Literal Commentary on Job (Expositio super Iob ad litteram)

Then Elihu, proceeding, spoke thus. After Elihu had rebuked Job for the fact that he desired to dispute with God, he proceeds to dispute against those two things which he had set forth above; and first he disputes against that which, as it seemed to him, Job had said, namely that the divine judgment is unjust; and because this matter is very difficult and lofty, he is not content in this disputation to direct his words to Job alone, especially because he thought that in this matter he was in error, but he summons the wise to judge this matter. Now some men consider wisdom by themselves, and as to this he says, "Hear, you wise men, my words"; but others are instructed by those things which pertain to wisdom, and as to this he adds, "and you learned men," namely by others, "hearken to me." Why he invites others to a hearing he shows by adding, "for the ear tries words," as if to say: I invite you to this, that hearing my words you may judge them; and he brings in a comparison when he adds, "and the throat by tasting discerns food," as if to say: just as taste has the office of judging foods, so hearing has the office of judging words. To what these things pertain he explains by adding, "let us choose judgment among ourselves," as if to say: let us judge by common consent what is truer, and this is what he adds, "and let us see among ourselves what is best," namely whether what Job said, or that which I am about to say against him. Whence consequently he sets forth Job's word, adding, "because you have said, Job: I am just"; this same thing he had said above in chapter 27:6, "my justification, which I have begun to hold, I will not forsake," and further he had made manifest his own justice as to many things above in chapter 31. He adds moreover, "and God has overturned my judgment," and this same thing he takes from the fact that Job had said above in chapter 27:2, "As God lives, who has taken away my judgment," and it seems to pertain to the same thing that he had said above in chapter 19:6, "God has afflicted me with a judgment that is not equal." These words, indeed, Elihu interpreted for the worse; for Job had said that his judgment had been taken away because he judged that the punishments imposed on him were not from the judgment of one punishing guilt but from the providence of one proving justice, whence above in chapter 23:10 he had said, "He will prove me as gold that passes through fire"; but not whoever fails to use judgment overturns judgment, but only he who pronounces an unjust judgment: thus, therefore, he interpreted what Job had said, "God has taken away judgment," as though he had said: God overturns my judgment by judging unjustly, whence he adds, "for in judging me there is a lie," that is, a falsity of judgment; which indeed Job had never said, but Elihu believed this to be his intention in the aforesaid words, namely that he was saying he was unjustly punished. Elihu had conceived this opinion for this reason, that he did not see how anyone could be afflicted without sin unless unjustly; and because Job said that he was without sin, he judged that Job felt that he had been struck by God through violence contrary to justice, whence he adds, "and violent is my arrow without sin," as if to say that Job had said: since I am without sin, the arrow with which God has wounded me, that is, the adversity sent upon me, was violent, not just; and he seems to be alluding to the words of Job by which he had said above, "the arrows of the Lord are in me."

Therefore, after Elihu had imputed this perversity to Job himself, he begins to blame him on this account, saying, "Who is a man like Job?" As if to say: no one who seems to be a man is so perverse as he; for it seems the greatest perversity that anyone should mock God by detracting from his judgments, whence he adds, "who drinks up scoffing," that is, mockery and reprobation of the divine judgments, "like water," which indeed is drunk both easily and with refreshment, as if he were imputing to him that this, namely that he should burst forth into contumelies against God, was to him as a refreshment of his tribulation, and that he did this without any obstacle from a conscience gainsaying it. Now it is wont to be proper to those who wish to persevere in sins that they should hold the divine judgments in contempt, whence he adds, "who walks," that is, consents, "with those who work iniquity," namely those who despise the divine judgments; but men acting against the piety of divine religion not only despise the divine judgments but also deny them or assert them to be unjust, of which company he believed Job to be a partaker, whence he adds, "and walks with impious men," namely those who cast off the piety of divine religion. Why he says he consents with them he shows by adding, "for he has said: a man will not please God even if he has run with him," that is, even if he has followed him in the way of justice. This, however, Job had not said, but Elihu, abusing his words, imputes this to him; for Job had said above, chapter 23:11, "My foot has followed his steps," and afterward, above in chapter 30:21, he had said, "You are changed to be cruel to me, and in the hardness of your hand you are adverse to me," from which words Elihu believed Job to feel this, that he was displeasing to God although he had followed him; but Job had referred the aforesaid words to external persecution, not to interior reprobation. Since therefore Elihu, abusing Job's words, strove to impute to him what he himself did not feel nor had understood in his own words, it is manifest that the whole following disputation was not against Job; nevertheless, because Elihu judged Job to be of such great perversity that he reckoned the judgment of God unjust, he disdains to provoke him to disputation on this point but calls upon the other wise men to judge, whence he adds, "therefore, you men of heart," that is, of understanding, "hear me": for as the heart is the principle of bodily life, so the intellect is the principle of the whole of intellectual life, whence also above in chapter 12:3 he had put "heart" for "intellect," saying, "and I have a heart as well as you."

