Eccl 9:1

“Now I thought at that time that all men were judged worthy of the same things. And if any wise man practised righteousness, and withdrew himself from unrighteousness, and as being sagacious avoided hatred with all (which, indeed, is a thing well pleasing to God), this man seemed to me to labour in vain. For there seemed to be one end for the righteous and for the impious, for the good and for the evil, for the pure and for the impure, for him that worshipped God, and for him that worshipped not. For as the unrighteous man and the good, the man who swears a false oath, and the man who avoids swearing altogether, were suspected by me to be driving toward the same end, a certain sinister opinion stole secretly into my mind, that all men come to their end in a similar way. But now I know that these are the reflections of fools, and errors and deceits. And they assert largely, that he who is dead has perished utterly, and that the living is to be preferred to the dead, even though he may lie in darkness, and pass his life-journey after the fashion of a dog, which is better at least than a dead lion. For the living know this at any rate, that they are to die; but the dead know not anything, and there is no reward proposed to them after they have completed their necessary course. Also hatred and love with the dead have their end; for their envy has perished, and their life also is extinguished. And he has a portion in nothing who has once gone hence. Error harping still on such a string, gives also such counsel as this: What do you mean, O man, that you do not enjoy yourself delicately, and gorge yourself with all manner of pleasant food, and fill yourself to the full with wine? Do you not perceive that these things are given us from God for our unrestrained enjoyment? Put on newly washed attire, and anoint your head with myrrh, and see this woman and that, and pass your vain life vainly. For nothing else remains for you but this, neither here nor after death. But avail you yourself of all that chances; for neither shall any one take account of you for these things, nor are the things that are done by men known at all outside the circle of men. And Hades, whatever that may he, whereunto we are said to depart, has neither wisdom nor understanding. These are the things which men of vanity speak. But I know assuredly, that neither shall they who seem the swiftest accomplish that great race; nor shall those who are esteemed mighty and terrible in the judgment of men, overcome in that terrible battle. Neither, again, is prudence proved by abundance of bread, nor is understanding wont to consort with riches. Nor do I congratulate those who think that all shall find the same things befall them. But certainly those who indulge such thoughts seem to me to be asleep, and to fail to consider that, caught suddenly like fishes and birds, they will be consumed with woes, and meet speedily their proper retribution. Also I estimate wisdom at so high a price, that I should deem a small and poorly-peopled city, even though besieged also by a mighty king with his forces, to be indeed great and powerful, if it had but one wise man, however poor, among its citizens. For such a man would be able to deliver his city both from enemies and from entrenchments. And other men, it may be, do not recognise that wise man, poor as he is; but for my part I greatly prefer the power that resides in wisdom, to this might of the mere multitude of the people. Here, however, wisdom, as it dwells with poverty, is held in dishonour. But hereafter it shall be heard speaking with more authoritative voice than princes and despots who seek after things evil. For wisdom is also stronger than iron; while the folly of one individual works danger for many, even though he be an object of contempt to many.”

“One acquaints the heart with what one has decided to investigate. The heart in turn longs to know more about these things, which is why it is said, "I turned my heart to know." Those "spheres" are the matters [of inquiry]. The one who directs the heart by meditating on these spheres causes the heart to know them. However, one should note that those spheres that encircle human beings and those that the heart knows are not the same, because we may look into a lot of things, yet only know a very few of them.”

“"For all this I noted and I sought to ascertain all this: that the righteous and the wise together with their actions are in the Hand of God; whether love or hate man does not know; all preceded them. "Symmachus also interprets this more clearly, saying: I kept all these things in my heart so that I could expound all things, since the righteous and the wise, along with their works are in the hand of God. And besides neither friendship, nor hatred is known to man; yet all things are not certainin their presence, because they happen similar to all, both to the righteous and to the wicked alike. More precisely the meaning is this: I dedicated my heart even to this and wanted to know whom it is that God loves, and whom He hates. And I found too that even the work of the righteous is in the hand of God, but though, whether they are loved by God or not, now they know it cannot be and they remain undecided as to whether they should keep on doing what they are doing until it is approved, or pray. In the future therefore they will know and all will be on their faces, that is 'will precede them' when they leave this life. Knowledge of that matter then will come to them, since then is the judgement, but now the struggle. And whosoever remains confused as to whether they should keep on through the love of God, as Job, or through hate, as several sinners, will not be able to know for certain.”

“and to clarify Heb. וְלָבוּר [like] וּלְבָרֵר. all this I clarified and tested. that the righteous and the wise and their works are in God’s hand He helps them and He judges them in order to benefit them in their end. and their works These are their disciples, their servants, who follow in their ways. even love, even hate The rest of mankind does not know, and they do not discern to apply their hearts to what makes them beloved by the Omnipresent and what causes them to be hated. everything is before them before the righteous and the wise.”

“For if we could clearly know in what state God holds each one of us, we should neither depart above nor below, acquiescing in the truth in all things. But now, because this counsel has placed darkness as its hiding place, and the word is hidden from us, so that no one knows whether he is worthy of love or of hatred, more justly and more safely surely, according to the counsel of Truth itself, we choose for ourselves the last place, from which afterward we may be led up higher with honor, than we presume a higher place, from which we must soon withdraw with shame.”

