Hear ye my speech, and receive with Sour ears hidden truths.

“Behold, my eye has seen all these things. After Job had shown that the excellence of the divine power could be known through experience, as though concluding he adds: "behold, my eye has seen all these things, and my ear has heard them," as if to say: I have come to know the aforesaid effects, by which the divine strength and wisdom are shown, partly by sight and partly by hearing; nor did my knowledge come to rest in these sensible effects, but from them I ascended to an understanding of the truth, whence he adds "and I have understood each one," namely what each single effect demonstrates concerning God, whether concerning his wisdom or his understanding or his counsel or his strength. Hence, excluding their boastfulness, by which, in proposing magnificent things about God, they seemed to set themselves above Job, he adds "according to your knowledge I also know," namely those things which pertain to the magnificence of God, "nor am I inferior to you," as if he knew them either less or more imperfectly, or were now learning them from them. But since Zophar had proposed the divine excellence in order to accuse Job of striving to dispute with God, he subjoins "but yet I will speak to the Almighty," as if to say: although I understand, from his diverse effects, the excellence of divine wisdom and power no less than you, nevertheless on this account I am not reasonably changed from my purpose, so that I should not wish to address God, opening the movements of my heart to him who is the searcher and judge of hearts, and seeking the truth from him who is the teacher of all truth; hence he adds "and I desire to dispute with God," not indeed that I should wish to disapprove his judgments, but that I should destroy your errors, from which, once supposed, it would follow that there was injustice with God; hence he adds, first showing them to be "forgers of lies," because they had invented this lie, that Job had led a wicked life. But they had fallen into this lie on account of the fact that they erred concerning the faith by which God is worshipped, believing that in this life alone the recompense of merits and of punishments was made; and therefore he adds "and worshippers of perverse dogmas": for whoever departs from the true knowledge of God worships not God but his own false dogmas. But what he says, "first showing them," should not be understood as though he were first, in the order of the following teaching, going to destroy their depraved dogmas and afterward dispute with God; rather, since he intends to dispute with God, this is first in his intention, that he destroy their dogmas. Now it happens at times that some propose things that are plausible, though false, but while they do not know how to defend or prove them convincingly, they show forth their folly in speaking, which is what happened to Job's friends; and therefore he adds "and would that you were silent, that you might be thought wise." For this very fact, that you defend and prove your false dogmas unfittingly, shows you to be foolish. Since therefore you propose false dogmas and, in order to manifest them, take up unfitting means, you are therefore in need of correction; and this is what he concludes, adding "hear therefore my correction, by which I shall correct your procedure," and "attend to the judgment of my lips," by which I shall condemn your false dogmas. Now first he intends to correct their unfitting procedure. For since they held that the rewards and punishments of good and evil works are repaid in this life, in order to defend the justice of God it was necessary that they should take up certain lies: for since it is manifest that certain innocent and just men are afflicted with adversities in this life, it was necessary for them to impute crimes to the just in order to defend the justice of God, and thus they accused of impiety Job, whom they saw afflicted; but he does not use a fitting means who defends the truth by lies, and therefore he says "does God need your lie?" As if to say: is it necessary that, in order to defend the divine justice, lies be assumed? For what cannot be defended except by lies is impossible to be true. Now when someone strives to lie against manifest truth, he is compelled to devise certain deceitful and fraudulent ways so as to color the lie with some fraud; so too these men, when they tried to lie against the justice of Job, which was manifest to all, employed certain deceits, namely by showing human frailty, which easily slips into sin, and comparing it to the divine excellence, so that it might seem more probable that Job had been wicked than that God was unjust; and therefore he adds "that you should speak deceits on his behalf?" For they spoke deceits as it were on God's behalf, while they deceitfully strove to impute impiety to Job in order to defend that God is just. But they might say that they were not speaking deceitfully against Job, but were only saying what they believed. Job therefore shows that even if this were true, though excused from deceit they would fall into another vice, namely the acceptance of persons, which excludes the justice of one who judges. For it is acceptance of persons if someone despises or denies the justice of another which is apparent, on account of the greatness of someone else, even though he does not know the other's