself as it is. Therefore the Apostle wishes to say nothing other, when he says: we shall see in our homeland face to face, than that we shall see the very essence of God. I John III, 2: we shall see him as he is, et cetera.

But against this is that it is said, Gen. XXXII, 30: I saw the Lord face to face, et cetera. But it is agreed that then he did not see the essence of God; therefore to see face to face is not to see the essence of God.

Response. It must be said that that vision was imaginative; but imaginative vision is a certain higher degree, namely to see that which appears in the very image in which it appears, and there is another, lowest degree, namely only to hear words. Hence Jacob, in order to suggest the excellence of the imaginative vision shown to him, says: I saw the Lord face to face, that is, I saw the Lord appearing imaginatively in his image, and not through his essence. For thus it would not have been imaginative vision.

But nevertheless some say that in our homeland the divine essence itself will be seen through a created likeness. But this is altogether false and impossible, because nothing can ever be known through its essence by a likeness which does not agree with that thing in species. For a stone cannot be known according to what it is, except through the species of the stone, which is in the soul. For no likeness leads into the knowledge of the essence of any thing, if it differs from that thing according to species, and much less if it differs according to genus. For the essence of man cannot be known through the species of a horse, or of whiteness, and much less the essence of an Angel. Much less, therefore, can the divine essence be seen through any created species whatsoever, whichever it may be, since any created species in the soul is more distant from the divine essence than the species of a horse, or of whiteness, is from the essence of an Angel. Hence to posit that God is seen only through a likeness, or through a certain refulgence of his brightness, is to posit that the divine essence is not seen. And, moreover, since the soul is a certain likeness of God, that vision which is in the way would not be any more mirror-like and enigmatic than the clear and open vision which is promised to the saints in glory, and in which our beatitude will be. Hence Augustine says here, in the Gloss, that the vision of God which is through a likeness pertains to the vision of the mirror and the enigma. It would also follow that man's ultimate beatitude would be in something other than God himself, which is foreign to the faith. Also the natural desire of man, which is to arrive at the first cause of things, and to know it through itself, would be in vain.

There follows: now I know in part, et cetera. Here, that which he proved in general, he proves in particular concerning knowledge of himself, saying now, that is, in the present life, I Paul know in part, that is, obscurely and imperfectly; but then, namely in our homeland, I shall know just as I am known, that is: just as God has known my essence, so shall I know God through his essence; so that the term "just as" does not here import an equality of knowledge, but only a likeness.

Consequently he infers the principal conclusion when he says: but now there remain, et cetera. But the reason why he does not make mention of all the gifts, but of these three only, is because these three join one to God, while the others do not join one to God except by means of these; also the other gifts are certain things disposing toward the generating of these three in the hearts of men. Hence also only these three, namely faith, hope and charity, are called theological virtues, because they have God immediately as their object.

But since the gifts are for the perfecting either of the affection or of the intellect, and charity perfects the affection, faith the intellect: it does not seem that hope is necessary, but superfluous. To this it must be known, that love is a certain unitive force, and every love consists in a certain union. Hence also according to diverse unions, diverse species of friendship are distinguished by the Philosopher. But we have a twofold conjunction with God. One is as regards the goods of nature, which we here participate from him; the other as regards beatitude, insofar as we here are partakers, through grace, of that supernal felicity — according as it is possible here — and we also hope to arrive at the perfect attainment of that eternal beatitude and to become citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem. And according to the first communication with God, there is a natural friendship according to which each thing, according to what it is, seeks and desires God as first cause and highest good, as its end. But according to the second communication is the love of charity, by which only the intellectual creature loves God. But since nothing can be loved unless it is known, therefore for the love of charity there is first required knowledge of God. And because this is above nature, first faith is required, which is of things not appearing. Second, lest man should fail, or go astray, hope is required, through which he may tend toward that end, as toward one pertaining to himself. And of these three it is said, Ecclesiasticus II, 8: you who fear God, believe in him — as to faith; you who fear God, hope in him — as to hope; you who fear God, love him — as to charity. These three, therefore, remain now, but charity is greater than all, on account of the things which were said above.