Commentary on Romans (Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos Lectura)

After the Apostle has shown that through the grace of Christ we are freed from sin, here he shows that through this same grace of Christ we are freed from the servitude of the law. And concerning this he does two things. First he sets forth his proposition; second he excludes an objection, at the place, "What shall we say then," etc. Concerning the first he does two things. First he shows that through the grace of Christ we are freed from the servitude of the law; second he shows the usefulness of this liberation, at the place, "that we may bring forth fruit to God," etc. Concerning the first he does three things. First he sets forth a teaching, from which an argument is drawn to show the proposition; second he makes it manifest, at the place, "for the woman that is under a husband," etc.; third he concludes, at the place, "wherefore, my brethren," etc.

Now he sets forth the teaching to them as something known. Hence he says, "know you not, brethren," as if he were saying: you ought not to be ignorant of this. 1 Corinthians 14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." And he shows the reason why they ought not to be ignorant, adding, "for I speak to them that know the law." But since the Romans were Gentiles and were ignorant of the law of Moses, what is said here seems not to apply to them. And therefore some have expounded this of the natural law, which was not unknown to the Gentiles, according to that which was said above, Romans 2:14: "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," etc. Hence it is also added, "that the law has dominion over a man," namely the natural law, "as long as it lives," namely the law, in man. Which indeed lives so long as natural reason flourishes effectively in man. But the natural law dies in man when natural reason succumbs to the passions. Isaiah 24:5: "They have broken the everlasting covenant," namely of the natural law.

But this does not seem to be according to the intention of the Apostle, who, speaking absolutely and indeterminately of the law, always speaks of the law of Moses. And therefore it must be said that the Roman faithful were not only Gentiles, but among them there were many Jews. Hence it is found in Acts 18:2, that Paul at Corinth found a certain Jew, named Aquila, who had recently come from Italy, and Priscilla his wife, because Claudius had commanded all the Jews to depart from Rome. The law therefore has dominion over man in this way, as long as he lives, namely, man. For the law was given to direct men in the way of this life, according to Psalm 24:12: "He has appointed him a law in the way he has chosen." Therefore the obligation of the law is dissolved by death.

Then, when he says, "for the woman that is under a husband," etc., he makes manifest what he had said by an example in the law of marriage. And first he sets forth the example; second he makes it manifest by a sign, at the place, "therefore, while her husband lives," etc. Concerning the first he does two things.

First, in the example, he sets forth how the obligation of the law lasts while life lasts, saying, "for the woman that is under a husband," that is, under the power of her husband, "is" so by divine law, by which it was said, Genesis 3:16: "You shall be under your husband's power." "She is bound to the law," namely by which she is held to live together with her husband, according to Matthew 19:6: "What God has joined together, let no man put asunder." And this inseparability of marriage is indeed caused chiefly insofar as it is a sacrament of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, or of the Word and human nature in the person of Christ. Ephesians 5:32: "This is a great sacrament in Christ and in the Church," etc.

Second, at the place, "but if her husband be dead," etc., he makes manifest in the example how the obligation of the law is dissolved after death, saying: "but if the husband," namely, of the woman, "be dead," the woman, after the death of her husband, "is loosed from the law of her husband," that is, from the law of matrimony by which she was bound to her husband. For since, as Augustine says in the book On Marriage and Concupiscence, marriage is a good of mortals, the obligation of marriage does not extend itself beyond mortal life. And because of this, in the resurrection, when life will be immortal, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is said in Matthew 22:30. From which it is clear that if someone should die and rise again, as happened in the case of Lazarus, she who had been his wife will not be his wife, unless she should again contract marriage with him anew.

But against this is brought forward what is found in Hebrews 11:35: "Women received their dead raised to life again." But it should be known that the women did not receive back their husbands, but their sons: as a certain woman did through Elijah, as is found in 3 Kings 17:17 and following, and another through Elisha, as is found in 4 Kings 4:18 and following. But it is otherwise in the case of the sacraments which imprint a character, which is a certain consecration of the immortal soul. But every consecration remains as long as the thing consecrated remains, as is clear in the consecration of a church or an altar. And therefore if one who has been baptized, or confirmed, or ordained should die and rise again, he ought not to receive the same sacraments again.

Then, when he says, "therefore, while he lives," etc., he makes manifest what he had said, by a sign. And first as to the obligation of matrimony, which endures in the woman while her husband lives, the sign of which is that she is called an adulteress if she should be with another man, that is, carnally united to him, while her husband lives. Jeremiah 3:1: "If a man shall put away his wife, and she, departing from him, marry another man, shall not that woman be polluted and defiled?"

Second, at the place, "but if he be dead," etc., he brings in the sign as to the fact that the obligation of the law of matrimony is dissolved by death, saying that if her husband, namely the woman's, should die, the woman is freed from the law of her husband, by which she is bound to her husband, so that she is not an adulteress if she should be carnally united to another man, especially if she is joined to him in marriage. 1 Corinthians 7:39: "If her husband," namely, the woman's, "die, she is at liberty: let her marry to whom she will." From which it is clear that second, or third, or fourth marriages are lawful in themselves, and not only by dispensation, as Chrysostom seems to say, who, upon Matthew, says that just as Moses permitted a bill of divorce, so the Apostle permitted second marriages. For there is no reason, if the law of matrimony is dissolved by death, why it should not be lawful for the surviving spouse to pass over to second vows. But as to what the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 3:2, that a bishop must be the husband of one wife, this is not said because second marriages are unlawful, but on account of a defect of the sacrament, because he would not be one man of one woman, as Christ is the spouse of one Church.