justice; if therefore the friends of Job judged him to be wicked, though seeing in him manifest justice, and by consideration of the divine greatness alone — though according to their own dogmas they could not understand how Job was justly punished by God — in their judgment by which they condemned Job they seemed to be accepting, as it were, the person of God. And therefore he adds "do you accept his face and strive to judge on God's behalf?" He says this pointedly, because he who does not know another's justice, and yet strives to devise whatever ways he can in order to show that the other's cause is just, strives to judge on behalf of someone. Now it happens at times that someone who defends another's cause fraudulently pleases that other person, even if he is just, which can happen in two ways: in one way, because he is ignorant that his cause is unjust, whence it pleases him to be defended by someone; and this he excludes from God, saying "or will it please him" — namely God — that you strive to judge unjustly on his behalf, since this cannot be unknown to him; on account of which he adds "whom nothing can conceal?" In another way, when he whose cause is defended by fraud is deceived by the frauds of the defender, so that he reckons the defense to be just; and this too he excludes from God, adding "or will he be deceived, as a man, by your frauds?" Thus, then, it is manifest that divine goodness and justice do not need a lie for their defense, because truth can be defended without a lie; from which it is also clear that, if from their dogmas being posited this unfitting consequence follows, that the justice of God needs a lie for its defense, it becomes manifest that the dogmas proposed are false. But further it must be considered that he who uses a lie to show forth the justice or goodness of God not only does something which God does not need, but even by this very act goes against God: for since God is truth, and every lie is contrary to truth, whoever uses a lie to show the magnificence of God, by this very act acts against God. And this is plainly clear through the Apostle in 1 Corinthians, where he says: "we are found even false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony against God that he raised up Christ, whom he did not raise up, if the dead do not rise" (1 Corinthians 15:15); therefore to say that God raised up a dead man, if it is not true, is against God, although it seems to show forth divine power, because it is against the truth of God. Thus, then, those who take up a lie in order to defend God not only fail to receive a reward, as though pleasing him, but even merit punishment, as acting against God; and therefore he adds "he himself will accuse you, because in secret you accept his face"; and he says "in secret," because although they seemed outwardly to be pleading God's cause, as though knowing the justice of God, yet in their consciences this was something they did not know — by what justice Job was punished — and thus, as regards the secret of their heart, they were accepting the face of God while they strove falsely to defend his justice. Now he shows how he will accuse them, adding "as soon as he shall move himself, he will trouble you," as if to say: you, because you now suffer no adversity, dispute about the justice of God with a tranquil mind; but if tribulation should come upon you — which he calls a "moving" of God, in that manner of speaking by which punishment in Scripture is called the wrath of God — your mind will be troubled, and especially since it is not grounded in truth. And because they reckoned no goods or evils except these temporal ones, while they were wary of sins lest evils should come upon them, they seemed to wish to serve God only out of fear of present evils; and therefore he adds "and his terror will fall upon you," as if to say: that on account of which alone you fear God so greatly will come upon you, namely present adversity, according to what is said in Proverbs 10:24, "what the wicked man fears will come upon him." And because they had vainly promised Job that even after death he would remain in the memory of men, he promises them the contrary, as though mocking them, saying "your memory shall be compared to ashes": for as ash, after the consuming of wood, lasts but a little while, so the fame of a man after death soon passes away, whence it seems vain to expect fame after death. They had also promised him a certain immunity and reverence to be shown at his tomb after death; but he, reckoning this too as nothing, promises them the contrary, saying "and your necks shall be brought down into clay," designating by their "necks" their power and dignity, which he says will be "brought down into clay," that is, into a contemptible and weak thing. "Be silent for a while, that I may speak," and so on. After Job had corrected the procedure of his friends, who strove to defend the divine justice by lies, he now proceeds to destroy their false dogmas under the figure of a disputation with God, and first he asks for a hearing, as one about to say great things, saying "be silent for a while, that I may speak whatever my mind shall suggest to me"; he adds this lest perhaps they should say: you speak empty things and therefore are not to be heard; but to listen for a little while to whatever someone says is not a hard thing; or he adds this to signify that he is