For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie, unto his glory, why am I also yet judged as a sinner?

“"For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto His glory: why yet am I also judged as a sinner?" For if God, he means is shown to be a Lover of man, and righteous, and good, by your acts of disobedience, you ought not only to be exempt from punishment but even to have good done unto you. But if so, that absurdity will be found to result, which is in circulation with so many, that good comes of evil, and that evil is the cause of good; and one of the two is necessary, either that He be clearly unjust in punishing, or that if He punish not, it is from our vices that He hath the victory. And both of these are absurd to a degree.”

“After the Apostle has shown that Judaism, to which belongs the reception of the law, and circumcision, do not suffice for salvation without the keeping of the law — through which the Gentile, without exterior Judaism and circumcision, obtains the fruit of both — here he raises an objection against what has been said; and first indeed he sets forth the objection, second he resolves it, at the words "much every way." He objects, therefore, first in this way: if it were so, as has been said, that he is not a true Jew, nor is circumcision true, in what is manifest, but in the hidden part of the heart, what advantage then has the Jew? That is, what more has been given to him than to the rest? It seems that nothing has. And this is unfitting, since the Lord said, Deuteronomy 7:6: "The Lord your God has chosen you, that you should be a peculiar people to him." Or what is the profit of circumcision, namely the exterior kind? It seems from what has gone before that there is none, which is unfitting, since it was handed down by God, who says, Isaiah 48:17: "I am the Lord who teaches you profitable things." Then, when he says "much every way," he resolves the aforesaid objection. And first as to the prerogative of Judaism, second as to the profit of circumcision, in chapter 4, at the words "What shall we say then?" Concerning the first he does two things. First he shows the prerogative of the Jews; second he excludes their boasting, by which they proudly preferred themselves to the Gentiles, at the words "What then? Do we excel?" Concerning the first he does three things. First he sets forth what he intends; second he makes it clear, at the words "first indeed"; third he excludes an objection, at the words "for what if some." He says therefore first: the question has been asked what advantage the Jew has; now he has an advantage both as to quantity, which is signified when he says "much," and as to number, which is signified when he says "every way." For they have something more both in the contemplation of divine things, according to Psalm 75:1: "known in Judea," and as to the disposition of temporal things, Psalm 147:20: "He has not done in like manner to every nation." They also have more as to the fathers, as to the promises, and as to the offspring. Below, 9:4: "whose is the adoption of the sons of God, and the glory, and the testament." And in each one of these there is no small excellence but a great and special one, which pertains to what he says, "much." For the greatest good of man is in the knowledge of God, in this, that he cleave to God and be instructed by God, Psalm 93:12: "Blessed is the man whom you shall instruct, O Lord." Then, when he says "first indeed," etc., he makes clear what he had said, saying: "first indeed," that is, the Jews have an advantage above all chiefly because the words of God were entrusted to them, as to friends, John 15:15: "I have called you friends." And this is much, because the words of God are honorable, Psalm 18:10: "the words of the Lord are true, justified in themselves"; they are delightful, Psalm 118:113: "how sweet are your words to my palate"; they are also profitable for not sinning, in the same Psalm: "in my heart I have hidden your words, that I might not sin against you." Then, when he says, "for what if some," he excludes an objection. And first he states it; second he excludes it by leading it to an absurdity, at the words "shall their unbelief"; third he shows that what it is led to is unfitting, at the words "but God is true." Someone could detract from the prerogative of the Jews by objecting their ingratitude, through which they would seem to have lost the dignity of the words of God. Hence he says, "but what if some of them have not believed"; is it not thereby excluded that the Jew has no advantage? According to 2 Peter 2:21: "It would have been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they had known it, to turn back." Now they did not believe, first indeed, the lawgiver. Psalm 105:24: "They believed not in his word." Second, they did not believe the prophets. Ezekiel 2:6: "They are unbelieving and subverters with you." Third, they did not believe the Son himself. John 8:45: "If I say the truth to you, why do you not believe me?" Then, when he says "shall their unbelief," he excludes the aforesaid objection by leading