I should have been as if I had not been, carried from the womb to the grave.

“Wherefore then hast Thou brought me forth out of the womb. Oh that I had been consumed, and no eye had seen me. Which same sentiment he had already uttered in his first speech, saying, Why died I not from the womb? and whilst he subjoins that which he adds here, I should have been as though I had not been, I should have been carried from the womb to the grave; he adds in other words, but no other sense, saying, Or as a hidden untimely birth I had not been, as infants which never saw light. But forasmuch as we have made out these particulars very much at length above, to avoid wearying the reader we forbear to unfold points already explained.”

“My soul is weary of my life, and so on. After Job had proposed above that both innocent and wicked are afflicted in this age, and had touched upon one cause of the punishment of the innocent that might be supposed, namely that the earth is as it were abandoned by God and exposed to the will of a power that is, as it were, unjust, punishing the innocent at its pleasure — this cause being set aside because it contains a manifest impropriety — he inquired who was the punisher of the innocent and for what cause, and he intends here to pursue this question further. But before he proceeds to the inquiry, he shows in what frame of mind he is speaking here: for he speaks in the person of an afflicted man, according to the conceptions which sorrow supplies to him; whence first he sets down the weariness he suffers in this life on account of the tribulations he suffers, which are so grave that they even render life itself wearisome: for although to live is delightful, yet to live in straits is wearisome, whence he says, "My soul is weary of my life." And just as a man to whom his life is delightful wishes to go on living, so one to whom his life is wearisome wishes to be deprived of life, and therefore he adds, "I will let loose my speech against myself"; for that is said "against" someone which is destructive of him: therefore a man speaks against himself when he desires to be deprived of life. But he says pointedly "I will let loose," for often a man suffers certain movements in his heart on account of some passion, whether of sorrow or of desire or of anger or of any other, and yet so restrains all these movements by reason that they do not proceed into outward speech; but when reason, wishing to show what he suffers within, brings forth the hidden movements into words, then he is said to let loose his speech, as one previously held back, and for this reason he adds, "I will speak in the bitterness of my soul," as if to say: the words which I shall utter outwardly show my inward bitterness, so as to give one to understand that he speaks in the person of an embittered man. But lest it again be understood that this letting loose of speech comes about because reason is overcome by sorrow, he adds, "I will say to God: Do not condemn me"; for when reason is conquered by passion, a man murmurs against God and sometimes proceeds even to blasphemy, but while amid tribulations a man's reason remains upright, he submits himself to God and awaits remedy from him, saying to God, "Do not condemn me." At the same time, in this he also approaches the question: for whereas above he had asked who was the cause of the punishment of the innocent in this world, here he now confesses that God is the author of the punishment, since he asks that he not be condemned by him, according to that word of 1 Kings 2:6, "The Lord kills and brings to life," by which the heresy of the Manichaeans is refuted. These things having been premised, on the supposition that God is the author of the punishment, he inquires of God concerning the cause of his own punishment, saying, "Show me why you judge me so," that is, make me know the cause on account of which I am punished by you: for he knew that the investigation of reason cannot arrive at the terminus of truth unless it be taught by God. Now to know the cause of one's own punishment is necessary for a man either for correction or that he may bear the scourges more patiently. He proceeds to the inquiry of this question under a certain disjunction: for it is necessary that the one who is punished be either innocent or a sinner. First he proceeds by supposing that he is innocent; and because we arrive at knowledge of divine things through human things, he sets forth two ways by which, in human judgment, the innocent are sometimes punished. The first way is on account of the malice of the one punishing, from which it happens in three ways that punishments are inflicted upon the innocent: sometimes indeed when through cunning they bring false charges against the innocent, and as to this he says, "Does it seem good to you that you should falsely accuse"; sometimes they oppress by power, and as to this he adds, "and oppress me, the work of your hands"; sometimes again they themselves do not punish the innocent from their own impulse, but because they inordinately love certain wicked men, they help them even in the oppression of the innocent, whence it is added, "and favor the counsel of the wicked?" But it must be considered that sometimes one and the same thing can