not about to speak by composing lies or devising deceits, but that which he has in mind. Now his friends had imputed two things to Job, namely impatience and boastfulness, both of which he excludes from himself lest he seem, in the disputation to follow, to be about to speak either out of anger or out of pride. Now it must be considered that impatience arises from an excess of sorrow not moderated by reason, and excessive sorrow induces despair; and from despair it happens that a man makes little of the safety of both body and soul: therefore, in order to exclude impatience from himself, he says "why do I tear my flesh with my teeth?" As if to say: there is no reason why I should despair, through impatience, of the safety of my body, after the manner of those who, despairing of bodily life, oppressed by hunger, eat their own flesh; and again "and why do I carry my soul in my hands?" That is, there is no reason why I should make little of the safety of my soul: for that which is carried in the hands is easily lost, whence it seems that its loss is not much feared — for what a man fears to lose he carefully hides. And he gives the reason why he ought neither to tear his flesh through impatience nor carry his soul in his hands, adding, saying "even if he should kill me, I will hope in him," as if to say: do not believe that, on account of the temporal evils which I suffer, I have ceased to hope in God; for if my hope were in God only on account of temporal goods, I would be compelled to despair — as he said above, "I have despaired" — but because my hope in God is on account of spiritual goods that remain after death, even if he should afflict me even unto death, the hope which I have in him will not cease. But because an inordinate hope degenerates into presumption, on this account he adds "yet I will argue my ways in his sight," as if to say: I do not so hope in him as though I were to be freed by him even if I should persevere in sins; but because he will free me if I reprove my own sins, and this is what is added, "and he himself shall be my savior," namely if my sins displease me. Now why he saves those who argue their ways in his sight, he shows, adding "for no hypocrite shall come before his sight," that is, no dissembler, who, though he is wicked, nevertheless professes himself just and does not argue his ways before God: hence he shall not come into his sight so as to see God, in whom the ultimate salvation of man consists, as he will explain further below; yet he shall come into his sight so as to be judged by him. Thus, then, he has excluded from himself not only impatience but also a presumption of innocence, in that he professes that he argues his ways before God, so that every calumny of his friends may cease. Then, about to enter the disputation, he first renders his hearers attentive in two ways: in one way by concealing what is to be said — for when we profess that the things to be said are difficult, hearers become more attentive — hence he says "hear my word and perceive my riddles with your ears": a riddle is called an obscure speech which puts forward one thing on the surface and signifies another thing within; in another way, from the certainty of the truth of the things to be said, hence he adds "if I shall be judged, I know that I shall be found just," which indeed he does not say of the justice of his life, since he had said above "I will argue my ways in his sight," but of the truth of the doctrine over which he was contending as it were in a judgment; now he is found just in a judgment for whom the sentence is given: hence when someone is shown, in disputing, to speak the truth, he is found just as it were in a judgment. After therefore he had rendered his hearers attentive, he determines the manner of his disputation: for he wishes to dispute as though contending with another, and this is what he adds "who is he that shall be judged with me," that is, with whom shall I dispute concerning the truth? "Let him come," that is, let him approach to dispute. Now the reason why he intends to dispute concerning the truth he adds, saying "why am I consumed in silence?" For man, in the course of the present life, is consumed little by little, and especially when he is subject to infirmity, as Job was; now he is consumed in silence who so runs through the present life that he nevertheless leaves no trace of his wisdom through teaching: therefore, lest Job should suffer this, he resolved not to be silent concerning the truth, so that, consumed in body, he might live on after death in his teaching. Or this can be referred to another intention: for when someone expresses outwardly the sorrow which he suffers in his heart, his mind is in some way soothed, but by being silent he is more inwardly straitened by sorrow and in some way is consumed by his own silence. Since therefore he had asked for a disputant, saying "who is he that shall be judged with me?" And had said above "I desire to dispute with God," from now on he speaks as though having God present and disputing with him. Now the disputation of man with God might seem improper, on account of the excellence by which God surpasses man; but it must be considered that truth is not varied by the diversity of persons, hence when someone speaks the truth he cannot be overcome, with whomsoever he disputes; now Job was certain that he was speaking the truth inspired