Now in his disputation Elihu first sets forth what he intends to prove, namely that there cannot be injustice in the divine judgment: for he is God, to whom the worship of piety is owed, and by his omnipotence he rules over all, establishing laws of justice for man; and therefore it would be against his divinity if he favored impiety, and therefore he says, "Far be it from God to act wickedly"; it would also be against the dominion of his omnipotence if he should incline to injustice, whence he adds, "and from the Almighty, iniquity," namely, far be it. Now, having removed divine injustice, he shows the manner of divine justice by adding, "for he will render to man his work," that is, he will requite him with good or evil for his works; and because among those who do well some do better than others, and among those who do evil some sin more than others, he therefore adds, "and according to the ways of each he will restore to them," namely better to the better and worse to the worse. That there is no injustice in God he proves first indeed from this, that if he himself were unjust, justice would nowhere be found, since to him pertains the universal judgment of all, whence he adds, "whom has he appointed over the earth as another?" As if to say: is it to be believed that anyone has been appointed by God to judge all the earth justly, if injustice were in him? Now he says it is not to be believed that another judges the earth, because the same one is the maker of the world and its governor; whence just as he committed to no other the making of the world, so he set no other over the governance of the world, and this is what he adds, "or whom has he set over the world which he made," that is, as governor of the whole world? As if to say, no one, because just as he made the world by himself, so also he governs and judges the world by himself; he indeed has executors of his governance as ministers, but he himself is the orderer of all things: in no way, however, is it possible that the universal governance of the world be unjust.

Secondly, he shows by an experiential proof that there is no violence and iniquity with God: for so great is his power, by which he conserves things in being, that if he wished to use violence contrary to justice, he could suddenly extinguish all men, whence he adds, "if he should direct," namely God, "toward him," that is, toward crushing man, "his heart," that is, his will, "his spirit," that is, his soul, "and his breath," that is, the bodily life that follows upon the soul, "he will draw to himself," namely separating him by his own power from the body, according to that saying of Ecclesiastes, last chapter: "and the spirit return to God who gave it." Now once the spirit divinely given to man has been taken away, it follows that the carnal life should fail, whence he adds, "all flesh will fail together," that is, the species of flesh will cease, and further it will be resolved into its constituent parts, whence he adds, "and man will return into ashes," according to that saying of the Psalm, "You will take away their spirit and they will fail, and they will return into their dust." Now he calls the dust into which flesh is resolved "ashes," either because among the ancients the bodies of the dead, burned by fire, were resolved into ashes, or because those things into which a dead body is resolved are certain remnants of the natural heat which flourished in the human body. Since, therefore, it is so easy for God, if he willed it, to reduce the whole human race to ashes, it appears from the very preservation of men that he does not use unjust violence against them. Because, therefore, Elihu thought the aforesaid arguments sufficient, he invites Job to consider them when he adds, "if therefore you have understanding," so that you may be able to perceive the force of my arguments, "hear what is said," namely with your outward ears, and with inward attention "hearken to the voice of my speech," so that you may recognize the justice of the divine judgment; to which he also leads him from his own peril or advantage when he adds, "can he who does not love judgment be healed?" As if to say: you who need to be healed, as one oppressed as it were by many infirmities, cannot attain this unless you love the divine judgment.