be good for different natures and evil for others, just as to be irascible is good for a dog, but evil for a man; but no one of sound mind calls into doubt whether God works anything out of malice, for there cannot be anything evil in the highest good; yet it can happen that something which is evil in man pertains to divine goodness, just as not to have mercy, insofar as mercy sounds as a passion in man, is indeed blamed in man, which nevertheless the divine goodness, out of its perfection, requires. Now it is manifest that the three things aforesaid — to falsely accuse, to oppress, and to favor the counsel of the wicked — are evils in men: whence he brings this into question, whether they can be good in God, whence he does not ask, "Do you falsely accuse and oppress?" but "Does it seem good to you that you should falsely accuse and oppress?" as if presupposing as certain that God never does anything except what seems good to him, and this is truly good. Likewise it must be considered that those things which happen naturally are imputed to no one as fault or as evil; and it is natural that each thing should destroy its contrary, whence also God, who is supremely good, hates those things which are done against him and destroys them, according to that word of the Psalm, "You have hated all who work iniquity, you will destroy," etc.; if therefore men had not been made by God but by a contrary principle, as the Manichaeans fable, it would seem good that God should oppress men for his own sake; therefore to exclude this he does not simply say, "that you should oppress me," but adds, "the work of your hands." Likewise it seems good that God should fulfill the wills of the just; but those who wish to falsely accuse or oppress an innocent man are not just but wicked, and especially if they wish this not out of ignorance or by chance but out of counsel and deliberation: whence, since he supposes himself innocent in the first part of the question, it follows that those would be wicked who wished to oppress or falsely accuse him out of deliberate counsel, and therefore he says pointedly, "and favor the counsel of the wicked." This cause therefore being set aside, since this cannot seem good to God, seeing that he himself is the work of God's hands and since his enemies who had oppressed him are proved to be wicked, he proceeds accordingly to the second way by which, in human judgment, the innocent are sometimes afflicted. For it happens sometimes that when someone innocent is falsely accused before a judge, the judge, in order to search out the truth, subjects him to torments, acting according to justice, but the cause of this thing is a defect of human knowledge, which is threefold: one indeed, because all human knowledge proceeds from sense, and since the senses are of bodily things and are themselves bodily, the judge cannot know the interior conscience of the accused; therefore, to exclude this from God, he says, "Do you have eyes of flesh?" As if he were to say: Do you know by bodily senses, so that you see only bodily things and cannot know interior things? He mentions the eyes because sight excels among the other senses. The second defect is that man, through the bodily senses, cannot even behold all bodily things: for he cannot know what is done in remote and hidden places, which he removes from God, saying, "or do you see as man sees," namely so that you cannot know the things that are done everywhere, even hidden things? The third defect of human knowledge is from time, both because man knows more from day to day, and also because through length of time he forgets the things he knew, so that he must, as it were, learn again: this therefore he removes from God, saying, "Are your days as the days of man," namely so that your knowledge grows from day to day; "and your years as the times of man," namely so that something is lost to your knowledge through the course of time? And he adds, "that you should inquire after my iniquity and search out my sin," that is, that through scourges you should inquire whether I have sinned in deed and am wicked in mind, as men search out sins through torments? And thus, after such an inquiry, finding no sins in me, you may know that I have done nothing impious, as if you could not know this otherwise except by searching out my sins through scourges; and that you should do this freely, without contradiction, since there is no one who can snatch anything out of your hand: for sometimes judges fail in this inquiry which is carried out through torments, when those who ought to be tortured are snatched from their hands. And because he had said above that he was the work of God's hands, in order to show from this that it cannot seem good to God to oppress him for his own sake, as if delighting in his oppression, he now makes manifest what he had supposed, whence he adds, "Your hands have made me." And lest anyone believe, according to the heresy of the Manichaeans, that man's soul was made by God but his body formed by a contrary author, he adds, "and fashioned me wholly round about." He says "round about" because the body appears to be, as it were, round about the soul, like a garment around the one clothed, or like a house around its inhabitant; he says "wholly" so