Then, when he says, "wherefore, my brethren," etc., he concludes the principal proposition, saying, "wherefore," etc., that is, by the fact that you have been made members of the body of Christ, dead together with him and buried, as was held above, "you are become dead to the law," that is, as to the fact that the obligation of the law ceases in you, in such a way, namely, that you may now belong to another, namely Christ, subject to his law, "who is risen again from the dead," in whom you also, rising again, have taken up a new life. And thus you are held bound not by the law of the former life, but by the law of the new life.

But there seems to be a dissimilarity in this respect, that in the preceding example the husband was dying, and the woman remained without the obligation of the law. But here he who is released from the obligation is said to die. But if we consider rightly, both are of the same reason, because since matrimony is between two, as a certain relation, it does not matter which of the two dies, as to the removal of the law of matrimony: for whichever happens, it is manifest that through the death by which we die together with Christ, the obligation of the old law ceases.

Then, when he says, "that we may bring forth fruit," he shows the usefulness of the aforesaid liberation. And concerning this he does three things.

First he sets forth the usefulness, saying, "that we may bring forth fruit to God." For by this, that we are made members of Christ, remaining in Christ, we are able to produce the fruit of good work to the honor of God. John 15:4: "As the branch cannot bear fruit," etc.

Second, at the place, "for when we were," he shows that this fruit was hindered when we were under the servitude of the law, saying: "when we were in the flesh," that is, subject to the concupiscences of the flesh. Below, Romans 8:9: "But you are not in the flesh, but in the spirit." But the passions and affections of sins, which indeed were, through the law, either made known or increased occasionally, as was shown above, "were at work in our members," that is, moved our members. James 4:1: "From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not from your concupiscences?" And this, "that they might bring forth fruit unto death," that is, that they might produce the fruit of death. James 1:15: "Sin, when it is completed, begets death."

Third, at the place, "but now we are loosed," he shows that the aforesaid usefulness is acquired by those who are freed from the servitude of the law, saying, "but now we are loosed," through the grace of Christ, "from the law of death," that is, from the servitude of the law of Moses, which is called the law of death, either because it killed bodily without mercy. Hebrews 10:28: "A man making void the law of Moses," etc. Or rather it is called the law of death, because it killed spiritually by occasion, according to that saying, 2 Corinthians 3:6: "The letter kills," etc. In which law, "we were held," as it were servants under the law. Galatians 3:23: "But before the faith came, we were kept under the law." "So," namely we are loosed, "that we should serve in newness of spirit," renewed in spirit through the grace of Christ. Ezekiel 36:27: "I will give you a new heart, and put a new spirit within you." "Not in the oldness of the letter," that is, not according to the old law. Or, not in the oldness of sin, which the letter of the law was not able to take away. Psalm 6:8: "I have grown old among all my enemies."

After the Apostle has shown that through the grace of Christ we are freed from the servitude of the law, and that this liberation is useful, here he responds to a certain objection, which takes its occasion from what has preceded, by which it seems that the old law is not good. And concerning this he does two things. First he resolves the objection by which the law seems not to be good; second he shows the law to be good, where he says "for we know," etc. Concerning the first he does two things. First he sets out the objection as regards the law itself; second he resolves it, where he says "therefore the law indeed is holy," etc.

He says therefore first: it has been said that the passions of sins were through the law, and that it is a law of death; what then shall we say follows from this? Shall we say that the law is sin? This indeed can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the law teaches sin, as it is said in Jeremiah 10:3: "the laws of the peoples are vain," because namely they teach vanity. In another way, that the law is called sin because he who gave the law sinned, in enacting such a law. And these two follow upon each other, because if the law teaches sin, the lawgiver sins in enacting the law. Isaiah 10:1: "Woe to those who enact unjust laws." But it seems that the law teaches sin, if the passions of sins are through the law, and if the law leads to death.

Then when he says "God forbid," he resolves the aforesaid objection. Concerning this it must be known that if the law of itself and directly caused the passions of sins or death, it would follow that the law would be sin in one of the aforesaid ways; but not if the law is the occasion of the passions of sin and of death. Concerning this therefore he does two things. First he shows what the law does of itself; second he shows what follows from it by way of occasion, where he says "but sin, taking occasion," etc.

Concerning the first he does three things. First he answers the question, saying "God forbid," namely, that the law should be sin. For neither does it teach sin, according to that word, Psalm 18:8: "the law of the Lord is immaculate," nor did the lawgiver sin, as if enacting an unjust law, according to that word, Proverbs 8:15: "by me kings reign," etc.

Second, where he says "but sin," etc., he sets down what pertains to the law of itself, namely to make sin known and not to take it away. And this is what he says: "but I did not know sin except through the law." Above, 3:20: "for through the law is the knowledge of sin." And if indeed this is understood of the natural law, what is said is manifest, because through the natural law man judges between good and evil. Ecclesiasticus 17:6: "he filled their hearts with sense, and showed them both good and evil." But the Apostle here seems to be speaking of the old law, which he signified above, saying "not in the oldness of the letter." It must therefore be said that without the law, sin could indeed be known insofar as it has the character of the dishonorable, that is, of being against reason, but not insofar as it imports offense against God; because through the law divinely given it is made manifest to man that human sins displease God, in this, that it forbids them and commands them to be punished.