in him by God through the gift of faith and wisdom, hence, not distrusting the truth, he asked that he not be pressed down by the divine power, neither by evils presently inflicted nor by fear of evils to be inflicted, and this is what he says: "only two things do not do to me, and then I will not hide myself from your face," as if to say: I will not fear to dispute with you: for those who fear are wont to hide themselves from the face of those whom they fear. Now what these two things are he shows, adding "withdraw your hand far from me," that is, do not strike me with present scourges; and "let not your dread terrify me," as regards future scourges: for by these two ways a man can be hindered from being able, in disputing, to defend even the truth which he most certainly knows, when he is either afflicted in body or troubled in soul by fear or some other passion. Now a disputation is between two persons, namely one who objects and one who responds; entering therefore into disputation with God, he gives him the choice of either person, whether of objecting or of responding, hence he says "call me, and I will answer you; or certainly I will speak, and you answer me," as if to say: object, and I will answer; or indeed I will speak by objecting, and you answer me; and he says this enigmatically, showing himself ready for either, whether to defend the truth which he professes or to attack what might be said against the truth. Now first he gives God the part of the objector, saying "how many iniquities and sins do I have; show me my crimes and offenses." Here it must be considered that the friends of Job, as though pleading God's cause, seemed to dispute against Job, according to what he said above, "do you accept his face and strive to judge on God's behalf?" Now the friends of Job objected this against him, that he had been punished for his sins: this therefore he asks to be objected to him by God, saying "how many iniquities and sins do I have; show me my crimes and offenses," as if to say: if it is so that you afflict me for my sins, as my friends, trying to speak on your behalf, calumniate, I ask that you show me for what sins you afflict me so grievously. Hence he does not say "what iniquities I have" but "how many," because if there is no other reason for present adversities than the sins of men, as the friends of Job supposed, it is necessary that the sins which are punished by the greatest afflictions be the greatest. Now of sins, some are commissions, which are done against the negative precepts of the law, some are omissions, by which the affirmative precepts are neglected; now something is committed against a precept of the law in three ways: in one way because it is to the harm of one's neighbor, as theft, homicide, and the like, which are properly called iniquities, because they are contrary to the equity of justice which is toward another; in another way insofar as a man sins in himself through the disordering of his own act, as appears especially in the sins of gluttony and lust, and these are called "sins," as it were certain disorderings of a man; in a third way certain things are committed directly against God, such as blasphemies, sacrilege and the like, and these, on account of their gravity, are called "crimes." Now omissions are properly called "offenses." Then, as though he for whom he had given the part of the objector were silent, he himself takes up the part of the one objecting and inquires into the causes of his punishment. And first, because someone might say that God punished him as an enemy, he excludes this cause, saying "why do you hide your face and think me your enemy?" For it seems unjust that someone should reckon another to be his enemy without cause; now the fitting cause of enmity can only be an offense: it is manifest, then, that God reckons a man his enemy when that man's sins are made manifest; but Job had asked that his sins be shown to him, and they were not shown to him; therefore no reason appeared why God should be his enemy, and this is what he suggests, saying "why do you hide your face," as though hating him secretly and for a hidden reason? For the face of a man who hates is open when he does not hide the reason for his hatred. Second, because someone might say that God punished him in order to show forth his power in him, he excludes this cause too, saying "do you show your power against a leaf that is carried off by the wind?" For it is not fitting that one who is most powerful should wish to show his power in the weakest of things; now the human condition is compared to a leaf that is carried off by the wind, because man is in himself frail and weak, like a leaf that easily falls, and nonetheless, in the course of time and the variety of fortune, he is driven about like a leaf by the wind: hence it does not seem fitting to say that God punishes a man for this reason alone, that in him he might show his power. Third, because someone might say that God punished him for sins which he committed in his youth, he excludes this too, saying "and do you pursue dry stubble? For you write bitter things against me and wish to consume me for the sins of my youth?" For a man in youth is compared to green grass, but in old age he is compared as it were to dry stubble: it would therefore seem the same thing to punish a man in his old age for the sins of his youth, as if someone, for