that it may be referred to each of the body's members; he says "fashioned" so as to allude to the fact that man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; and by "hands" the divine operation is understood, whence he says "hands" in the plural, because although the divine power operating is one, yet its operation is multiplied in its effects, both on account of the diversity of the effects and also on account of the variety of the intermediate causes through which it produces its effects. He adds, moreover, "and will you thus destroy me suddenly?" Because it seems sudden that someone who has produced a thing should corrupt it without a manifest cause: for whoever makes something wills it to be — for he makes it in order that it may be — but whoever destroys something wills it not to be; it seems therefore, if someone destroys what he had previously made, that this is a sudden change of will, unless some manifest cause newly arises from which it may appear that what before was to be made ought now to be destroyed; but such a sudden change of will cannot fall upon God, and therefore, as it were in wonder, he asks, "and will you thus destroy me suddenly?" as if to say: it seems improper that you should now destroy without cause one whom you formerly made. Or what he said, "have made me," can be referred to the constitution of the substance, while what he said, "and fashioned me wholly round about," can be referred to those things which accrue to the substance, whether they be goods of the soul or of the body or of external fortune. And because he had in general set down that he was made and fashioned by God, he pursues in particular the manner of his making, after the likeness of someone who wishes to bring back to another's memory something which he seems to have forgotten: he expounds everything to him in particular so that in this way it may be brought back to his memory. Now God seems to forget the benevolence which he has toward his creature when he exposes it to corruption, for he behaves after the manner of one forgetting; and according to this manner it is said in the Psalm, "How long, O Lord, will you forget me unto the end?" And therefore he says, "Remember, I beseech you, that you made me as clay." Here it must be considered that he commemorates a twofold making of man: first indeed that which pertains to the first institution of nature, alluding to what is said in Genesis 1, "God formed man from the slime of the earth," and therefore he says, "that you made me as clay," where he also seems to touch upon the composition of man from the first elements. And because it was also said to the first man, "You are dust and unto dust you shall return," he consequently adds, "and will bring me back into dust," which also befits natural matter: for it is a consequence of the order of nature that those things which are generated from the earth should be resolved back into the earth. But concerning this someone might wonder, since it seems a greater thing to form man from the earth than to preserve man once formed from being reduced to dust, whence it is that God, who formed man from clay, permits him to be reduced to dust: namely, whether this is solely from the necessity of matter, so that man in this has nothing more than the other things that are formed from the earth, or whether this is from divine providence punishing some fault of man. He then next touches upon the making of man with respect to the work of propagation, according as man is generated by man. Here it must be considered that he attributes all the works of nature to God, not so as to exclude the operation of nature, but in the manner in which those things that are done through second causes are attributed to the principal agent, as the operation of the saw is attributed to the craftsman: for this very fact, that nature operates, it has from God, who instituted it to this end. Now in this generation of man there occurs first the resolution of the seed, and as to this he says, "Have you not milked me like milk?" For just as seed is a superfluity of nourishment, so also is milk. Secondly there occurs the compacting of the bodily mass in the womb of the woman, and as to this he adds, "and curdled me like cheese?" For the seed of the male stands to the matter which the female supplies in the generation of man and of other animals just as rennet stands in the generation of cheese. Thirdly there occurs the distinction of the organs, whose consistency and strength are from the sinews and bones, while they are surrounded on the outside by skin and flesh, whence he says, "You have clothed me with skin and flesh, you have knit me together with bones and sinews." The fourth is the animation of the fetus, and especially with respect to the rational soul, which is not infused except after organization; and together with the rational soul there are divinely infused into man certain seedbeds of the virtues, some indeed common to all, but some proper to certain individuals, according as some men are naturally disposed to one virtue, others to another: for Job says below, "From my infancy mercy grew up with me, and it came out with me from the womb," whence here too he says, "You have granted me life and mercy." The last is