Third, where he says "for concupiscence," etc., he proves what he had said, saying: "for I did not know concupiscence, unless the law said: You shall not covet." Concerning this it must be considered that what he had said—that sin is not known except through the law—someone could refer to the very act of sin, which the law brings to man's knowledge while it forbids it. And this indeed is true as regards some sins; for it is said, Leviticus 18:23: "A woman shall not lie down to a beast." But that this is not the Apostle's meaning here is clear from what is said here. For there is no one who is ignorant of the very act of concupiscence, since all experience it. It must therefore be understood, as we said above, that sin is not known except through the law, as regards the guilt of punishment and the offense against God.

But he proves this through concupiscence, because depraved concupiscence stands in a general relation to all sins. Hence the Gloss says, and Augustine: "the Apostle chose this which is a general sin," namely concupiscence. The law is therefore good, which, while it forbids concupiscences, forbids all evils. Now it can be understood that concupiscence is a general sin, insofar as it is taken for the concupiscence of an illicit thing, which belongs to the essence of any sin whatsoever. But Augustine did not call concupiscence a general sin in this way, but because some special concupiscence is the root and cause of every sin. Hence also the Gloss says that concupiscence is a general sin, from which all evils come. For the Apostle brings in the precept of the law which is found in Exodus 20:17, where it is specially forbidden: "you shall not covet the thing of your neighbor," which is the concupiscence of avarice, of which 1 Timothy 6:10 speaks: "covetousness is the root of all evils." And this is so because "all things obey money," as is said in Ecclesiastes 10:19. And therefore the concupiscence of which he speaks here is a general evil, not by community of genus or species, but by community of causality. Nor is it contrary to what is found in Ecclesiasticus 10:15: "the beginning of all sin is pride." For pride is the beginning of sin on the part of aversion. But covetousness is the principle of sins on the part of conversion toward a changeable good.

It can, however, be said that the Apostle specially takes up concupiscence for the manifestation of his proposal, because he wishes to show that without the law sin was not known, namely insofar as it pertains to offense against God; and this is most clearly evident from the fact that the law of God forbids concupiscence, which is not forbidden by man. For God alone reckons man guilty on account of the concupiscence of the heart, according to that word, 1 Kings 16:17: "men see the things that appear, but God looks upon the heart." But the law of God rather forbade the concupiscence of another's thing, which is taken away by theft, and of another's wife, who is violated through adultery, more than the concupiscence of other sins, because these sins even in the very concupiscence have a certain delight, which does not happen with other sins.

Then, when he says "but occasion having been taken," etc., he shows what follows by way of occasion from the law. And first he sets forth what he intends; second he manifests his proposal, where he says "without the law," etc. He says therefore first, that sin, occasion having been taken through the commandment—namely of the law forbidding sin—wrought in me all concupiscence. Now by "sin" here can be understood the Devil, according to an emphatic manner of speaking, because he is the beginning of sin. And according to this, he works in man every concupiscence of sin. 1 John 3:8: "he who commits sin is of the Devil, because the Devil sins from the beginning." But because the Apostle here had not made mention of the Devil, it can be said that any actual sin whatsoever, insofar as it is apprehended in thought, works in man its own concupiscence, according to that word, James 1:14: "each one is tempted by his own concupiscence: then concupiscence gives birth to sin."

But it is better that we refer this to the sin which he had said above, chapter 5:12, entered into this world through one man—namely, to original sin, which indeed before the grace of Christ is in man according to guilt and punishment, but, grace having come, passes away in guilt and remains in act as regards the tinder of sin; or to habitual concupiscence, which works in man every actual concupiscence—whether this be referred to the concupiscences of diverse sins (for the concupiscence of theft is one thing, that of adultery another, and so of the rest), or whether it be referred to the diverse degrees of concupiscence, as it consists in thought, delight, consent, and deed. But sin takes occasion from the law for working this effect in man. And this is what he says: "occasion having been taken." Either because, with the commandment's coming, the character of transgression is added—since where there is no law, neither is there transgression, as was said above at 4:15—or because the desire for the forbidden sin grows, for the reasons set forth above.

And it must be noted that he does not say that the law gave occasion for sinning, but that sin itself took occasion from the law. For he who gives occasion scandalizes and consequently sins; and this indeed happens when someone does some less upright work, whereby his neighbor is offended or scandalized—for instance, if someone should frequent disreputable places, even without bad intention. Hence it is said below, 14:18: "judge this rather, that you should not put a stumbling block or scandal for your brothers." But if someone does an upright work—for instance, if he gives alms and another is thereby scandalized—he himself does not give occasion for scandal; hence he neither scandalizes nor sins, but the other, who is scandalized, takes the occasion, and it is he who sins. So then the law did something upright, because it forbade sin; hence it did not give occasion for sinning; but man takes occasion from the law, and on account of this it follows that the law is not sin, but rather that sin is on the part of man.

Thus therefore it must be understood that the passions of sins which pertain to the concupiscence of sin are not through the law, as though the law worked them, but sin works them, occasion having been taken from the law. And for the same reason it is called a law of death, not because the law works death, but because sin works death, occasion having been taken from the law. The letter, however, can in the same sense be ordered otherwise, so that it be said that sin worked, through the commandment of the law, all concupiscence, and this by occasion taken from the commandment itself; but the first exposition is simpler and better.