it to an absurdity, because if, on account of the unbelief of some, the prerogative of the Jews were taken away, it would follow that the unbelief of man would make void the faith of God, which is unfitting. And this is what he says: shall the unbelief of them, namely of those who did not believe, make void the faith of God? This can be understood in two ways. In one way, of the faith by which one believes in God. For it is not the case that, because some did not believe, the faith of those who did believe is made void. For the evil of some existing within a society does not make void the good of others. Ecclesiasticus 33:12: "Some of them he has blessed and exalted, and some he has sanctified and brought near to himself," and so on. This is against those against whom Augustine speaks in his letter to the people of Hippo: "To what other end do these sit, and what else do they discuss, except that, when a bishop, or a cleric, or a monk, or a nun has fallen, they may believe all such persons to be the same, but that not all can be exposed?" In another way it can be understood of the faith by which God is faithful in fulfilling his promises. Hebrews 10:23: "For he is faithful who has promised." Now this fidelity would be made void if, on account of the unbelief of some, it should happen that the Jew had no advantage. For God promised to multiply and magnify that people, as is clear in Genesis 22:16: "I will multiply your seed." Then, when he says "God forbid," "but God is," he shows that it is unfitting that the faith of God should be made void on account of the unbelief of men. And first indeed he brings forward a reason for this; second, an authority, at the words "as it is written"; third, he excludes a false understanding of the author cited, at the words "but if our injustice." Now the reason is taken from this, that God according to himself is true. Jeremiah 10:10: "But the Lord God is true"; 1 John, at the end: "This is the true God and life eternal." And yet every man is a liar. Psalm 115:10: "I said in my excess, every man is a liar." Whence it is clear that the lie of man, or unbelief not cleaving to the truth, does not make void the truth or faith of God. For the clarification of these things it must be known that truth imports the equation of a thing to the intellect. Now a thing is equated to our intellect in one way, and to the divine intellect in another. For our intellect receives its knowledge from things, and therefore the cause and measure of its truth is the being of the thing: for from the fact that a thing is, or is not, a statement is said to be true or false, according to the Philosopher. Hence our intellect can be true or false, insofar as it can be equated or not equated. But that which can be and not be needs another agent in order that it may be, without which it remains non-being. For just as air, without something illuminating it, remains dark, so too our intellect, unless it is illumined by the first truth, remains of itself in falsehood. Hence, as far as it is of itself, every man is a liar as to intellect, but he is true only insofar as he participates in divine truth. Psalm 42:3: "Send forth your light and your truth." But the divine intellect is the cause and measure of things, and for this reason, according to itself, it is unfailingly true, and each and every thing is true insofar as it is conformed to it. Similarly, according as truth is taken on the part of the thing, man of himself does not have truth, because his nature is convertible into nothing; but only the divine nature, which is neither from nothing nor convertible into nothing, has truth of itself. Then, when he says "as it is written," he proves the same point by the authority of Psalm 50:6, where it is read thus: "that you may be justified in your words, and may overcome when you are judged." How this bears upon the point at hand can be seen, if the preceding words of the Psalm are considered. For it is stated beforehand, "against you only have I sinned," and then follows, "that you may be justified in your words, and may overcome when you are judged." For God had promised David, through the prophet Nathan, that he would establish his kingdom forever in his seed, as is found in 2 Kings 7:12. But afterward, when he fell into a grave sin, namely of adultery and murder, as is read in 2 Kings 11:2 and following, on account of this sin it was said by some that God would not keep his promise to him. The intention of the Psalmist, then, is to say two things. First indeed, that on account of his sin the justice of God is not changed, to which it pertains that he should fulfill his words. And as to this he says, "that you may be justified in your words," that is, that from this you may appear just in your words, because on account of my sins you do not pass them by. Proverbs 8:8: "All my words are right." Psalm 144:13: "The Lord is faithful in all his words." Second, that the divine promise should surpass human judgment. And this is what he says, "may overcome," namely by keeping your promise, "when you are judged," namely by men: that