the preservation of life, both in the maternal womb and after departure from the womb, which preservation indeed comes about partly through natural principles and partly through other benefits of God added over and above nature, whether they pertain to the soul or to the body or to external goods, and as to this he adds, "and your visitation has preserved my spirit": for just as God is said in the Scriptures to withdraw from someone when God takes away his gifts from him, so he is said to visit him when he bestows his gifts upon him. And lest, from the fact that he had said to God, "Remember, I beseech you, that you made me as clay," anyone might believe him to hold the opinion that forgetfulness could fall upon God, he excuses himself from this, adding, "although you conceal these things in your heart, yet I know that you remember all things"; and God is said, after the likeness of man, to conceal something in his heart when he does not show through effect what he has in knowledge or affection: thus therefore he says God conceals the aforesaid things in his heart because it is not shown in effect that he recognizes him as his own creature, whom he seems thus to destroy so suddenly. If I have sinned, and you have spared me for an hour, and so on. Above, Job inquired into the cause of his punishment on the supposition that he was innocent; now, however, he proceeds to inquire whether he is punished on this account, that he is a sinner. And that he is not punished on account of sin he first shows, using this argument: for if he committed a sin, it seems most likely that he committed it in the time of his prosperity; but if sin were the whole cause why some sustain adversities in the present, then, the cause being posited, the effect is posited, so that it would be necessary that as soon as someone sins, adversity should follow; but it was manifest that Job, in the time of his prosperity, kept the same manner of living: whence if he sinned by living in this manner, he had sinned long before he suffered adversity; it would therefore be necessary to say that, since adversity did not follow immediately after the sin, God spared him for that time in which he did not bring in adversities; but it is improper to say that a sin which God spared should again be imputed unto punishment: it does not seem, therefore, that he is now punished for a sin previously committed by him. This, then, is what he says: "If I have sinned," namely in the time of my prosperity, "and you have spared me for an hour," namely because you did not immediately bring in adversity, "why do you not allow me to be clean from my iniquity?" As if to say: why, since you reckoned me for some time as it were pure, sparing me my iniquity, do you now punish me again as though I were not pure? He then subjoins another argument as well, which is this: if sin is the whole cause of present adversities, it would follow that not so much the just as the sinners suffer adversities in this world; but we see that adversities are common to both the just and to sinners, and this is what he says: "And if I shall be wicked, woe is me" — that is, I sustain adversities; "and if just, either I was so before, or have now become so, I shall not lift up my head" — as if raised up from misery: "I say this, being filled with affliction," as to sorrows, "and misery," as to want and confusion. Now by "being filled" he designates the abundance of affliction and misery, and this he seems to say against the statement of Eliphaz and Baldad, who had said that if he were converted he would be freed from adversity: against which he says that even if he had become just, he is nevertheless not thereby relieved from misery, although for preceding sins, if there were any, he is now sufficiently punished, which he designates by the fullness of affliction and misery. And because Eliphaz had imputed it to him as pride that he called himself innocent, he adds, "and on account of my pride you will seize me as a lioness": for Eliphaz had said above, in denunciation of Job, "the roaring of the lion, and the voice of the lioness, and the teeth of the young lions have been broken"; he says therefore, "on account of my pride you will seize me as a lioness," as if to say: you cause me to be reckoned by those who catch at my words as a lioness because of pride. And this very fact, that he was thus reckoned wicked, was to him a punishment upon punishment, whence he adds, "and returning, you torment me wonderfully" — as if to say: you came before, afflicting me through the taking away of possessions and wounds of the body, and now you have returned again and torment me through my friends, which is wondrous because I ought rather to receive consolation from friends; or he says this because a man is afflicted most of all when he is derided by friends. But of what sort this torment is he shows, adding, "you renew your witnesses against me": for Eliphaz, while he seemed to defend the justice of God, and likewise his companions, in which they showed themselves as it were witnesses of God, spoke against Job, accusing him of sin; "and you multiply your wrath against me," that is, the effect of your wrath, in that you punish me in many ways, "and afflictions war against me," as if they