Then, when he says "for without the law," he manifests what he had said, and this through the experience of the effect. And first he sets forth the effect; second he resumes the cause, where he says "for sin," etc. Concerning the first he does three things. First he describes the state before the law; second, the state under the law, where he says "but when the commandment had come," etc.; third, from a comparison of both states, he concludes the outcome of the law, where he says "and it was found to me," etc.

He says therefore first, that sin, occasion having been taken through the commandment, wrought in me all concupiscence, which appears from this: "for without the law sin was dead"—not indeed in the sense that sin did not exist, since through one man sin entered into this world before the law, as was said above at 5:12. But it is understood that it was dead, either as regards man's knowledge, who did not know certain things forbidden by the law to be sins, for instance concupiscence; or because it was dead as regards the efficacy of causing death, by comparison to what it was afterward. For it did not have as great a power of inducing man to death as it afterward had, occasion having been taken under the law. For that is held to be as it were dead which is weakened in power. Colossians 3:5: "mortify your members which are upon the earth." Such then was the state before the law as regards sin.

But what it was as regards man, he shows by adding: "but I lived without the law at one time." This too can be understood in two ways. In one way, as regards what seemed to man of himself, that he was living, while he did not know sin to be that by which he was dead. Apocalypse 3:1: "you have a name that you live, but you are dead." Or this is said by comparison to the death which followed by occasion of the law. For those who sin less are said to live, in comparison to those who sin more.

Then, when he says "but when the commandment had come," etc., he describes the state under the law. And first as regards sin, when he says "but when the commandment had come"—the law, namely, having been given—"sin revived," which can be understood in two ways. In one way, as regards man's knowledge, who began to know that sin was in him, which he had not known before. Jeremiah 31:19: "after you showed me, I struck my thigh, I was confounded and ashamed." And he significantly said "revived," because in Paradise man had had full knowledge of sin, although he did not have it through experience. Or "it revived" as regards power, because, the law having been given, the power of sin was, by occasion, increased. 1 Corinthians 15:56: "the power of sin, the law."

Second, as regards man himself, when he says "but I died." This too can be understood in two ways. In one way according to knowledge, so that the sense is "I died," that is, I came to know myself as dead. In another way by comparison to the prior state, so that the sense is "I died," that is, I am more bound over to death than before. Hence it is in some way true, what was said to Moses and Aaron, Numbers 14:41: "you have killed the people of the Lord."

Then, when he says "and it was found," etc., he concludes, from the comparison of both states, the outcome of the law, saying: "and it was found," according to what has been said, that the commandment which was unto life—first indeed according to the intention of the giver of the law; second as regards the very honorableness of the commandment and the devotion of the one obeying. Ezekiel 20:11: "I gave them good precepts and judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." "this was unto death for me"—by occasion, namely through the sin which was in man. Job 20:14: "his bread in his belly shall be turned into the gall of asps within him," etc.

Then, when he says "for sin," etc., he resumes the cause, as it were manifesting it through the aforesaid outcome, saying: this happens for this reason—namely that the aforesaid commandment, which was unto life, should be found to be unto death—for sin, occasion having been taken through the commandment, deceived me, namely through the concupiscence which it wrought in me, as is said, Daniel 13:56: "beauty has deceived you, and concupiscence has subverted your heart," and through it—namely the commandment—sin, by occasion, killed me. 2 Corinthians 3:6: "the letter kills."

Then, when he says "therefore the law," etc., he draws the intended conclusion, namely that the law is not only not sin, but further that it is good, as making sin known and forbidding it. And first he concludes as regards the whole law, saying: as is clear from what has preceded, "the law indeed is holy." Psalm 18:8: "the law of the Lord is immaculate." 1 Timothy 1:8: "we know that the law is good." Second, as regards the particular commandment of the law, saying "and the commandment of the law is holy"—as regards the ceremonial precepts, by which men are ordered to the worship of God. Leviticus 20:7: "be holy, because I am holy." And "just," as regards the judicial precepts, by which man is ordered in due measure toward his neighbor. Psalm 18:10: "the judgments of the Lord are true, justified," etc. And "good," that is, honorable, as regards the moral precepts. Psalm 118:72: "the law of your mouth is good to me above thousands," etc. Yet because all the precepts order us to God, therefore he named the whole law holy.

Then, when he says "was that then which is good," etc., he raises a question as regards the effect of the law. And first the question, saying "was that then which is good"—namely in itself—"made death unto me," that is, of itself the cause of death? This indeed someone could falsely understand from what was said above: "it was found that the commandment which was unto life, this was unto death for me." Second he resolves it by outright denial, saying "God forbid." That which is of itself good and life-giving cannot be the cause of evil and of death, according to that word, Matthew 7:18: "a good tree cannot produce evil fruits."

Third, where he says "but sin," etc., he harmonizes what is now said with what was said above. For the commandment is not thus found to be unto death, that it itself works death, but because, occasion having been taken from it, sin works death. And this is what he says: "but sin, that it may appear sin"—that is, from this it appears to be sin—"through the good of the law," that is, through the commandment of the law; because from this the thing itself is good, that it produces knowledge of sin. And this by occasion, insofar as it manifests sin. But sin is not thus understood to have worked death through the law, as though without the law there would have been no death. For it was said above that "death reigned from Adam even to Moses," namely when there was no law. But it is understood that sin works death through the law, because the condemnation of death was increased by the coming of the law. And this is what is added: thus I say that sin worked death through the good, "that sin might become sinning"—that is, causing to sin, through the commandment of the law, by occasion. And this beyond the measure in which they had sinned before, either because the guilt of transgression was added, or because the concupiscence of sin grew, as was said above, the prohibition of the law having come. But "sin" here is understood, as we said above, to be either the Devil, or rather the tinder of sin.