is, that on account of my sins you would not fulfill it. Below, 12:21: "Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good." This is said to man, which pertains much more to God. Now it must be considered that the promise made to David by God was to be fulfilled concerning the incarnation of Christ. Hence it pertained to the prophecy of predestination, according to which something is promised as to be fulfilled in every way; but what is promised or foretold according to the prophecy of threat is not foretold as to be fulfilled in every way, but according as human merits, which can change, require. And therefore, if what was promised to David had not come to pass, it would have prejudiced the divine justice. But if what is promised through the prophecy of threat does not come to pass, it does not prejudice the divine justice, but signifies a change of human merits. Hence he says, Jeremiah 18:7: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root up, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that nation shall repent," etc., "I also will repent of the evil," and so on. Thus, then, it is clear according to this sense, that the sin of man does not exclude the divine fidelity. There are also given other senses of this authority in the Gloss, which do not pertain so much to the intention of the Apostle, the first of which is, that these words, which are set down here, are to be joined with what the Psalmist had said before: "Wash me yet more from my iniquity," to this end, namely, "that you may be justified," that is, that you may appear just, "in your words," in which you promised pardon to sinners — not only in Ezekiel, since these words of the Psalm were said earlier, but also Leviticus 24:41: "they shall pray for their iniquities, and I will remember my covenant," and so on. Deuteronomy 30:1: "if, led by repentance of heart, you shall return to God, the Lord your God will bring you back, and will have mercy on you." And thus "may you overcome when you are judged" by men — namely their judgment that you ought not to grant me pardon. Second, these words are joined with what was said, "against you only have I sinned," that is, by comparison to you who alone are just. And this is what he says, "that you may be justified," that is, that by comparison with me and the sins of others you may appear just, Psalm 10:8: "The Lord is just, and has loved justice," and this not only in deeds, but also in words, which is the greatest thing, according to James 3:2: "if any man does not offend in word"; and "may overcome when you are judged," that is, whenever you are compared to any other whatsoever in judgment. Isaiah 5:3: "judge between me and my vineyard," and so on. Third, these words are referred to Christ, who alone is without sin, according to 1 Peter 2:22: "who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth," and thus he is justified in his words in comparison to all men. And "may you overcome," namely, sin, death, and the Devil. Revelation 5:5: "behold, the lion has overcome." And this while "you are judged," namely unjustly by Pilate. Job 36:17: "your cause has been judged as that of the wicked." Then, when he says "but if our injustice," he excludes a false understanding of the authority he had cited. For someone could understand the aforesaid words according to this sense, that this word "that" be taken causally and not merely consecutively. And thus it would follow that the sin of man is directly ordered to commending the justice of God. But the Apostle shows this to be false, so as to give one to understand that the word "that" is put consecutively, namely, that, David having sinned, it followed that the divine justice was made manifest; but not causally, as though the sin of man commended the justice of God. This indeed he proves by leading it to an absurdity. And this in two ways. First indeed on the part of the divine judgment, second on the part of human judgment. Concerning the first he does three things. First he sets forth the false sense; second he shows the absurdity which follows from this, at the words, "what shall we say? Is God unjust"; third he shows this to be unfitting, at the word "God forbid." It must be considered that above the Apostle had made two comparisons: one indeed of the divine truth to human falsehood, when he had said: "but God is true, and every man a liar." The other of the justice of God to human sin, according to the words of Psalm 50:6, in which he says: "against you only have I sinned, that you may be justified." And as to the first comparison, he says: if these words are to be understood as meaning that our injustice directly commends the justice of God, what shall we say? That is, we shall not be able to bear the absurdities that follow. For sin is not necessary to God for the commending of his justice. Ecclesiasticus 15:22: "he does not desire a multitude of unfaithful and unprofitable children." Now he expresses the absurdity which follows, saying: is God, who inflicts wrath, that is, vengeance for sin, unjust? For this follows from what has been said. For if sin were