“The security of salvation requires that the matter be so effected that it not fall into doubt; and there is no one who is certain of the goodness and faith of the minister, and even the same person is not certain concerning himself whether he is worthy of love or of hatred: therefore, if the Sacraments could be dispensed only by the good, no one would be certain of the reception of the Sacrament; and so it would be necessary always to repeat them, and the malice of one would prejudice the salvation of another; nor would there be any stability in the grades of the hierarchy of the Church militant, which consists especially in the dispensing of the Sacraments. And therefore it was fitting that the dispensation of the Sacraments be entrusted to man not by reason of holiness, which varies according to the will, but by reason of authority, which always remains.”

“"There are just and wise ones" etc. Here the second point is touched upon, namely the uncertainty of discernment. For a man does not know of himself whether he is a good man or an evil one, even the good man himself. Therefore he says: "There are just and wise ones," and thus good; "and their works are in the hand of God," that is, in the power of knowing, accepting, and rewarding. In his hand are merits and rewards. There are merits of good thoughts: Proverbs 21: "As the divisions of waters, so is the heart of the king in the hand of the Lord." There are merits of good affections: Psalm: "In his hand are all the ends of the earth." There are also merits of good speeches: Wisdom 7: "In his hand are both we and our words." There are also merits of good works, as in the passage at hand. There are also rewards in his hand: Wisdom 3: "The souls of the just are in the hand of God"; and since they are in the hand of God, they ought to be known. "And yet man does not know whether he is worthy of love" or of "hatred," and thus he does not know how to discern; 1 Corinthians 4: "I am conscious of nothing against myself, but I am not justified in this" etc. There is a doubt about what he says: "Man does not know whether he is worthy of love or of hatred." This seems false: 1. Because Romans 8: "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? I am certain," etc.: therefore there is an objection against it there. You will say that he knew by revelation; it is objected that man can know by himself, because the worthiness of divine love places in us sanctifying grace; but Augustine says that those things which are essentially in the soul are better known than those which are known according to species: therefore if we are certain of those things which we know according to species, as when something sweet is placed upon the tongue, much more so of grace. 2. Likewise, Augustine says that he who has faith is certain that he has faith. Therefore he who has love or charity is certain that he has it: therefore he who has grace is certain: therefore he is certain whether he is pleasing to God. 3. Likewise, concerning hatred one can be certain: indeed, he who has sinned and wills to sin is certain that he is worthy of hatred. On the contrary: I. 1 Corinthians 4: "I am conscious of nothing against myself, yet I am not justified in this," etc. 2. Likewise, Job 9: If he comes to me, I shall not see him; and if he departs, I shall not perceive it; and in the same place: "If I am simple, my very soul shall be ignorant of this." 3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus 5: "Concerning the forgiven sin, do not be without fear": therefore no one is certain. To this some respond that the passage is understood concerning the hatred of predestination and reprobation, of which no one is certain; and thus there is no objection, because predestination does not place in us any effect through which it could be known. It must be answered otherwise, because this response does not satisfy the text: for the text says: "He does not know whether he is worthy of love"; but no one is worthy of or merits being predestined: therefore it is understood according to present justice. On account of this, others respond that knowledge is twofold, namely necessary and infallible: and this we cannot have, because no one can know with certitude whether he has grace, except through revelation, as the Apostle did. There is another kind that is probable and through signs: and this indeed can be had and is had, because many know through probable signs that they are in grace. To the objection, then, that the soul sees essentially: I say that habits in the soul are not known except through the fact that the soul sees itself disposed toward some act; and because the acts of unformed and formed faith and of gratuitous and natural love are so similar that a man can scarcely or never discern between them: therefore, even if he knows the habit, he nevertheless does not know whether it is gratuitous. To the objection concerning hatred, I say that he speaks of the just, because they do not know whether they are worthy of love or hatred; not of the openly wicked. Yet whatever the case may be concerning charity and faith—whether a man knows that he has them or not—he nevertheless does not know whether he is worthy of the love or hatred of God: for we can believe, but how do we know that the Lord hates the wicked and loves the good, when He bestows so many and such great goods upon the wicked as upon the good? Hence Ecclesiastes did not say that they do not know themselves to be just, but that they do not know themselves to be beloved by God.”