After the Apostle excluded those things from which the law seemed to be evil and an effect of evil, here he proves that the law is good. And concerning this he does two things. First he proves the goodness of the law from the very repugnance which is found in man toward the good, which the law cannot remove; secondly he shows by what means this repugnance to the law can be removed, at the words "unhappy man that I am," etc. Concerning the first he does three things. First he sets forth what he intends; secondly he proves his proposition, at the words "for what I work," etc.; thirdly he draws the intended conclusion, at the words "I find then," etc. Concerning the first he does two things. First he sets forth the goodness of the law; secondly, the condition of man, at the words "but I," etc.

He says therefore first: it has been said that the law is holy. And this he expresses by "for we know" — we who are wise in divine matters — "that the law," namely the old law, "is spiritual," that is, bringing men into accord with the spirit. Psalm: "the law of the Lord is unspotted." Or "spiritual" in the sense of having been given by the Holy Spirit, who is called the finger of God in Scripture. Luke 11:20: "If I cast out devils by the finger of God." Hence it is said in Exodus 31:18: "The Lord gave to Moses two tables of stone, written with the finger of God." The new law, however, is called not only the spiritual law but the law of the spirit, as is clear below at 8:2, because it is not only from the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit imprints it upon the heart which he indwells.

Then, when he says "but I am carnal," etc., he shows the condition of man. And this saying can be expounded in two ways. In one way, that the Apostle speaks in the person of a man existing in sin. And thus Augustine expounds it in the book of Eighty-three Questions. But afterward, in the book Against Julian, he expounds this so that the Apostle is understood to speak in his own person, that is, of a man established under grace. Let us therefore proceed to explain how these words and what follows can be expounded in different ways according to both manners, although the second exposition is better.

What is said first, then, "but I," etc., is to be understood in this way: that the word "I" is understood as standing for the reason of man, which is the principal element in man; hence each man seems to be his own reason or his own intellect, just as a city seems to be its ruler, so that what the ruler does, the city is seen to do. Now a man is called carnal because his reason is carnal, which is said to be carnal in two ways. In one way, from the fact that it is subjected to the flesh, consenting to those things to which the flesh incites, according to 1 Corinthians 3:3: "Whereas there is among you envying and contention, are you not carnal," etc. And this way is understood of a man not yet repaired by grace. In another way reason is said to be carnal from the fact that it is assailed by the flesh, according to Galatians 5:17: "the flesh lusts against the spirit." And in this way the reason even of a man established under grace is understood to be carnal. For both kinds of carnality arise from sin, hence he adds "sold under sin."

But it must be noted that the carnality which implies the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit arises from the sin of the first parent, because this pertains to the tinder of sin, whose corruption is derived from that sin. But the carnality which implies subjection to the flesh arises not only from original sin, but also from actual sin, by which man, obeying the concupiscences of the flesh, makes himself a slave of the flesh; hence he adds "sold under sin," namely either the sin of the first parent, or his own. And he says "sold," because the sinner sells himself into a slave of sin, at the price of fulfilling his own will. Isaiah 50:1: "Behold you are sold for your iniquities."

Then, when he says "for what I work," etc., he shows what he had proposed. And first, that the law is spiritual; secondly, that man is carnal, sold under sin, at the words "now then it is no more I," etc. Concerning the first he does two things. First he sets forth the proof; secondly he draws the conclusion, at the words "now if I do that which I will not," etc. The proof is taken, however, from man's weakness, which he first sets forth; secondly he adduces the proof, at the words "for not," etc.

Now man's weakness is manifest also from this, that he works that which he understands is not to be worked; hence it is said "for what I work, I understand not," namely, that it is to be worked. This indeed can be understood in two ways. In one way, of him who is subject to sin, who indeed understands in a universal way that sin is not to be worked, yet, overcome by the suggestion of the devil, or by passion, or by the inclination of a perverse habit, works it. And therefore he is said to work what he understands is not to be worked, acting against conscience; as in Luke 12:47: "the servant who knew the will of his lord and did not do it, shall be beaten with many stripes." In another way it can be understood of him who is established in grace. He indeed works evil, not by carrying it out in deed or by a consenting mind, but only by concupiscence according to the passion of the sensible appetite; and that concupiscence is apart from reason and intellect, because it forestalls its judgment, upon whose arrival such an operation is impeded. And therefore he pointedly does not say "I understand that it is not to be done," but "I understand not," because, namely, while the intellect has not yet deliberated or given command, such an operation of concupiscence arises. Galatians 5:17: "the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."

Then, when he says "for I do not that good which I will," etc., he proves what he had said, both by division and by effect. By division, indeed, of that which he said, "for what I work," etc., under which two things are contained, namely not doing good and doing evil, because even he who does not do good is said to work sin, by the sin of omission. But on the part of what he said, "I understand not," he proves by effect; for since the intellect moves the will, willing is the effect of that which is understanding.