the lack of green grass, should vent his fury upon dry stubble. But it must be considered that, in this inquiry, he does not depart from the position that the adversities of men are brought about by divine judgment, to signify which he says "you write bitter things against me," as though bitter things, that is, the adversities of men, proceed from the Scripture of the divine sentence. Fourth, because someone might say that although Job did not commit grave sins, yet he committed certain sins without which the present life is not lived, and that he was punished for these, he excludes this too, saying "you have put my foot in the stocks and have observed all my paths and have considered the footprints of my feet, I who am to be consumed like rottenness, and like a garment that is eaten by the moth?" Here it must be considered that those who are put in the stocks of a prison are so bound that they cannot turn aside from the stocks; now just as a man's foot is constrained by a stock, so a man's conduct is constrained by the law of divine justice, from which it is not lawful to turn aside, and this is what he says, "you have put my foot in the stocks." Now it pertains to divine justice to examine the deeds of men, not only what each one does but also with what mind or to what end, and therefore he says "you have observed all my paths," as regards deeds, and "have considered the footprints of my feet," as regards the affection of the one acting, or also as regards whatever circumstances of the deed. Now it seems unreasonable that God should have so great a diligence concerning the acts of men, if they altogether cease to be through the death of the body — which indeed is sometimes natural, sometimes violent — hence concerning both he adds, saying "I who am to be consumed like rottenness," as regards natural death, and "like a garment that is eaten by the moth," as regards violent death, as if to say: if, as my friends suspect, there is no other life than the present one, which a man loses either by way of rottenness or by way of cutting off, it would seem unreasonable that God should have such strict care for the acts of men as to punish a man even for the smallest sins and negligences. And because this last statement affords a great way toward the inquiry of the truth, he insists further on manifesting it, and what he had said of himself singularly he brings back generally to the whole human race. Here first he expounds the frailty of the human condition: both as regards its origin, when he says "man born of woman," as though of a frail thing; and as regards its duration, when he says "living a short time"; and as regards its condition, when he says "is filled with many miseries" — where he seems, as it were, to be expounding what he had said above, "do you show your power against a leaf that is carried off by the wind?" Second, he excludes those things in which a man might glory, the first of which is the beauty of the body, in which he flourishes in youth: but this glory is nothing, because it passes quickly after the manner of a flower, hence he says "who comes forth like a flower and is crushed," namely easily; the second is fame, which does not last long, hence he says "and flees like a shadow": for of a passing shadow no trace or memory remains; the third is power and strength, by which someone strives to preserve himself and his own, and against this he says "and never remains in the same state." And these three can be referred to the three things above: for man born of woman comes forth like a flower and is quickly crushed; thus he lives so short a time that he flees like a shadow of which no trace remains; and thus he is filled with so many miseries that even if at times he obtains prosperity and joy, yet he never remains in the same state. Third, he wonders at the diligence of divine providence concerning man: for it seems wonderful that concerning a thing so frail and despised God has such great care. Now although all things are subject to divine providence, yet the divine solicitude appears specially concerning man in three things: first indeed as regards the fact that he gave him laws and precepts of living, and this he touches when he says "and do you think it worthy to open your eyes upon such a one," in that manner of speaking by which someone is said to open his eyes upon another when he directs him and considers his ways; second as regards the fact that God rewards man for good things and punishes him for evil ones, and this he touches when he says "and to bring him with you into judgment"; third as regards the fact that God adorns him with virtues by which he keeps himself clean against the foulnesses of sin, and this he touches when he says "who can make clean one conceived of unclean seed?" Now the seed of man is unclean not according to nature but according to the infection of concupiscence; yet from this unclean seed a man conceived is at times found clean through the virtues. Now just as it belongs to that which is per se hot to make hot from cold, so it belongs to that which is per se clean to make clean from unclean, and therefore he adds "is it not you alone," namely who are truly and of yourself clean? For purity and cleanness are found perfectly in God alone, in whom there can be neither potentiality nor any defect, hence whatever is in any way clean or pure has its cleanness and purity from God.”