attack me with a certain authority and without contradiction: for soldiers are accustomed to attack, with royal authority and without any contradiction, one who is reckoned guilty. Why then have you brought me forth out of the womb, and so on. Job had ended his inquiry with this, that whether he were just or a sinner, he lay under manifold tribulations; and lest anyone should believe that God delights in his tribulations, he wishes to inquire whether this can be true. Now it seems improper that anyone should produce his own effect for this purpose, that it should fare ill, since rather every agent intends good in its effect; but he supposes, as is clear from what has been said, that he is the work of God, and therefore he asks him, "Why have you brought me forth out of the womb?" As if to say: did you cause me to be born for this reason, to subject me to tribulations? And because someone might say that even so, to be amid tribulations is simply better than not to have been born, he excludes this, saying, "Oh, that I had been consumed," namely in the maternal womb, "so that no eye might see me" — that is, so that I might not suffer the confusion which I suffer from such great evils as the eyes of men behold in me; and yet, if I had been consumed in the maternal womb, I would have had the dignity of being without the misery which has befallen me in my existing, and this is what he says, "I would have been" — as it were participating, that is, I would have participated in that which is good in being — "as if I had not been," that is, I would have been free from the evils of this life, as though I had never existed; for it is not the dignity of human being that it should be preserved forever, but that a man should at length die and be carried to the tomb which is prepared for the dead so that some memory of him might remain after death; and this too would not have been lacking to me, whence there follows, "carried from the womb to the tomb." Now no one is found so cruel, delighting in another's punishments, that he does not cease from afflicting even a little; granted, then, that God were not the cause of man's birth, still the days of man are few, especially in comparison to the eternity of God, and this brevity too, when a man has already passed a great part of his life, is expected to be soon ended, and this is what he says: "Shall not the fewness of my days be ended soon," since all the days of my life are few, a great part of that very fewness having already passed? It is not a great thing, therefore, if for the rest you should cease from striking, and this is what he concludes: "Suffer me therefore." And if it seems hard to you that I should be even for an hour without afflictions, it is certain that even with you ceasing from striking, there remains to me nothing whereby I might rejoice but whereby I might grieve, and this is what he adds, "that I may bewail my sorrow a little" — namely, that which I have conceived from the preceding blows; and he says this because he still reckoned himself struck while his friends reproached him, of whom he had said, "you renew your witnesses against me." And because it could be answered to him, "rather, you are to be afflicted here for a little time; when you pass from here you will find consolation," which could be understood in two ways: in one way, by returning again to this life, and this he excludes when he says, "before I go" — namely through death — "and shall not return" — so as to live again — which can be expounded in two ways: in one way, that he says he will not return to a like manner of living, as some fabled; or better, it should be said that he speaks after the manner of a disputant, according to what his adversaries held, before the truth is made manifest: for below, Job will clearly indicate the truth of the resurrection, and therefore in all the foregoing he speaks of the resurrection while supposing the opinion of those with whom he was disputing, who did not believe there was any other life than this one, but that in this life alone men are either punished or rewarded for the evils and goods which they do — in another way, he could expect consolation after the end of this life in the very state of death itself, but this he excludes, saying, "to the land that is dark," namely to which I shall go after death. And this can be expounded in two ways: in one way, of Hell, to which the souls of all men descended, even of the just, before Christ, although the just did not there suffer sensible pains but only darkness, while the others suffered both pains and darkness; but because Job had spoken as though it were doubtful whether he himself were just, as the truth of the matter was, or a sinner, as his friends falsely charged, he describes Hell in common, both as to the good and as to the wicked. Taking Hell, then, in this common sense, it is called a "dark land" insofar as it lacks the brightness of the divine vision; it is called "covered with the mist of death" with respect to original sin, which is a mist inducing death; it is called a "land of misery" with respect to the punishments which the reprobate suffer there; it is called a "land of darkness" with respect to the obscurities of actual sins in which the wicked are involved; and