He says therefore first, as to the omission of good: "for the good which I will, I do not do." This indeed can be understood in one way of a man established under sin: and thus what he says, "I do," is to be taken according to a complete action, which is exercised outwardly in deed through the consent of reason. But what he says, "I will," is to be understood not indeed of a complete will, which commands the deed, but of a certain incomplete will, by which men will the good in a universal way, just as in a universal way they also have a right judgment about the good; yet through a perverse habit or passion this judgment is perverted and such a will is depraved in the particular, so that a man does not do what in a universal way he understands is to be done and would will to do. But according as it is understood of a man repaired by grace, it must conversely be understood that by what he says, "I will," is meant a complete will persevering in the choice of the particular operation, so that by what he says, "I do," is understood an incomplete action, which consists only in the sensitive appetite, not arriving as far as the consent of reason. For a man established under grace indeed wills to preserve his mind from wicked concupiscences, but he does not do this good, on account of the inordinate movements of concupiscence arising in the sensitive appetite. And similar is what he says in Galatians 5:17: "so that you do not the things that you would."

Secondly, as to the perpetration of evil, he adds: "but the evil which I hate, that I do." If this indeed be understood of a sinful man, by what he says, "I hate," is understood a certain imperfect hatred, according to which every man naturally hates evil. But by what he says, "I do," is understood a perfect action, through the execution of the deed according to the consent of reason. For that hatred of evil in a universal way is removed, in the particular object of choice, through the inclination of a habit or a passion. But if it be understood of a man established under grace, by what he says, "I do," is conversely understood an imperfect action, which consists only in the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite. By what he says, "I hate," is understood a perfect hatred, by which one perseveres in the detestation of evil even to its final reprobation, of which it is said in Psalm 138:22: "I have hated them with a perfect hatred," namely the wicked, insofar as they are sinners. 2 Maccabees 3:1: "when the laws were as yet very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high priest, and the others hating evil."

Then, when he says "now if I do that which I will not," etc., he concludes from the aforesaid disposition of man that the law is good, saying: "now if I do that which I will not, I consent to the law, that it is good" — in whichever of the aforesaid ways it be understood — by this very fact that I do not will evil, I consent to the law, that it is good, in this, that it forbids the evil which I naturally do not will. For it is manifest that the inclination of man according to reason to will the good and to flee evil is according to nature or grace, and each of these is good. Hence the law also, which agrees with this inclination by commanding the good and forbidding evil, is by the same reasoning good. Proverbs 4:2: "I will give you a good gift, forsake not my law," etc.

Then, when he says "now then it is I," etc., he proves what he had said about the condition of man, namely that he is carnal, sold under sin. And concerning this he does three things. First he sets forth what he intends; secondly he proves his proposition, at the words "for I know," etc.; thirdly he concludes what he intended, at the words "now if I do that which I will not," etc.

That the carnal man, sold under sin, is in a certain manner a slave of sin, appears from this, that he himself does not act but is acted upon by sin. For he who is free, acts of himself, and is not acted upon by another. And therefore he says: it has been said that through intellect and will I consent to the law; but now, while I act against the law, it is no longer I who work that which I do against the law, but sin, which dwells in me; and thus it is clear that I am a slave of sin, inasmuch as sin, having as it were dominion in me, is the one working.

And this indeed can rightly and easily be understood of a man established under grace, since what he desires as evil according to the sensitive appetite belonging to the flesh does not proceed from the work of reason, but from the inclination of the tinder of sin. Now that is said to be worked by man which reason works, because man is what he is according to reason; hence the movements of concupiscence, which are not from reason but from the tinder, are worked not by man but by the tinder of sin, which is here called sin. James 4:1: "From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not from your concupiscences, which war in your members?"

But concerning a man established under sin this cannot properly be understood, because his reason consents to sin, and therefore he himself is the one working. Hence Augustine says, and it is found in the Gloss: a man is much deceived who, consenting to the concupiscence of his own flesh, and deciding to do what it desires, and having so resolved, still thinks he can say: "it is not I who work it." It can nevertheless, although forcedly, be expounded also of the sinful man. For an action is attributed above all to the principal agent, which moves according to its own property, and not to an agent which moves or acts according to the property of another by which it is moved. But it is manifest that the reason of man, according to what is proper to itself, is not inclined to evil except insofar as it is moved by concupiscence. And therefore the working of evil which reason does, insofar as it is overcome by concupiscence, is not attributed principally to reason, which is here understood by "man," but rather to the concupiscence itself or to the habit, from which reason is inclined to evil. Now sin is said to dwell in man, not as though sin were some thing, since it is a privation of good, but the permanence of this sort of defect in man is thereby designated.

Then, when he says "for I know," he proves that the sin dwelling in man works the evil which man does. And first he lays down the middle term for proving his proposition; secondly he clarifies that middle term, at the words "for to will," etc.

He proves therefore first that the sin dwelling in man works the evil which man does. This proof indeed is manifest according as the words are referred to a man established under grace, who is freed from sin through the grace of Christ, as was held above at 6:22. As regards, then, that in which the grace of Christ does not dwell, he is not yet freed from sin. But the grace of Christ does not dwell in the flesh, but dwells in the mind; hence below at 8:10 it is said that if Christ is in us, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit lives because of justification. Therefore sin still holds dominion in the flesh, which the concupiscence of the flesh works. For here he takes "flesh" together with the sensitive powers. For thus flesh is distinguished against spirit and is repugnant to it, insofar as the sensitive appetite tends toward the contrary of that which reason desires, according to Galatians 5:17: "the flesh lusts against the spirit."