He then rebukes his opinion, which he thought to be about the injustice of the divine judgment, by many clear indications of divine justice, whence he adds, "and how do you condemn him," namely God, "who is just," as appears through many things, "so greatly," namely so as to call him a subverter of judgment? Now for the commendation of divine justice he first assumes that God does not accept the persons of the powerful, but rebukes and punishes them for their sins. Among human powers royal dignity excels, and as to this he first says, "he," namely God, "says to a king: apostate," that is, he does not fear to rebuke a king for apostasy from his own profession, by which he professes that he will keep justice; secondly, the leaders of armies hold the place, of whom he adds, "who calls leaders impious," as if to say: he does not fear to rebuke them for cruelty; thirdly he places the rulers of cities, when he adds, "who does not accept the persons of princes," namely so as to keep himself from rebuking and judging them for their sins; fourthly he touches those who have not lawful but usurped power, namely tyrants, and as to this he adds, "nor did he acknowledge," that is, approve, "the tyrant," namely by deferring to him, "when he disputed," namely the tyrant, "against the poor man," as if to say: he does not favor the powerful against the powerless, which pertains to his justice. And why he does not defer to them he adds, "for they are all the work of his hands," namely both the great and the small, and therefore he does not despise the small but loves them as his own works, nor does he fear the powerful since they are subject to his power. And lest anyone should believe that God only rebukes the powerful but does not punish them further, there is added concerning their twofold punishment: first indeed concerning death coming upon them unforeseen, whence it is added, "they will die suddenly," according to that saying of Isaiah 30:13, "suddenly, when it is not expected, its ruin will come"; for if death came upon them in the accustomed manner, expected, this would not be imputed to the divine judgment but to lower causes. Secondly he sets down the punishment of the rebellion of subjects, by which they lose their power, whence he adds, "and in the middle of the night peoples will be bowed down," that is, the peoples subject to kings and princes are suddenly bowed down by some hidden scheming to the point of deserting their princes, whence he adds, "and they will pass over," namely changing their allegiance, "and they will take away," that is, depose from dominion or even kill, "the violent one," that is, him who, having despised justice, inflicted violence on his subjects, "without a hand," namely of armed men: for when a prince is taken away by outsiders, it is required that there be an armed hand against him, but when the subjects, in whom lay the whole of his power, suddenly desert him, he seems to be taken away without a hand; although this too could be referred to the punishment of the peoples, the former reading is better because now the discussion concerns the justice which God exercises upon the great, and afterward there will be discussion of the justice which he exercises upon the peoples. Now that punishments of this kind should be believed to come from the divine judgment, he adds, "for his eye," that is, the regard of divine providence, "is upon the ways of men," that is, upon their works; and to express that God knows singularly all the particulars of human works, he adds, "and he considers all their steps," that is, all the processes of human operations, namely distinctly, not only in general.

Now someone might believe that since God is light, but the impious are in darkness, they might be hidden from God, but he excludes this by adding, "there are no darknesses," namely of ignorance, "and there is no shadow of death," that is, no obscurity of guilt leading to death, so that those who work iniquity might be hidden there, as if to say: just as they themselves do not wish to know God, so God does not know them; yet he is said to be ignorant of them by way of reprobation. And because he had said that princes die and are taken away suddenly for their sins, which seems to be an irremediable punishment, he shows the reason for this consequently from the fact that once God has judged that a man is to be finally condemned for his sins, the faculty is not given to man to contend further, as it were in judgment, with God: and this is what he adds, "for it is not further," namely after God has judged him to be condemned, "in man's power that he should come to God in judgment," as if God were going to retract his judgment on his account; and this he seems to say especially against Job, who, after he had been condemned to punishment, had said above in chapter 23:3, "I would come even to his throne, I would set judgment before him. He will crush many and innumerable," and so forth.

There are two things on account of which men are especially wont to decline from justice: the first is that they defer to the great, the second is that they defer to the multitude against justice; now he had shown above the perfection of divine justice from the fact that God does not defer to the great, whence now, consequently, for the commendation of divine justice, he shows that he does not defer even to the multitude of sinners, whence he says, "he will crush many," namely sinners, by killing them or punishing them otherwise. And lest it be believed that divine justice proceeds only up to some certain quantity of a multitude and no further, he adds, "and innumerable," as if to say: those whom God's justice crushes on account of sins cannot be comprehended by a fixed number. But lest it be believed that from this the state of the human race would perish, he adds, "and he will make others stand in their place," namely because, some dying, others succeed them, and some falling from prosperity, others are raised up, so that thus in a certain manner uniformity may appear in the human race. Now it is wont to happen that when there are many to be punished, judges cannot diligently examine the causes of individuals; but lest this be believed of God, he adds, "for he knows their works," namely what each one deserves; and therefore he requites each according to his own works, whence he adds, "therefore he will bring on night," that is, a sudden and unexpected adversity, "and they will be crushed," namely unforeseen. Why they are oppressed in the night he shows from this, that although they could have seen what was expedient for them, they despised this, and therefore it is just that the faculty of foreseeing the coming evils, so as to guard against them, should not be given to them: and this is what he adds, "as it were the impious," that is, those who spurn the knowledge of piety, "he has struck them," namely being "in the place of those who see," that is, in the state in which they could see, both through natural reason and through sacred doctrine, what was to be done and what was to be avoided; but they themselves spurned this, whence he adds, "who as if of set purpose withdrew from him," namely God, sinning from deliberate malice. Whence he consequently attributes to them affected ignorance when he adds, "and would not understand all his ways," that is, the commandments of God, and thus it is clear that they are not excused on account of ignorance but are rather rendered more damnable. Now he shows the effect of this kind of affected malice by adding, "so that they caused the cry of the needy to come to him," as if to say: they show themselves so ignorant of the ways of God that they oppressed the poor whom God hears; whence just as they do not shrink from the oppression of the poor, so they do not fear the indignation of God, whence he adds, "and he heard the voice of the poor," as if to say: they think little of the fact that God applies his will to hearing the poor.