it is said that there is there a "shadow," that is, a likeness, of death, because they are afflicted there just as if they were always dying; and it is said that there is no order there, either on account of the confusion of mind which the damned suffer, or because that order is not observed there which is observed here — for here fire burns and gives light, which is not the case there; and everlasting horror dwells there, because although they always grieve over present punishments, they always likewise fear future ones. But because those against whom he was disputing did not posit the immortality of the soul such that it would remain after death, and he himself still speaks according to their positions, it is expounded better, as to the sense of the letter, that the whole be referred to the body, which is buried in the earth and turned into earth. He says, then, "to the dark land," with respect to the very property of earth, which is in itself opaque; but although it is in itself opaque, yet the living who dwell upon the earth are illumined by the light of the air covering the earth, but the dead do not enjoy this light, whence he adds, "and covered with the mist of death," as if to say: death brings it about that after death one no longer uses the light which the living use. Now it happens sometimes that although someone living does not enjoy the light surrounding the earth, yet, existing in some hidden place of the earth, he enjoys the things he desires as to appetite and considers truths as to intellect, but the dead lack this, whence he adds "a land of misery" with respect to the lack of all desirable things, and "of darkness" insofar as the consideration of truths is wanting. Among the other things, moreover, in which the living delight, the chief is human society with its due order, whereby some preside and others are subject and others serve, but the dead are deprived of this, whence he adds, "where is the shadow of death" — as if to say: among the dead there are nothing but shadows, according to the estimation of the living, as is said in Wisdom 17:4, "Persons appearing sad gave them fright"; "and no order," because, without difference of honor and dignity, the condition of the dead is alike; "but everlasting horror dwells there," with respect to the living, to whom the dead are a horror — as if to say: there is nothing in the state of the dead except what men shudder at, and this will be everlasting among them if they do not return to life. Thus, therefore, Job, in inquiring into the cause of his tribulation, has shown that it is not from some wicked man into whose hand the earth has been given, that it is not from God oppressing him through false accusation, that it is not from God searching out his fault, that it is not from God punishing sins, that it is not from God taking delight in his punishments: whence the cause of his tribulation still remains in doubt. All these things Job pursues so as necessarily to lead his hearers to posit another life in which both the just are rewarded and the wicked punished, since, this not being posited, no cause can be given for the tribulation of the just, who, it is certain, are sometimes afflicted in this world.”

“Are not my days few?.... They are so, the days of every man are but few; see Job 14:1; the remainder of Job's days were but few; considering the course of nature, and especially the sore afflictions he had on him, it could not be thought his days on earth were many; in all likelihood, according to human probability, he had but a few days to live: or "are not my days a small little thing" (g)? it is as an hand's breadth, as nothing before God, Psa 39:5, cease then; that is, from afflicting him; since he had so short a time to live, he requests there might be some intermission of his trouble; that he might have some intervals of comfort and refreshment, that not all his days, which were so few, should be spent in grief and sorrow: some connect this with the preceding clause, and which is most agreeable to the accents, "shall not the fewness of my days cease" (h)? I have but a few days, and these few days will soon cease; therefore give me some respite from my afflictions; and so the Targum,"are not my days swift and ceasing?" and let me alone; do not follow me with afflictions, or disturb and distress me with them; but take off thine hand, that I may have some rest and ease; see Job 7:10; or "put from me"; thine anger, as Kimchi, or thine army, as Junius and Tremellius; or thy camp, as Cocceius; that is, decamp from me, remove thy troops, the changes and war that are against me, by which I am besieged, surrounded, and straitened; let me be delivered from them: that I may take comfort a little; that he might have some breathing time, some respite from his troubles, some refreshment to his spirit, some reviving to his fainting soul, some renewing of strength, before he departed this life; see Psa 39:13; so Aben Ezra and Gersom render it: "that I may be strengthened"; or that his heart might gather strength. (g) "nonne parum dies mei?" Montanus, Bolducius, Schmidt; "paucum quid", Vatablus, Beza, Mercerus. (h) "An non param, vel paucitas dierum meorum cessabit?" Cocceius; "annon pauxillulum dierum meorum deficiet?" Schultens.”