He says therefore: it has been said that in me, even repaired by grace, sin works; but this must be understood "in me" according to the flesh together with the sensitive appetite. "For I know," through reason and experience, "that" the good, namely of grace, by which I have been reformed, "does not dwell in me." But lest it be understood "according to reason," in the manner set forth above, he explains: "that is, in my flesh." For "in me," that is, in my heart, this good does dwell, according to Ephesians 3:17: "that Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts." And by this it is clear that this saying gives no support to the Manichees, who hold that the flesh is not good according to nature, and thus is not a good creature of God, since it is written in 1 Timothy 4:4: "every creature of God is good." For the Apostle here is not treating of the good of nature, but of the good of grace, by which we are freed from sin. But if this be referred to a man existing under sin, then what he says, "that is, in my flesh," is superfluously added. Because in a sinful man the good of grace dwells neither as regards the flesh, nor as regards the mind; unless perhaps someone should wish, forcedly, to expound this as having been said because sin, which is the privation of grace, is in a certain way derived from the flesh to the mind.

Then, when he says "for to will," etc., he clarifies what he had said. And first from man's faculty; secondly from man's action, which demonstrates the faculty, at the words "for I do not that which I will," etc. Now man's faculty is first described as regards the will, which seems to be in man's power. Hence he says "for to will is present with me," that is, it is near to me, as though existing under my power. For nothing is so much established in man's will as man's will itself, as Augustine says.

Secondly he sets down man's faculty, or rather difficulty, as regards the completion of the effect, when he adds "but to perform the good, I find not" — namely, existing in my own power — according to Proverbs 16:1: "it is the part of man to prepare the soul"; and again: "the heart of man disposes his way, but it is the Lord's to direct his steps." This saying, however, seems to lend support to the Pelagians, who said that the beginning of a good work is from us, insofar as we will the good. And this is what the Apostle seems to say: "but to perform the good, I find not." But the Apostle excludes this sense in Philippians 2:13, saying: "it is God who works in us, to will and to accomplish." What he says, then, "to will is present with me" — namely to one already repaired by grace — is from the working of divine grace, through which grace indeed I not only will the good, but also do some good, because I resist concupiscence and act against it, led by the spirit; but I do not find it in my power how I might perfect this good, namely, so as to totally exclude concupiscence. And by this it is made clear that the good of grace does not dwell in the flesh, because if it dwelt in the flesh, then just as I have the faculty of willing the good through grace dwelling in the mind, so I would have the faculty of perfecting the good through grace dwelling in the flesh.

But if it be referred to a man established under sin, it can be expounded thus, that "to will" is taken for an incomplete will, which, from the instinct of nature, is present toward the good even in whatever sinners. But that willing "is present with" man, that is, lies alongside man, as though weak, unless grace grants the will efficacy to accomplish it.

Then, when he says "for I do not the good which I will," etc., he clarifies what he had said from man's action, which is the sign and effect of the human faculty. For from this it appears that man does not find how to perform the good, because he does not do the good that he wills, but does the evil that he does not will; and this indeed has been expounded above.

Then, when he says "now if I do that which I will not," etc., he concludes that which he had proposed above, saying: "now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that work it, but sin that dwells in me"; and this too has been expounded above. But it must be noted that from one and the same middle term, namely "that which I will not, I do," the Apostle concludes two things which he had set forth above: namely the goodness of the law, when he says, "now if I do that which I will not, I consent to the law of God, that it is good"; and again, the dominion of sin in man, when he says here, "now if I do that which I will not, it is no more I that work it, but sin that dwells in me." Of these two conclusions, the first pertains to what he had said, "the law is spiritual"; the second to what he had said, "but I am carnal, sold under sin." But the first conclusion, which concerns the goodness of the law, he elicits from that middle term by reason of what he says, "I will not," because his reason does not will that which the law forbids, and from this it is clear that the law is good. But on the part of what he says, "I do it," he concludes that sin holds dominion in man, working against the will of reason.

After the Apostle has shown that the law is good from the fact that it agrees with reason, here he draws two conclusions according to the two things he had set down; the second is set down where he says, "But I see another law," etc. Concerning the first he does two things. First he draws the conclusion from what has been said; second he sets down a sign for the greater manifestation of it, where he says, "I am delighted," etc.

Now he had set down two things above. The first indeed, that the law is spiritual; this having now been proved, he concludes thus: "I find then" — that is, by experience — that the law of Moses is in accord with me willing to do good, that is, with my reason, by which I approve the good and detest the evil, since that law itself also commands the good and forbids the evil. Deuteronomy 30:14: "The word is very near to you, in your mouth and in your heart, that you may do it." And in this way it was necessary that — that is, because evil, that is, sin or the tinder of sin, is present to me — that is, lies alongside my reason, as it were inhabiting my flesh. Micah 8:5: "From her that sleeps in your bosom, guard the closures of your mouth," that is, from the flesh.