“Of God. He seems to treat both alike, so that the just themselves cannot say whether their sufferings be a punishment or a trial. (St. Jerome) (Calmet) — Knoweth not certainly, and in an ordinary manner. (Worthington) — Hatred. Hebrew and Septuagint, “yet love and hatred man knoweth not.” (Haydock) — Prosperity or adversity proves nothing. (Calmet) — Mortals cannot tell whether their afflictions tend to their greater improvement, like Job’s, or they are in punishment of sin, like those of Pharao, and of the Egyptians. This they shall know after death. (Worthington) — Yet the wicked know already that they are displeasing to God. (Salmeron in 2 Corinthians xii.) “The just and….their works are in the hand of God, even love and hatred; men know not,” &c. (De Dieu; Amama)”

“"For all this I brought to my consciousness, and all this I sought to make clear to me, that the righteous, and the wise, and their deeds, are in God's hands: neither love nor hatred stands in the knowledge of man, all lies before them." With ki follows the verification of what is said in Ecc 8:17, "is unable to find out," from the fact of men, even the best and the wisest of men, being on all sides conditioned. This conditioning is a fact which he layeth to his heart (Ecc 7:2), or (since he here presents himself less as a feeling than as a thinking man, and the heart as reflecting) which he has brought to his consciousness, and which he has sought to bring out into clearness. ולבוּל has here not the force of an inf. absol., so that it subordinates itself in an adverbial manner (et ventilando quidem) - for it nowhere stands in the same rank with the inf. absol.; but the inf. with ל (ל) has the force of an intentional (with a tendency) fut., since the governing הייתי, as at Ecc 3:15, היה, and at Hab 1:17, יהיה, is to be supplied (vid., comm. on these passages, and under Isa 44:14): operam dedi ut ventilarem (excuterem), or shorter: ventilaturus fui. Regarding the form לבוּר, which is metapl. for לבר, and the double idea of sifting (particularly winnowing, ventilare) of the R. בר, vid., under Ecc 3:18. In the post-bibl. Heb. the words להעמיד על בוריו would denote the very same as is here expressed by the brief significant word לבוּר; a matter in the clearness of its actual condition is called בוריו דבר על (from לברי, after the form חלי, purity, vid., Buxtorf's Lex. Talm. col. 366). The lxx and Syr. have read ראה ולבי instead of ולבור, apparently because they could not see their way with it: "And my heart has seen all this." The expression "all this" refers both times to what follows; asher is, as at Ecc 8:12, relat. conj., in the sense of ὃτι, quod, and introduces, as at Ecc 7:29, cf. Ecc 8:14, the unfolding of the זה - an unfolding, viz., of the conditioning of man, which Ecc 8:17 declared on one side of it, and whose further verification is here placed in view with ki, Ecc 9:1. The righteous, and the wise, and their doings, are in God's hand, i.e., power (Psa 31:16; Pro 21:1; Job 12:10, etc.); as well their persons as their actions, in respect of their last cause, are conditioned by God, the Governor of the world and the Former of history; also the righteous and the wise learn to feel this dependence, not only in their being and in what befalls them, but also in their conduct; also this is not fully attained, לאל ידם, they are also therein not sufficient of themselves. Regarding 'avadēhěm, corresponding to the Aram. 'ovadēhon, vid., 'avad. The expression now following cannot mean that man does not know whether he will experience the love or hatred of God, i.e., providences of a happy nature proceeding from the love of God, or of an unhappy nature proceeding from the hatred of God (J. D. Michaelis, Knobel, Vaih., Hengst., Zckl.), for אהבה and שׂן are too general for this, - man is thus, as the expression denotes, not the obj., but the subj. to both. Rightly, Hitz., as also Ewald: "Since man has not his actions in his own power, he knows not whether he will love or hate." Certainly this sounds deterministic; but is it not true that personal sympathies and antipathies, from which love and hatred unfold themselves, come within the sphere of man, not only as to their objects, in consequence of the divine arrangement, but also in themselves anticipate the knowledge and the will of man? and is it less true that the love which he now cherishes toward another man changes itself, without his previous knowledge, by means of unexpected causes, into hatred, and, on the other hand, the hatred into love? Neither love nor hatred is the product of a man's self-determination; but self-determination, and with it the function of freedom, begins for the first time over against those already present, in their beginnings. In הכּל לף, "by all that is before him," that is brought to a general expression, in which לפני has not the ethical meaning proceeding from the local: before them, prae = penes eos (vid., Song, under Sol 8:12), but the purely local meaning, and referred to time: love, hatred, and generally all things, stand before man; God causes them to meet him (cf. the use of הקרה); they belong to the future, which is beyond his power. Thus the Targ., Symm., and most modern interpreters; on the contrary, Luther: "neither the love nor the hatred of any one which he has for himself," which is, linguistically, purely impossible; Kleinert: "Neither the love nor the hatred of things does man see through, nor anything else which is before his eyes," for which we ought at least to have had the words לפניו גם הכל אשׁר; and Tyler: "Men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them," as if the text were אשׁר בכל. The future can, it is true, be designated by אחרית, and the past by לפנים, but according to the most natural way of representation (vid., Orelli's Synon. der Zeit, p. 14) the future is that which lies before a man, and the past that which is behind him. The question is of importance, which of the two words לף הכל has the accent. If the accent be on לף, then the meaning is, that all lies before men deprived of their freedom; if the accent be on הכל, then the meaning is, that all things, events of all kinds, lie before them, and that God determines which shall happen to them. The latter is more accordant with the order of words lying before us, and shows itself to be that which is intended by the further progress of the thoughts. Every possible thing may befall a man - what actually meets him is the determination and providence of God. The determination is not according to the moral condition of a man, so that the one can guide to no certain conclusion as to the other.”