directly ordered to the commending of justice, it would be worthy not of punishment but of reward. And thus God, in punishing men for sin, would be unjust — against that saying of Deuteronomy 32:4: "God is faithful and without any iniquity." He then consequently excludes this absurdity, when he adds, "God forbid," namely, that God should be unjust. "I speak according to man," that is, that I have put forth these words not from my own understanding, but from the understanding of an erring man, as it is said in 1 Corinthians 3:3: "whereas there is among you envying and contention, are you not carnal?" Now he shows that this ought not to be said, adding, "otherwise," namely, if God is unjust, how will he judge this world? That is, how would it be fitting that he should be the universal and supreme judge of the world? For it is necessary that what is first and supreme in any genus be infallible: just as the first mover is immutable. Hence in Psalm 95:13 it is said: "he will judge the world in equity." And a similar argument is set forth in Job 34:12 and following, where it is said: "in very deed God will not condemn without cause, neither will the Almighty pervert judgment. Whom has he set over the earth besides himself?" etc., namely because if he himself did not judge justly, one would have to say that another was judge of the world. Then, when he says "for if the truth," he shows the same point through human judgment. And concerning this also he does three things. First he sets forth the false understanding of the aforesaid words; second he sets down the absurdity which follows, at the words "why yet"; third he shows that to be unfitting, at the words "whose damnation." Now he expresses the false sense according to that comparison which is of divine truth to human falsehood, when he says: "for if through my lie," that is, on account of my lie, "the truth of God," namely made manifest, "has abounded unto his glory," in such a way that the lie of man pertains directly to the increase of his glory — against what is said in Job 13:7: "does God need your lie?" He then subjoins consequently two absurdities which follow. Of these, one is that man ought not to be reckoned a sinner on account of a lie, since it is directly ordered to the glory of God. And this is what he says: "why yet," that is, why even now, "am I also judged," namely by men, "as a sinner," for a lie. Wisdom 17:10: "for wickedness, being fearful, has given testimony to its condemnation," since, namely, sinners are condemned by everyone's judgment. The other absurdity is that the false statement would have a place, which was imputed to the apostles. For because they preached that through the abundance of the grace of Christ the abundance of sins was dissolved, according to what is said below, 5:20: "where sin abounded, grace has abounded still more," they blasphemed the apostles, as if to say that men ought to do evil that good might come, which would follow if the lie of man directly commended the truth and grace of God. This is what he says: "let us not do evil," namely by sinning, and by teaching falsehood, "that good may come," namely that the truth and justice of God may be commended, "as we are slandered," that is, as some, by slandering, impute to us. Below, 1 Corinthians 4:5: "we are blasphemed, and we entreat"; and as some say we say, distorting our words. 2 Peter, at the end: "which the unlearned and unstable distort." But these things he excludes by adding, "whose damnation is just," that is, of those who do evil that good may come. For just as one ought not to syllogize truly from false premises, so one ought not to arrive at a good end through evil means. Jeremiah 12:1: "it is well with all that transgress, and do wickedly," which is said from the persons of the wicked. Or, "whose," namely of those who falsely impute these things to us, "damnation is just." For the perverters of sacred doctrine are justly condemned. Revelation, at the end: "if any man shall add to these, God shall add unto him the plagues written in this book."”

“And not rather, as we be slanderously reported,.... These are the apostle's own words, in answer to the objector he represented; and it is as if he should say, why do not you go on? why do you stop here? "and not rather" say, as we are evil spoken of, and our doctrine is blasphemed: and as some affirm; ignorantly and audaciously enough: that we say; and teach: let us do evil that good may come; a slander cast upon the apostle's doctrine of unconditional election, free justification, and of God's overruling the sins of men for good; and is the same which is cast on ours now, and is no small proof of the likeness and sameness of doctrines: whose damnation is just; whose judgment would have been right, and their censure of our doctrines just, had it been true that we held such a principle, taught such a doctrine, or encouraged such a practice: or their condemnation is just, for aspersing our principles and practices in so vile a manner; and all such persons are deserving of damnation, who teach such things, or practise after this sort.”