Then when he says, "For I am delighted," etc., he sets down a sign by which it is shown that the law agrees with reason. For no one is delighted except in that which is fitting to him. But man according to reason is delighted in the law of God; therefore the law of God is fitting to reason. And this is what he says: "I am delighted with the law of God according to the interior man," that is, according to reason and mind, which is called the interior man — not because the soul is figured according to the form of a man, as Tertullian held, or because it alone is the man, as Plato held, that man is a soul using a body; but because that which is more principal in man is called man, as was said above. Now in man that which is more principal according to appearance indeed is that which is exterior, namely the body so figured, which is called the exterior man; but according to truth, that which is intrinsic, namely the mind or reason, is what is here called the interior man. Psalm 118:103: "How sweet are your words to my throat." 1 Maccabees 12:9: "Having for our solace the holy books that are in our hands."

Then when he says, "But I see," etc., he sets down another conclusion which corresponds to what he had said above, saying, "But I am carnal," etc. Saying, "I see another law in my members," which is the tinder of sin, which indeed can be called law for a twofold reason. In one way on account of similar effects, because just as the law induces to doing good, so the tinder induces to sinning. In another way by comparison to its cause. Now since the tinder is a certain punishment of sin, it has a twofold cause: one indeed sin itself, which took dominion in the sinner and imposed on him a law, which is the tinder, just as a lord imposes a law on a conquered servant. The other cause of the tinder is God, who placed this punishment on man when he sinned, so that the lower powers should not obey his reason. And according to this, the very disobedience of the lower powers, which is called the tinder, is called law insofar as it is introduced through the law of divine justice, like the sentence of a just judge, which has the force of law, according to that saying, 1 Kings 30:25: "And this was done from that day forward, and it was appointed and determined, and became as it were a law in Israel unto this day."

But this law consists originally indeed in the sensitive appetite, but is found diffusively in all the members, which serve concupiscence unto sinning. Above, Romans 6:19: "Just as you presented your members to serve uncleanness," etc. And therefore he says, "in my members." Now this law has two effects in man. For first it resists reason, and as to this he says, "fighting against the law of my mind," that is, against the law of Moses, which is called the law of the mind insofar as it accords with the mind, or against the natural law, which is called the law of the mind because it is naturally implanted in the mind. Above, Romans 2:15: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts." And concerning this fighting it is said, Galatians 5:17: "The flesh lusts against the spirit." The second effect is that it reduces man into servitude. And as to this he adds, "and captivating me," or according to another reading, "leading me captive," "in the law of sin, which is in my members," that is, in myself, after the manner of Hebrew speech, according to which nouns are put in place of pronouns. But the law of sin takes man captive in two ways: in one way, the sinning man, through consent and operation; in another way, the man established under grace, as to the movement of concupiscence. Concerning this captivity it is said in Psalm 125:1: "When the Lord turned the captivity of Sion."

Then when he says, "Unhappy man that I am," etc., he deals with liberation from the law of sin, and does three things concerning this. First indeed he poses the question; second he gives the answer, where he says, "the grace of God," etc.; third he draws the conclusion, where he says, "therefore I myself," etc.

Concerning the first he does two things. One thing indeed he confesses, namely his own misery, when he says, "Unhappy man that I am" — which indeed is on account of the sin which dwells in man, whether only as to the flesh, as in the just man, or also as to the mind, as in the sinner. Proverbs 14:34: "Sin makes peoples miserable." Psalm 37:7: "I have been made miserable and bowed down even to the end." The other thing he asks, saying, "Who will deliver me from the body of this death?" This indeed seems to be the question of one desiring, according to that saying, Psalm 141:10: "Bring my soul out of prison." It must be known, however, that in the body of man one can consider both the very nature of the body, which is fitting to the soul, whence the soul does not wish to be separated from it — 2 Corinthians 5:4: "We do not wish to be stripped, but to be clothed over" — and again the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, according to that saying, Wisdom 9:15: "The body which is corrupted weighs down the soul," etc. And therefore he says pointedly, "from the body of this death."

Then when he says, "The grace of God," etc., he answers the question. For man cannot by his own powers be freed from the corruption of the body, nor even of the soul, although he consents with reason against sin, but only through the grace of Christ, according to that saying, John 8:36: "If the Son shall have made you free, you shall be free indeed." And therefore there follows, "the grace of God" — namely, will free me — "which is given through Jesus Christ." John 1:17: "Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ." Now this frees from the body of this death in two ways: in one way, so that the corruption of the body does not dominate the mind, dragging it to sin; in another way, so that the corruption of the body is totally removed. As to the first, therefore, it is fitting for the sinner to say: "grace has freed me from the body of this death," that is, it has freed me from the sin into which the soul is led by the corruption of the body. But from this the just man is already freed, whence it belongs to him to say, as to the second: "the grace of God has freed me from the body of this death," namely, that in my body there be no corruption of sin or of death — which will be in the resurrection.

Then when he says, "Therefore I myself," etc., he draws a conclusion which, according to the two aforesaid expositions, is inferred differently from what precedes. For according as the aforesaid words are expounded in the person of the sinner, the conclusion is to be inferred thus: it was said that the grace of God freed me from the body of this death, namely so that I might not be led by it into sin; therefore, when I shall already be freed, with the mind I serve the law of God, but according to the flesh the law of sin, which indeed remains in the flesh as to the tinder, through which the flesh lusts against the spirit. But if the aforesaid words are understood from the person of the just man, it is to be inferred thus: the grace of God through Jesus Christ freed me from the body of this death, namely so that in me there be no corruption of sin and of death. Therefore, I myself, one and the same, before I am freed, with the mind serve the law of God, consenting to it, but with the flesh I serve the law of sin, insofar as my flesh, according to the law of the flesh, is moved to concupiscence.