And because he had attributed the crushing of the multitude to the divine judgment, someone might believe that this, namely that some multitude is crushed and another prospers, does not come from the divine judgment but through the governance or the assault of some powerful prince; therefore, to exclude this, he adds, "for when he grants peace, who is there that can condemn?" As if to say: I say this for the reason that it is he who crushes many and innumerable, because if he wished to grant them the peace of time and prosperity, no one could condemn the multitude, and conversely, if he intends to condemn, there is no one who can offer peace, whence he adds, "since he has hidden his face," namely withdrawing the presence of his consolation, "who is there that can behold him," that is, who could find consolation in him, as it were seeing his beauty? There is, moreover, also another punishment of the multitude besides crushing, namely that by which it is afflicted by the dominion of tyrants, and as to this punishment he adds, "and over a nation and over all men alike," as if to say: he exercises his judgments not only on one nation through crushing or the oppression of tyrants, but also on all men; and concerning the oppression of tyrants he adds, "who makes a hypocrite reign on account of the sins of the people," namely the people who are afflicted by his rule, in which he also seems to answer the question which Job had proposed above in chapter 21:7, "why do the wicked live, are they strengthened and exalted with riches?" For he asserts that this is not on account of their own merits, as Job had proved there, but on account of the demerits of others who are punished through their prosperity.

Thus, therefore, having shown that there cannot be injustice in God and that his justice is most manifest from the judgments which he exercises upon princes and the multitude, he gives Job the opportunity to respond, whence he adds, "since therefore I have spoken to God," that is, those things which pertain to the honor of God, "I will not forbid you either," namely giving you the opportunity to respond. And to what end his response ought to tend he shows by adding, "if I have erred," namely as you have imputed to your other friends, that they were cultivators of perverse dogmas, "teach me," namely the truth, so that I may be freed from error. Now someone can fail in speaking not only by erring against the truth of doctrine, but also by failing in a particular judgment against the truth of justice, whence he adds, "if I have spoken iniquity, I will not add further," showing himself ready for correction. And because he judged that Job would be gravely disturbed against him, he consequently shows that his disturbance would be unjust, adding, "does God require it of you?" As if to say: even granted that I have spoken iniquity, you are not bound to answer to God for it, whence you ought not to be gravely disturbed on this account, whence he adds, "because it has displeased you?" Namely through an inordinate disturbance of mind. Now he shows secondly that he ought not to be gravely disturbed because Job himself had begun the words, saying, "let the day perish," etc., from which the whole disputation took its origin, whence he adds, "for you began to speak, and not I." Thirdly he shows that he ought not to be gravely disturbed because he himself also has the faculty of saying what pleases him, whence he adds, "but if you know anything better," namely than what I have said, "speak," namely by showing my error or iniquity.

And lest it seem that he had said this as though doubting his own justice and the truth of his own words, he intends consequently to assert that Job is deficient both in wisdom and in understanding: and for this reason he judged him unworthy of his disputation, one part of which pertains to the opponent, in whom is especially required acuteness of intellect for finding reasonable ways to demonstrate the proposition, whence he adds, "let men of understanding speak to me," namely raising objections to me; the other part of the disputation pertains to the respondent, in whom is especially required wisdom that he may judge well of what is heard, whence he adds, "and let a wise man hear me," namely the objector, ready to respond. Now he had gathered this defect in Job from his words, whence he adds, "but Job has spoken foolishly," that is, against wisdom, namely as to this, that he judged him to have said something against the rectitude of the divine judgment, "and his words do not sound of discipline," which indeed pertains to an ordered intellect, and this he seems to have referred to the fact that Job asserted himself to be just. And because Job did not recognize these defects in himself, Elihu turns his words to God, asking that Job be tried so as to recognize his defects, whence he adds, "my father," that is, O God whom I reckon as a father on account of the reverence I have toward you, defending your justice in all things, "let Job be tried," that is, let his defect be shown to him through scourges, "unto the end," that is, until he recognize himself unjust; or "unto the end," that is, until death. And he shows the justice of this petition by adding, "do not cease from a man of iniquity," as if to say: his iniquity deserves this, that scourges should not cease. And for greater emphasis he adds, "who to his sins," namely the past ones for which he has been scourged, "adds blasphemy," namely so as to assert that he himself is just but God unjust; for which he wishes upon him first indeed a punishment in the present, whence he adds, "let him meanwhile be constrained among us," namely by adversities; and secondly he hints at a future punishment, whence he adds, "and then," namely once already afflicted in time, "let him provoke God to judgment," namely of future vengeance, "by his own words," namely by which he blasphemes against him.