“Hear diligently my speech,.... Or, "in hearing hear" (s); meaning, not only that his friends would attentively hear him, but continue to hear him; that they would hear him out what he had to say further: upon his expressing himself with so much faith and confidence in God, they might rise up from their seats and be preparing to be gone, as not having patience to hear a man talk so confidently, who they thought was a bad man and an hypocrite; or they might attempt to interrupt him while speaking, and therefore he desires they would be still, and patiently and diligently hear what he had more to say: and my declaration with your ears; that is, that they would listen to it attentively, when he doubted not but he should make his case as clear as the sun, and set it in such a point of view, as that it would appear most plainly to be right, and he to be a just man. (s) "audite audiendo", Pagninus, Montanus, Beza, &c.”

“17 Hear, O hear my confession, And let my declaration echo in your ears. 18 Behold now! I have arranged the cause, I know that I shall maintain the right. 19 Who then can contend with me? Then, indeed, I would be silent and expire. Eager for the accomplishment of his wish that he might himself take his cause before God, and as though in imagination it were so, he invites the friends to be present to hear his defence of himself. מלּה (in Arabic directly used for confession = religion) is the confession which he will lay down, and אחוה the declaration that he will make in evidence, i.e., the proof of his innocence. The latter substantive, which signifies brotherly conduct in post-biblical Hebrew, is here an ἅπ. λεγ. from חוה, not however with Aleph prostheticum from Kal, but after the form אזכּרה = הזכּרה, from the Aphl = Hiphil of this verb, which, except Psa 19:3, occurs only in the book of Job as Hebrew (comp. the n. actionis, אחויה, Dan 5:12), Ewald, 156, c. It is unnecessary to carry the שׁמעוּ on to Job 13:17 (hear now ... with your own ears, as e.g., Jer 26:11); Job 13:17 is an independent substantival clause like Job 15:11; Isa 5:9, which carries in itself the verbal idea of תּהי or תּבא (Psa 18:7). They shall hear, for on his part he has arranged, i.e., prepared (משׁפּט ערך, causam instruere, as Job 23:4, comp. Job 33:5) the cause, so that the action can begin forthwith; and he knows that he, he and no one else, will be found in the right. With the conviction of this superiority, he exclaims, Who in all the world could contend with him, i.e., advance valid arguments against his defence of himself? Then, indeed, if this impossibility should happen, he would be dumb, and willingly die as one completely overpowered not merely in outward appearance, but in reality vanquished. יריב עמדי following הוא מי (comp. Job 4:7) may be taken as an elliptical relative clause: qui litigare possit mecum (comp. Isa 50:9 with Rom 8:34, τίς ὁ καταδρίνων); but since זה הוא מי is also used in the sense of quis tandem or ecquisnam, this syntactic connection which certainly did exist (Ewald, 325, a) is obliterated, and הוא serves like זה only to give intensity and vividness to the מי. On עתּה כּי (in meaning not different to אז כּי), vid., Job 3:13; Job 8:6. In Job 13:19 that is granted as possible which, according to the declaration of his conscience, Job must consider as absolutely impossible. Therefore he clings to the desire of being able to bring his cause before God, and becomes more and more absorbed in the thought.”